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This thesis examines the interplay between corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), financial reporting and corporate labor investment. In the first study, I examine 
the relationship between CSR and earnings quality in the context of changing 
regulatory regimes. For accrual-based earnings management, I find firms with higher 
CSR engagement are more likely to conduct aggressive accrual-based earnings 
management prior to the passage of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) whereas this 
aggressiveness of accrual-based earnings management has been significantly 
lowered by the passage of SOX. I further find the relationship between CSR and 
accrual-based earnings management is moderated by the manager-shareholder 
incentive alignment. Firms practicing CSR with low alignment are more likely to 
engage in accrual-based earnings management and therefore receive more 
constraining effect by regulatory scrutiny imposed by the passage of SOX. In terms 
of real earnings management, I consistently find that firms with higher CSR 
engagement are less likely to engage in costly real earnings management strategy in 
both pre- and post-SOX period. The results indicate that when facing the trade-off 
between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management, firms 
with higher CSR engagement are more likely to engage in the earnings management 
that is less costly. Overall, the results suggest socially responsible firms present more 
transparent financial reporting practices in the post-SOX period. 
In the second study, I investigate the impact of employee treatment on labor 
investment efficiency and its implications for firm performance. Using a large sample 
of U.S. firms over the period of 1995 to 2015, I provide evidence that employee-
 
 
friendly treatment is significantly associated with lower deviations of labor investment 
from the level justified by economic fundamentals, i.e., higher labor investment 
efficiency. I find employee-friendly treatment reduces both overinvestment and 
underinvestment, primarily via effective hiring. Moreover, labor investment efficiency 
is associated with improved labor productivity, return on assets and production 
efficiency, and employee-friendly policies contribute to both return on assets and 
production efficiency. Using the 2008-2009 financial crisis as an external shock and 
applying difference-in-difference method, I also show that employee-friendly firms 
have higher labor investment efficiency in the post-financial crisis period, but 
experience more inefficient labor investment during the crisis. The results are robust 
to placebo tests, alternative proxies for both employee treatment and labor investment 
efficiency, when I control for additional control variables, and when I address 
endogeneity issues.  
The third study investigates the impact of real earnings management and real 
earnings smoothing on corporate employment decisions. Using a large sample of U.S. 
firms from 1995 to 2016, I find that real earnings management is significantly 
associated with lower labor investment efficiency (i.e., higher deviations of labor 
investment from the level justified by economic fundamentals) whereas real earnings 
smoothing significantly improves labor investment efficiency. The findings are 
consistent with the notion that real earnings smoothing alleviates market frictions 
stemming from information asymmetry between managers and outside capital 
suppliers while real earnings management has the opposite effect. Consistently, I also 
find that the positive impact of real earnings smoothing on labor investment efficiency 
is mainly driven by the informational component rather than the garbling component 
of real earnings smoothing. In addition, I find that financially constrained firms with 
equity-based financing incentives are more likely to engage real earnings smoothing 
 
 
to lower the information asymmetry to obtain financing benefits whereas debt-focused 
constrained firms potentially adopt real earnings smoothing as an earnings 
manipulation tool. Overall, the sign reversal between real earnings management and 
real earnings smoothing for labor investment efficiency indicates distinctive 
implications of these two real earnings adjustments to capital market participants.  
These studies shed light on the understanding regarding the implications of 
stakeholder relationship for financial reporting practices and how stakeholder 
relationship, as well as financial reporting practices, can interact in the decision-
making of corporate labor investment. The findings as to the relationship between 
CSR and financial reporting quality, the influence of employee-friendly policies and 
real earnings adjustments on labor investment efficiency contribute to the literature 
over the role of CSR and accounting information in capital market and also speak to 
the relevant literature on stakeholder relation, accounting quality, corporate 
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This thesis investigates the interplay between corporate social responsibility 
(hereafter CSR), financial reporting and corporate labor investment. In recent years, 
CSR has become an important integral part of business practice. In fact, many 
companies nowadays dedicate a certain part of their financial reports to their CSR 
performance. For example, a recent survey by KPMG (2017) suggests that 93% of 
the world's largest 250 companies report CSR performance either in standalone CSR 
reports or as part of their annual reports. Moreover, another report by the Forum for 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment (USSIF) (2018) shows that the U.S. 
sustainable, responsible and impact investment (SRI) has increased more than 18-
fold from 1995 to 2018 with a compound annual growth rate of 13.6 percent over the 
period, demonstrating the importance that market participants attach to CSR activities. 
CSR is usually defined as the corporate behavior that goes beyond the legal or 
regulatory requirements faced by the company (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). 
Several prior studies suggest that CSR should be a multi-dimensional concept and 
include several key factors (i.e., environment, social, employee relations, etc) (Griffin 
and Mahon, 1997; Ullmann, 1985; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Atkins (2006) 
suggests that investing public also consider a firm as socially responsible when the 
firm is transparent in its financial reporting. On the one hand, a firm practicing CSR is 
expected to be socially responsible by providing investors with more transparent and 
reliable financial information. On the other hand, CSR engagement can also be 
associated with the pursuit of a manger’s self-interest and opportunistic incentives 
(Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McWilliams et al., 
2006). Hence, if managers opportunistically engage in CSR activities, CSR can be a 
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manifestation of the agency problem and firms practicing CSR are likely to provide 
financial information that is less reliable or misleading. Therefore, more granular 
research is needed to understand how socially responsible (or not) firms make 
investment decisions and their financial reporting practices.  
My first Ph.D. study aims to address the ongoing debate about the association 
between CSR and earnings quality. Specifically, I investigate the relationship between 
CSR and earnings quality in the context of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter 
SOX). In addition to the ongoing debate on the relationship between CSR and 
earnings quality, my research question is important for several reasons. 
First, capital market participants consider accounting information and its value 
relevance as one of the most important factors in their decision-making. Accounting 
information provides capital market participants with the means to assess a firm’s 
fundamental financial position to assess potential investment opportunities. The 
underlying accounting information also contains a monitoring function that enables 
capital providers to monitor their invested capital allocation (Beyer et al., 2010). 
Among various types of accounting information, earnings quality has been seen as 
one of the key indicators of a firm’s performance. According to the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (SFAC No.1), higher quality earnings provide 
more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant 
to a specific decision made by specific decision-makers. Given the importance of 
accounting information, investigating the financial reporting quality of firms practicing 
CSR also provide another dimension to assess whether firms practicing CSR are truly 
socially responsible from the financial reporting behavior perspective.  
Second, SOX introduced a host of reforms with the objective of improving 
corporate transparency and investor confidence. Investigating the implications of SOX 
is also important. Given prior studies have found that firms practicing CSR behave 
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differently from their peers in earnings management and financial reporting, the aim 
of my first study is to investigate the association between CSR and earnings quality 
in the context of SOX passage. The results of the study show that firms with higher 
CSR engagement are more likely to conduct aggressive accrual-based earnings 
management prior to the passage of SOX whereas the aggressiveness of accrual-
based earnings management has been significantly lowered by the regulatory scrutiny 
after the passage of SOX. While prior studies identify a general increase in real 
earnings management in the post-SOX period (Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo and Zhou, 
2006), I find that firms practicing CSR are less likely to engage in real earnings 
management before SOX and there is no significant evidence showing that firms 
practicing CSR switch from accrual-based to real earnings management after the 
passage of SOX. Given prior studies suggest that real earnings management 
generally has more severe consequences than accrual-based earnings management 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), the 
results suggest that when facing the trade-off between accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management, firms with higher CSR engagement are 
more likely to engage in the earnings management that is less costly. From the 
regulatory perspective, the results also suggest that SOX as an accounting-related 
reform is effective in curbing firms’ opportunistic financial reporting behavior. Hence, 
from a broad sense, the results speak to the literature on CSR, accounting quality, 
and relevant legislation for corporate governance. 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies suggest that CSR should be a multi-
dimensional concept and includes several key factors. Prior studies on CSR usually 
include (not limited to) community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human 
rights as the constituent parts of a firm’s overall CSR performance (e.g., Borisov et 
al., 2015; Deng et al., 2013; Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Krüger, 2015; Lins et al., 
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2017; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). One of the important dimensions of CSR is 
employee welfare and it has been found that a large number of CSR programs are 
employee-related (Flammer and Luo, 2017). Employees are the most important value 
relevant stakeholders and a key source of competitive advantages (e.g., Coff, 1997; 
Faleye and Trahan, 2011). Aoki (1984) suggests that shareholders and employees 
are the two main stakeholders and how to align the interests between shareholder 
and employees is an important question. Some firms in the high-tech industry (e.g. 
Google, Apple, Microsoft) are well known for providing their employees with welfare 
in addition to traditional pecuniary incentives. Flammer and Luo (2017) argue that the 
role of relationship-based incentives such as CSR for the interest-alignment between 
shareholders and employees has been largely ignored by prior studies and there is a 
clear and significant void in the extant literature.  
In today's knowledge economy, media and government agencies have been 
paying closer attention to the employee welfare and many firms also proactively deal 
with the challenges of recruiting and retaining talents by improving employee welfare 
and treatment. One natural question regarding this increase in employee treatment 
will be whether these firms follow value-maximizing objectives when they offer 
generous employee treatment and welfare. While some prior studies find that these 
employee-friendly practices have a favorable impact on firms' operational, financial, 
and stock price performances (Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2016; Ertugrul, 2013; 
Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018), some studies also find employee-
friendly treatment can be a manifestation of agency problems and therefore hampers 
firms’ performance (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Ben-Nasr and Ghouma, 2018; 
Cronqvist et al., 2009; Landier et al., 2007; Pagano and Volpin, 2005).  
In the second study of my thesis, I investigate the implications of employee-
friendly treatment and policies for firms’ labor investment, which also further speaks 
5 
 
to the importance of human resource investment for firms’ overall performance. In 
particular, I investigate the impact of employee treatment on labor investment 
efficiency and its implications for firm performance. Examples of employee-related 
CSR programs can include but not limited to investments in work-life balance (e.g., 
childcare, flexitime), training and development, and employee involvement and so on. 
In my study, I follow previous studies on employee treatment and welfare to construct 
the employee-friendly treatment measure (Bae et al., 2011; Cronqvist et al., 2009; 
Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015; Verwijmeren and 
Derwall, 2010). The primary employee-friendly treatment measure includes several 
labor-related dimensions, including union relations, cash profit sharing, employee 
involvement, and retirement benefits. In order to ensure the validity of the measure, I 
also adopt two alternative employee treatment measures, Fortune magazine’s list of 
the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For In America’ (Edmans, 2012) and the employee-
relevant components available from the ASSET4 database, including health & safety, 
employment quality, training and development, and diversity and opportunities. The 
results of my study show that employee-friendly treatment is significantly associated 
with higher labor investment efficiency (i.e., lower deviations of labor investment from 
the level justified by economic fundamentals). I also find that higher labor investment 
efficiency is associated with improved labor productivity, return on assets and 
production efficiency, and employee-friendly policies contribute to both return on 
assets and production efficiency. Moreover, I also use the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
as an external shock and applying difference-in-difference method, and the results 
show that employee-friendly firms have higher labor investment efficiency in the post-




Following the second study of my thesis, my third study examines the impact 
of real earnings adjustment, namely real earnings management and real earnings 
smoothing, on labor investment decisions. Prior accounting research shows that 
accounting quality improves capital investment efficiency by mitigating the market 
frictions stemming from information asymmetry between managers and outside 
capital suppliers (Baker et al., 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Blanchard et 
al., 1994; Jensen, 1986; Lambert et al., 2007; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Richardson, 
2006; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)1. However, prior studies overwhelmingly focus on 
capital investment rather than labor. This is because the classic view considers labor 
as a variable factor of production that is free of adjustment costs as the timing of labor 
costs is perfectly matched with the cash flow they generate and the adjustment costs 
associated with labor tend to be relatively low compared to capital expenditure (Dixit 
et al., 1994). However, previous studies in labor economics have already shown that 
labor has fixed, or quasi-fixed cost components, such as search and matching, 
training and development, hiring and firing (Anderson et al., 2003; Danthine and 
Donaldson, 2002; Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Oi, 1962; Yashiv, 
2007) and these labor costs can be substantial (Bhattacharjee et al., 2015; Farmer et 
al., 1985; Hamermesh, 1995; Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Therefore, firms need 
external capital to finance their labor payments and the frictions in the capital market 
can be influential for firms’ ability to recruit, train, and retain an effective workforce 
(Benmelech et al., 2011; Campello et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2014; Matsa, 2018). As a 
result, financial reporting is expected to play a role in facilitating firms to efficiently 
                                                          
1 In the frictionless capital market of Modigliani and Miller (1958) firms invest until the marginal 
benefit of capital investment equals the marginal cost, investing in all projects with positive net 
present value and none with negative net present value. In practice, due to the capital market 
imperfections stemming from information asymmetry and firms may depart from this optimal 
level and may either over- or under-invest (Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2003).  
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invest in labor by mitigating market frictions stemming from information asymmetry 
between managers and outside capital suppliers. 
Recent research highlights that firms use real activities earnings management 
as an alternative tool for accrual-based earnings management to manipulate earnings 
(Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). Even though severe real earnings management is likely to have long-
term adverse economic consequences than accruals management (Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010), the real earnings management becomes prevalent as 
it is less likely to attract auditor scrutiny and managers’ ability to engage in accrual-
based earnings management is curbed after SOX (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984). 
However, extant accounting literature relatively overlooks another type of real 
earnings adjustment, real earnings smoothing. To lower the fluctuations of earnings 
realizations, managers can use their discretion and engage in two potential earnings 
smoothing, accrual-based earnings smoothing, and real earnings smoothing. 
Khurana et al (2017) argue that previous accounting literature predominantly focuses 
on accrual-based earnings smoothing and largely neglects real earnings smoothing. 
In fact, it is prevalent that managers engage in real economic actions to reduce 
earnings volatility by changing the timing or structuring of an operating, investment or 
financing transaction (Khurana et al., 2017). The survey of Graham et al (2005) finds 
that 96.9% of the respondents show their preference for achieving a smoother 
earnings path and 78% of the respondents admit to taking value-destroying real 
economic activities to achieve smoother earnings. Does real earnings smoothing 
have the same implications as real earnings management? Is real earnings 
smoothing harmful? To date, the evidence on this issue is limited. Prior studies show 
mixed evidence regarding the role of earnings smoothing. Some studies suggest that 
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earnings smoothing plays relatively positive information role in conveying information 
with capital market participants (Demski, 2010; Erickson et al., 2016; Gassen and 
Fülbier, 2015; Goel and Thakor, 2003; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; Tucker 
and Zarowin, 2006) whereas some studies find that earnings smoothing reduces 
earnings informativeness and managers have motivations to smooth earnings for 
private gains (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Healy, 1985; 
Jayaraman, 2008; Khurana et al., 2017). One recent and notable study that 
specifically investigates real earnings smoothing is the study of Khurana et al (2017). 
The study investigates the influence of real earnings smoothing on stock price crash 
risk and find that firms with higher levels of real earnings smoothing experience a 
higher stock price crash risk. 
Given the void in the literature, the third study of my thesis examines the 
influence of real earnings management and real earnings smoothing on labor 
investment decisions. The results show that real earnings management is significantly 
associated with lower labor investment efficiency (i.e., higher deviations of labor 
investment from the level justified by economic fundamentals) whereas real earnings 
smoothing significantly improves labor investment efficiency. The findings are 
consistent with the notion that real earnings smoothing alleviates market frictions that 
stem from information asymmetry between managers and outside capital suppliers 
while real earnings management reduces the earnings informativeness. Moreover, I 
also find that the positive impact of real earnings smoothing on labor investment 
efficiency is mainly driven by the informational component rather than the garbling 
component of real earnings smoothing. In addition, I find that financially constrained 
firms with equity-based financing incentives are more likely to engage real earnings 
smoothing to lower the information asymmetry to obtain financing benefits whereas 
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debt-focused constrained firms potentially adopt real earnings smoothing as an 
earnings manipulation tool.  
Overall, this thesis contributes to the literature on CSR, financial reporting and 
corporate labor investment along several dimensions. First, this thesis connects the 
literature on CSR with that on financial reporting (Choi and Pae, 2011; Hong and 
Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Prior et al., 2008). The thesis is related to the 
literature on the influence of CSR on earnings quality and highlights the impact of 
regulatory scrutiny on the association between the two. Second, to the best of my 
knowledge, the second study of my thesis is the first attempt to explore the influence 
of labor treatment policies on corporate labor investment and efficiency. Many studies 
show that employee-friendly treatment policies have favorable impact on firms’ 
operation and performance (Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2016; Ertugrul, 2013; 
Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018). My study connects this stream of 
literature but distinct from prior studies because my study focuses on labor investment 
efficiency. I find that employee-friendly policies significantly influence a firm’s labor 
investment by improving corporate labor investment efficiency, which further exerts a 
positive influence on firm performance. Third, this thesis adds to the literature on 
corporate human capital investment. Prior studies (Matsa, 2018; Rajan and Zingales, 
2000) argue that human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot be owned and can act 
strategically by choosing where to work and whether to quit their employment, forcing 
their employers to be more sensitive to their needs. Therefore, my thesis also adds to 
the burgeoning literature on the factors that align the interests between shareholders 
and employees. Finally, my thesis contributes to the literature investigating the 
determinants of corporate labor investment by investigating employee treatment and 
real earnings adjustments. Earlier studies have identified a number of factors affecting 
labor investment efficiency, such as financial reporting quality, stock price 
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informativeness, institutional investors’ horizons (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly 
et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014). My studies identify the other two important factors that 
potentially affect corporate labor investment efficiency, employee treatment, and real 
earnings adjustments. In addition, this thesis also contributes to the under-explored 
stream of literature on the effects of real earnings smoothing. To the best of my 
knowledge, the only prior literature regarding real earnings smoothing is Khurana et 
al. (2017) which finds that real earnings smoothing helps managers withhold bad 
news which results in an increase of firm-specific stock price crash risk. In contrast to 
their findings, my study sheds lights on the positive side of real earnings smoothing 
and shows that real earnings smoothing improves firms’ labor investment efficiency. 
Taken together, this thesis sheds light on the understanding regarding the 
implications of stakeholder relationship for financial reporting and how stakeholder 
relationship, as well as financial reporting practices, can interact in the corporate 
employment decisions.   
Overall, the empirical chapters of this thesis focus on three different 
components: stakeholder relations, financial reporting and labor investment. The rest 
of the thesis is constructed as follows: In Chapter 2, I review the related literature 
regarding the three main projects of my Ph.D. Chapter 3 is the first project of my Ph.D.: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Quality in the Context of Changing 
Regulatory Regimes. Chapter 4 is the second project of my Ph.D.: Do Employee-
Friendly Firms Invest More Efficiently? Evidence from Employment Decisions. 
Chapter 5 is the third project of my Ph.D.: The Effect of Real Earnings Adjustments 
on Corporate Labor Investment. A summary of the findings and the suggestions for 










In this chapter, I review existing empirical evidence with regards to the 
relationship between stakeholder relationship and financial reporting behavior, and 
the implications of employee treatment and real earnings adjustment. I firstly review 
the prior evidence regarding the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management. Previous studies provide mixed evidence on the relationship between 
CSR and earnings management with one stream of literature suggesting that CSR 
engagement represents sincerely consideration for the interest of various 
stakeholders (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Borghesi et al., 2014; Choi and Pae, 
2011; Eccles et al., 2014; Gao and Zhang, 2015; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Hong and 
Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Lins et al., 2017; Linthicum et al., 2010; Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010) and another stream of literature suggesting CSR 
representing a manifestation of agency problems (Krüger, 2015; McWilliams et al., 
2006; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Petrovits, 2006; Prior et al., 2008; Surroca and Tribó, 
2008). This tension provides me with an interesting ground to test the relationship 
between CSR and earnings management in the context of the changing regulatory 
regime by investigating whether firms practicing more CSR response to Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) differently in their financial reporting practices. 
I then review the implication of employee treatment and welfare, one of the 
most important dimensions of CSR, for firm performance (Edmans, 2011; Edmans et 
al., 2016; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018); innovation 
performance (Chen et al., 2016; Mao and Weathers, 2015); capital structure decisions 
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and financial policies (Bae et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2013; Ghaly et al., 2015; 
Simintzi et al., 2015). Since the second Ph.D. study investigates the impact of 
employee treatment on labor investment efficiency, I also review the relevant prior 
literature supporting employee-friendly treatment could potentially contribute to higher 
labor investment efficiency from the high talents attractiveness, stakeholder theory 
and human capital theory of corporate governance perspectives. In contrast to the 
favourable view regarding employee-friendliness, literature review also suggest that 
employee-friendly treatment can be a manifestation of agency problems and therefore 
hampers firms’ performance (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Ben-Nasr and Ghouma, 
2018; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Landier et al., 2007; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Hence, 
given the mixed evidence on employee treatment and welfare, it is also an interesting 
empirical question regarding whether employee-friendly treatment can increase labor 
investment efficiency or not. My second Ph.D. study particularly seeks to answer this 
research question.  
Finally, I review the relevant literature on real earnings adjustments (i.e., real 
earnings management and real earnings smoothing). On the one hand, previous 
research suggests that firms use real activities earnings management as an 
alternative tool for accrual-based earnings management to manipulate earnings and 
real earnings management become more common after the passage of SOX (Cohen 
et al., 2008; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Moreover, 
Graham et al. (2005) suggest that managers use real activities management as a 
substitute for accruals management and even prefer to manage real activities over 
accruals. On the other hand, previous accounting literature has largely focused on 
accrual-based earnings smoothing with little attention paid to real earnings smoothing, 
even though real earnings smoothing potentially can be more pervasive in practice in 
comparison with accrual-based earnings smoothing (Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 
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1984). Given real earnings management and real earnings smoothing are both real 
earnings adjustments made by managers, the impact of these two types of real 
earnings adjustment is under-explored and the paper fills this void by highlighting the 
distinctive implications of the two types of real earnings adjustment for firms’ 
employment decisions. 
 
1.2 The Relationship between CSR and Earnings Management  
 
A large number of recent studies have established the prominence of CSR. In 
practice, more firms nowadays have incorporated CSR as part of their corporate 
strategies and voluntarily dedicated certain sections of their annual reports or issue 
stand-alone reports to their CSR performance. Previous studies have investigated 
whether CSR engagement represents a firm’s sincere consideration for the interests 
of a wide variety of stakeholders or just a manifestation of the agency problem. From 
earnings quality perspective, CSR can be either a signal of a firm’s sincere care about 
various stakeholders’ interests by reporting more transparent and reliable financial 
information or a manifestation of agency problem that leads to higher levels of 
misreporting behaviors.  
From the opportunistic CSR perspective, CSR engagement can exacerbate 
the agency problem for several reasons. Numerous previous studies have identified 
the opportunistic use of CSR and corporate philanthropy from agency theory and 
optimal contracting theory perspective. For instance, McWilliams et al. (2006) find that 
managers choose to engage in CSR activities in order to pave their personal career 
path and seek self-serving interests. Petrovits (2006) finds that managers strategically 
contribute to philanthropy in order to meet financial reporting targets. In fact, several 
previous studies suggest that the principal-agent conflict can be magnified if 
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managers act on behalf of non-shareholder stakeholders because stakeholder-
orientation usually involves the participation of different groups of stakeholders in the 
decision-making process, thus resulting in a multiplicity of objectives in corporate 
decisions. Departing from the clear and single objective of value maximization, 
managers attempt to take a variety of stakeholders’ interests into consideration 
instead of only being responsible for shareholders. This makes it difficult to evaluate 
managers’ performance in a principled way and enables managers to pursue their 
own self-interest benefits at the expense of the interests of shareholders and other 
financial claimants. Hence, managers’ attempt to serve various stakeholders instead 
of only shareholders can exacerbate agency costs. In this sense, CSR engagement 
can be considered as a manifestation of agency problems and managers may attempt 
to please stakeholders in order to pursue their own benefits through CSR engagement. 
For instance, managers may engage in CSR activities to entrench themselves in order 
to achieve greater career development and job security. Managers who manipulate 
earnings may engage in stakeholder-orientated activities as a self-entrenchment 
strategy and intend to gain support from stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008). Pagano and 
Volpin (2005) argue that managers can adopt an employment policy that offers 
generous long-term contracts with suppliers and long-term commitments to support 
environmental or philanthropic institutions as an antitakeover device to create 
stakeholder constituencies supporting the incumbent management. By forming an 
alliance with certain stakeholders, managers employ stakeholder-oriented initiatives 
as a self-defense mechanism to reduce a firm’s attractiveness by impairing the 
raider’s ability to generate a profit from the hostile takeover. In addition, Krüger (2015) 
finds that managers gain a good reputation among key stakeholders at expense of 
shareholders’ interest, reflecting that agency problem between principals and agents 
is aggravated when managers tend to serve stakeholders rather than shareholders. 
Therefore, managers can use CSR to satisfy stakeholders and self-entrenched 
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managers may seek the connivance from stakeholders to validate their opportunistic 
behavior like earnings manipulation. Prior et al. (2008) find that opportunistic 
managers who manage earnings to pursue self-serving goals have incentives to 
involve in CSR engagements and find a positive association between CSR and 
earnings management. 
On the contrary, some prior studies suggest that socially responsible firms 
provide more transparent financial information. Few potential reasons can explain 
why firms with greater CSR commitment tend to provide higher earnings quality. First, 
firms that choose to voluntarily dedicate certain sections of their annual reports to 
CSR disclosure or issue standalone CSR report may attempt to use CSR disclosure 
to signal their social efforts. From voluntary disclosure theory, firms voluntarily 
disclosure CSR information and issue standalone CSR reports as a signal of their 
commitment to social responsibilities to distinguish themselves from their peers 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). According to Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), 
firms with the superior CSR performance will attempt to obtain a competitive 
advantage by voluntarily disclosing CSR information while firms with inferior CSR 
performance will avoid CSR disclosure that will adversely influence their reputation. 
Thus, CSR engagement can be considered as a proxy for a firm’s reputation or a 
signal of management ethics (Linthicum et al., 2010). From this perspective, firms that 
value their reputation tend to protect their corporate image and reputation by 
preventing managers from opportunistic behaviors that may potentially damage their 
reputation. Consistently, some studies also suggest that CSR can be considered as 
social capital/trust (Eccles et al., 2014; Lins et al., 2017). Lins et al. (2017) find that 
firms with a greater commitment to CSR have higher stock returns than firms with less 
CSR commitment during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. They argue that the trust 
between firms and its stakeholders is built through CSR investment and it pays off 
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during the low-trust period. Hence, firms with high CSR commitment are expected to 
prevent their social capital from being squandered and inhibit the trust from being 
sabotaged by opportunistic actions that are contradictory to their shared values and 
cooperative norms. Second, many prior studies also find that CSR performance is 
positively associated with corporate financial performance, which may also lower the 
propensity of firms for engaging earnings management. Hong and Andersen (2011) 
argue that firms commit to CSR only when they have strong financial positions as 
financial slack that allows them to spend more on CSR. Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) 
also find that high slack corporate resources and positive attainment discrepancy as 
a result of a firm’s actual performance exceeding aspirations can lead to proactive 
CSR activities. Thus, high CSR engagement tends to be positively associated with 
strong financial position and abundant slack resources, therefore providing high-CSR 
firms with less incentives to engage in earnings management. 
Several studies find that there is a negative relationship between CSR and 
earnings management. For instance, Choi and Pae (2011) examine the relationship 
between corporate commitment to business ethics and earnings quality. They find 
firms with higher levels of ethical commitment exhibit lower levels of earnings 
management and higher levels of conservatism in financial reporting and accuracy in 
predicting future cash flows. Consistently, Hong and Andersen (2011) use a sample 
of non-financial U.S. firms from 1995 to 2005 and they find socially responsible firms 
have higher quality accruals and lower levels of real earnings management. Another 
notable study is conducted by Kim et al. (2012). They find that socially responsible 
firm are less likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, to manage 
earnings via real activities manipulation and to be the subject of SEC investigation as 
evidenced by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) against top 
executives. Gao and Zhang (2015) also find the reported earnings of high-CSR firms 
17 
 
are more related to their permanent earnings and are more value relevant. Moreover, 
Ferrell et al. (2016) find well-governed firms with fewer agency problems actually 
engage more in CSR. They argue that CSR may not be a manifestation of agency 
problem as articulated in agency theory but exercises a complementary function to 
agency problems mitigation. Apart from the two opposite views towards CSR, some 
scholars also find mixed results regarding the association between CSR and earnings 
quality. For instance, Yip et al. (2011) find a negative association between CSR and 
earnings management in the oil and gas industry but a positive association in the food 
industry. Therefore, they argue that the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management is context-specific and driven by political costs instead of sincere 
devotion to the society. Chih et al. (2008) also find that firms with better CSR 
performance have lower levels of earnings smoothing and earnings loss avoidance, 
but higher levels of earnings aggressiveness. Finally, Choi et al. (2013) find that CSR 
is negatively related to earnings management but the relationship is weaker for firms 
with high business group affiliation and concentrated ownership.  
 
1.3 Employee Treatment and Welfare and Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
One of the important dimensions of CSR is employee treatment and welfare. 
Recent studies have addressed firms’ employee treatment schemes and their 
relevance to firm performance. Many studies show that employee-friendly treatment 
schemes have favorable impact on firms’ operation and performance (Edmans, 2011; 
Edmans et al., 2016; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018). 
For example, Edmans (2011) finds that employee satisfaction is positively associated 
with long-term shareholder returns. Fauver et al. (2018) use a sample from 43 
countries over the period 2013 to 2014 and find that firms with employee-friendly 
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culture are valued higher and perform better. Mao and Weathers (2015) and Chen et 
al. (2016) also find that firms treating their employees well produce more and better 
patents. The empirical evidence above suggests that employee-friendly treatment 
schemes are in line with the benefits to shareholders. Another stream of literature 
examines the impact of employee treatment on firms’ capital structure decisions and 
financial policies (Bae et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2013; Ghaly et al., 2015; 
Simintzi et al., 2015). For instance, Bae et al. (2011) show that firms treating their 
employees well maintain low debt ratios and suggest that treating employees well is 
an important element of their financing policies. Ghaly et al. (2015) also find that firms 
that are strongly committed to employee well-being tend to hold more cash.  
My second Ph.D. study investigates the influence of employee 
treatment/welfare on labor investment efficiency. Previous literature shows that firms 
in practice face capital market imperfections stemming from information asymmetry 
and may either over- or under-invest (e.g., Stein 2003). Moral hazard and adverse 
selection are the two primary imperfections in the market that make firms depart from 
the optimal investment level. On the one hand, moral hazard may lead to managers 
pursuing self-serving objectives to maximize their own personal welfare and invest in 
projects that are not in line with shareholder maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), which can cause either over- or underinvestment depending on the availability 
of capital (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Blanchard et al., 1994; Jensen, 1986; 
Lambert et al., 2007; Richardson, 2006; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, 
adverse selection costs could induce investment inefficiency if managers are better 
informed than outside capital suppliers and try to time capital issuances to sell 
overprice equities. Investors may respond to this information disadvantage by 
increasing the cost of capital, which consequently lowers the firm’s flexibility in 
obtaining external financing (Baker et al., 2003; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
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Several prior studies suggest that the capital market imperfection for capital 
investment also applies to labor investment. For instance, Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 
(2016) document that stock price informativeness positively affects labor investment 
efficiency as managers could use the information incorporated in stock prices in 
making human capital investment. Their results suggest that better-informed stock 
prices could lead to better monitoring of managers which in turn reduces managerial 
moral hazard behavior in inefficient labor investment. Consistent with the role of 
monitoring, Ghaly et al. (2017) find that monitoring by long-term investors could 
reduce agency conflicts in firms’ labor investment decisions, leading to higher labor 
investment efficiency. Jung et al. (2016) document that laborism which captures the 
presence of left-leaning government, the rigidity of employee protection laws, and 
collectivist culture, is negatively related to labor investment efficiency. They posit that 
a strong laborism will pressure firms to retain existing employees and to continue to 
hire labor even if unnecessary, resulting in deviations of firms’ labor investment from 
the optimal level. Finally, Jung et al. (2014) emphasize the role of accrual-based 
financial reporting quality in improving labor investment efficiency and find that higher 
financial reporting quality is associated with higher labor investment efficiency.  
Based on prior literature, in my second Ph.D. study, I argue that employee-
friendly treatment could potentially contribute to higher labor investment efficiency in 
three ways. First, one potential channel through which employee-friendly treatment 
can affect labor investment efficiency is where a firm’s reputation for employee 
friendliness is known by both current and potential employees in the labor market. 
Employees of firms that devote material corporate resources to employee-friendly 
treatment perceive their current jobs as superior to alternatives and are likely to be 
collaborative (Flammer and Luo, 2017). The gift exchange model of efficiency wage 
theory (Akerlof, 1982) also suggests that employees consider employee-friendly 
benefits as a gift and reciprocate by exerting greater efforts in their work. Thus, for 
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employees, employee-friendly treatment encourages nurturing and constraining 
mechanisms that facilitate alignment of interests between employees and their firms, 
and the benefits of the current position lead to lower employee turnover (Salop, 1979; 
Zingales, 2000). As a result, firms can better anticipate their employment needs, 
which may lower the risk of over-investing or under-investing in labor. Equally, 
employee-friendly treatment helps firms to attract applicants from the labor market 
(Chow, 1983; Stigler, 1962; Turban and Greening, 1997; Weiss, 1980). Prior research 
suggests that application decisions are related to corporate reputation, and that job 
seekers’ perception of employers is related to the information available about the firm 
(Gatewood et al., 1993). Hence, the impact of employee-friendly treatment on 
reputation can be influential for both firms’ retention and recruitment. Edmans et al. 
(2016) also suggest that the retention and recruitment benefits of satisfied employees 
are particularly important in flexible labor markets such as the U.S. Firms with a good 
reputation for employee treatment will find it relatively easy to attract employees and 
are less likely to suffer labor under-investment.  
Second, stakeholder theory suggests that financial stakeholders are more 
likely to increase costly explicit claims if they doubt a firm’s ability to honor its implicit 
claims to non-financial stakeholders (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). A firm’s failure to achieve good 
employee relations can lead to low employee morale and high employee turnover, 
which can ultimately erode the firm's reputation in the labor market. This may cause 
parties to implicit contracts to doubt a firm’s ability to honor its implicit claims and 
ultimately transform those agreements into costly explicit contracts (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987). For example, external capital suppliers may increase the cost of 
capital in order to compensate for the potential risk to future cash flows and value 
being adversely affected by unsatisfied non-financial stakeholders (e.g., strike, 
boycott). Several recent studies also highlight the influence of external financing costs 
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in constraining firms’ employment decisions (Benmelech et al., 2011; Campello et al., 
2010; Matsa, 2018). In contrast, prior studies find that firms having harmonious 
relations with their stakeholders enjoy better access to finance and lower financing 
costs (Cheng et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). As a result, 
profitable investments are less likely to be missed and firms face lower risks of labor 
under-investment owing to financial pressure. 
Third, Rajan and Zingales (2000, 1998) and Zingales (2000) formalize the 
human capital theory of corporate governance suggesting that the focus of corporate 
governance for the modern firms will shift from addressing agency problems between 
managers and shareholders to exploring the treatment of general labor force. In this 
model employee treatment is a crucial component of the governance structure (Guo 
et al., 2016). Consistent with the human capital theory of corporate governance, 
several studies highlight the positive effect of employee-friendly treatment on 
corporate governance (Ferrell et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016). For instance, Guo et al., 
(2016) find that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of internal 
control weaknesses and firms with employee-friendly treatment have a significantly 
lower propensity for employee-related material weaknesses and financial 
restatements. Moreover, Ferrell et al., (2016) also find that firms with fewer agency 
problems tend to engage more in CSR activities and suggest that such activities 
reduce the adverse impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value. 
In contrast to the positive view regarding employee-friendliness, some studies 
also find that employee-friendly treatment can be a manifestation of agency problems 
and therefore hampers firms’ performance (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Ben-Nasr and 
Ghouma, 2018; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Landier et al., 2007; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
A firm’s investment in employee benefits can exacerbate its agency problems as 
managers may seek a good relationship with subordinates by overpaying them 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For instance, earlier research finds that employee-
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friendly treatment can aggravate agency costs by serving as an antitakeover device 
and a tool to help underperforming managers avoid dismissal (Atanassov and Kim, 
2009; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Similarly, Cronqvist et al. (2009) show that 
entrenched CEOs are more likely to adopt employee-friendly practices and Landier et 
al. (2007) shows that managers adopt employee-friendly treatment to improve their 
social interactions with the labor force to gain private benefits. In these cases, 
employee-friendly treatment can exacerbate agency problems and is expected to 
have a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Entrenched CEOs are likely 
to adopt employee-friendly practices and engage in empire building by over-investing 
in labor force. Also, underperforming CEOs may use employee-friendly treatment as 
a tool to avoid dismissal or prefer to enjoy a peaceful life by giving up profitable labor 
investment projects and under-invest in labor. 
 
1.4 Role of Real Earnings Adjustments 
 
Real earnings management is defined as “management actions that deviate 
from normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting 
certain earnings thresholds” (Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 337). Even though severe 
management of real activities is likely to have potential long-term economic 
consequences than accruals management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010), 
previous research indicates that firms use real activities earnings management as an 
alternative tool for accrual-based earnings management to manipulate earnings 
(Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). A survey 
reported by Graham et al. (2005) suggests that managers use real activities 
management as a substitute for accruals management and even prefer to manage 
real activities over accruals.  
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The popularity of real earnings management might be due to two reasons. First, 
managing accruals might be risky for the firms as the year-end shortfall between 
actual earnings and targets might exceed the extent of accruals manipulation. In such 
cases, real activities based earnings management that occurs during the year 
provides a more timely and flexible alternative. Second, comparing to accrual 
manipulation, real activities management in pricing and production is less likely to 
attract auditor or regulatory scrutiny. Dechow et al. (1996) show SEC enforcement 
actions with regards to earnings overstatements but not relate to decisions on pricing, 
production, and discretionary expenses. Moreover, Cohen et al. (2008) document that 
firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management after the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 with stricter scrutiny in curbing accrual-based 
earnings management.  
Linking to the research question, prior literature suggests corporate disclosures 
and the quality of financial reporting can facilitate firms to lower the information 
asymmetries between managers and outside capital suppliers and therefore market 
frictions (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Lambert et al., 2007; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Verrecchia, 2001). On the one hand, lower quality of financial reporting can induce 
increase the moral hazard costs and investment inefficiency through the monitoring 
functions of corporate disclosures and financial reporting for managerial investment 
activities (Biddle et al., 2009). For instance, Bushman and Smith (2001) highlight the 
governance role of financial accounting information and show that high financial 
reporting quality can help promote the effective governance and monitoring of firms. 
As real earnings management captures the abnormal components of operational 
costs due to managerial discretionary behavior, it represents a distortion to the 
accounting measurement system and therefore indicates lower quality of financial 
reporting (Dechow et al., 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). Kothari et al. (2015) also find 
that firms engage in real earnings management to induce overvaluation at the time of 
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a seasoned equity offering (SEO) and such manipulation also likely to cause post-
SEO stock market underperformance. Consistently, Francis et al. (2016) find that 
firms’ real earnings management levels are positively associated with future stock 
price crash risk. 
On the other hand, costs associated with adverse selection could also induce 
investment inefficiency through higher cost of capital and the decrease in firms’ 
flexibility in obtaining external financing (Biddle et al., 2009). From equity providers’ 
perspective, Kim and Sohn (2013) document a positive relationship between the 
extent of real earnings management activities and a firm’s cost of equity capital, 
indicating that capital market demands a higher risk premium for these activities as 
they exacerbate the information quality of earnings. From debt holders’ perspective, 
Ge and Kim (2014) find a positive association between real earnings management 
and the cost of new bond issues, suggesting that credit rating agencies and 
bondholders also require high-risk premiums for the increased credit risk due to real 
earnings management. However, real earnings management also might be used by 
firms in a way to reduce adverse selections costs. For example, Alissa (2013) finds 
that firms successfully achieve better credit ratings by managing their earnings via 
real activities. Kim et al. (2010) find that firms use real earnings management to avoid 
violations of debt covenants which consequently reduces the cost of debt. 
Another property of real earnings adjustments can be real earnings smoothing. 
Earnings smoothing can be defined as managerial discretionary behavior in the 
purpose of decreasing the reported earnings fluctuations (Gao and Zhang, 2015). 
Previous accounting literature has largely focused on accrual-based earnings 
smoothing with little attention paid to real earnings smoothing, even though real 
earnings smoothing potentially can be more pervasive in practice in comparison with 
accrual-based earnings smoothing (Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984). 
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Different from real earnings management, prior literature posits a relative 
positive information role of earnings smoothing (Demski, 2010; Erickson et al., 2016; 
Gassen and Fülbier, 2015; Goel and Thakor, 2003; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 
2002; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). In particular, investors perceive firms with smoother 
earnings to be less risky and therefore require a lower expected return or cost of 
equity capital (Erickson et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2005). Also, creditors prefer firms 
with smoother earnings and require a lower cost of debt (Gassen and Fülbier, 2015). 
The ease of external financing helps firms in coping labor adjustment costs and 
therefore increases labor investment efficiency. Moreover, prior literature also finds 
that managers engage in earnings smoothing to provide private information about 
future earnings to the market. For example, Goel and Thakor (2003) state that 
earnings smoothing could reduce information asymmetries between managers and 
external funding providers. Also, Dichev and Tang (2009) show that smoother 






Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Quality in the Context of 




The concept of corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) has continued 
a trajectory of evolutionary growth in the past decades. Previous CSR research has 
paid much attention to the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance (CFP) (e.g., Flammer, 2015; Lins et al., 2017; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Surroca et al., 2010). In contrast to a large number of studies focusing on CSR-
CFP relation, only a few prior studies investigate the relationship between CSR and 
earnings quality. Earnings are the key metric considered by outsiders and are one of 
the most important measures that are at the forefront of executives’ thinking. Previous 
research finds that earnings can be managed either through discretionary accruals 
(Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005) 
or by altering the timing of real transactions activities (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). In Graham et al. (2005) survey and 
interview of more than 400 executives, several CFOs argue that “you have to start 
with the premise that every company manages earnings” (p.29). Previous research 
attributes earnings management to economic incentives for capital market and 
contractual motivations. I extend the literature by investigating the relation between 
CSR and earnings management and whether firms practicing more CSR response to 




Recent studies have found that firms practicing CSR behave differently from 
other firms in financial reporting. There are several extant studies that have examined 
the relationship between CSR and firms’ earnings quality and the empirical evidence 
is mixed. Prior et al. (2008) find there is a positive relation between CSR and earnings 
management, indicating that firms with better CSR performance are more likely to 
engage in earnings manipulation. However, Hong and Andersen (2011) find that more 
socially responsible firms provide higher quality accruals and less activity-based 
earnings management. Another notable study is conducted by Kim et al. (2012) who 
find that socially responsible firms are less likely to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management as well as be the subject of SEC 
investigations.  
Whether firms exhibit CSR tend to engage in more or fewer earnings 
manipulations is ultimately an empirical question, and it depends on whether CSR 
engagement represents a sincere consideration of fostering long-term relationships 
with stakeholders or a manifestation of the agency problem. On the one hand, prior 
literature shows that agency problem between principals and agents is aggravated 
when managers attempt to serve stakeholders instead of pursuing the single objective 
of value maximization (Jensen, 2002). In the absence of clear performance criteria, 
managers may engage in CSR to entrench themselves in order to pursue self-serving 
goals and there may be a positive relationship between CSR and earnings 
management. On the other hand, if managers engage in CSR in the context of a moral 
imperative, then high-CSR firms are expected to have more responsible operating 
decisions including transparent and reliable financial reporting. In this case, high CSR 
engagement is expected to constrain earnings management and provides a negative 
relation between CSR and earnings management.  
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Using a sample of 15,844 firm-year observations over the period of 1993 to 
2015, I find that firms with higher CSR engagement are more likely to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management prior to the passage of SOX. I find that the 
relationship between CSR and accrual-based earnings management is moderated by 
the effect of manager-shareholder incentive alignment. Specifically, I find that firms 
practicing CSR with low manager-shareholder incentive alignment present more 
opportunistic financial reporting behavior before the passage of SOX. Accordingly, 
the effect of SOX in curbing accrual-based earnings management is more significant 
for low-alignment firms, which suggests that the regulatory scrutiny imposed by SOX 
have been effective in reducing the accrual-based earnings management of firms 
practicing CSR. On the other hand, I find that firms practicing CSR are less likely to 
engage in real earnings management prior to the passage of SOX. While there is a 
general increase in real earnings management in the post-SOX period identified by 
prior studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo and Zhou, 2006), I find no significant evidence 
showing that firms practicing CSR switch from accrual-based to real earnings 
management after the passage of SOX. Given real earnings management departures 
from normal operational practices and therefore generally have more severe 
consequences than accrual-based earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; 
Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), I interpret my results that when facing 
the trade-off between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management, socially responsible firms are more likely to engage in the earnings 
management that is less costly. Hence, my results indicate that firms with higher CSR 
engagement are generally more transparent in their financial reporting in the post-
SOX period.  
My primary discretionary accrual proxy is estimated by using the performance-
adjusted modified Jones model suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). I estimate the 
29 
 
discretionary accruals for each year using all firm-year observations and use the 
absolute value of discretionary accrual to capture the magnitude of earnings 
management for my main analyses. My results are robust after adopting an alternative 
earnings management measure as in Dechow et al. (1995) and alternative CSR 
measure used in Deng et al. (2013) and Lins et al (2017). In order to ensure that the 
CSR measure that I use in my study does not proxy for other known factors that affect 
earnings quality, I follow Kim et al (2012) and control for a number of firm 
characteristics variables that are influential and pronounced for firms’ earnings quality 
and social performance, which helps us to mitigate the potential correlated omitted 
variable problem. When investigating the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management, I address the potential endogeneity problems using two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions. I adopt the mean of CSR in year t of all firms belonging 
to firm i’s 2-digit SIC code as an instrument for the CSR performance of firm i in year 
t to capture CSR in the first stage, and I use earnings quality proxies on the predicted 
CSR in the second stage. Overall, my 2SLS estimation supports my results generated 
from OLS regressions and shows that firms with high CSR engagement are more 
likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management but less likely to engage in 
real activities manipulation in the pre-SOX period and become more transparent in 
the post-SOX period in terms of overall financial reporting quality. 
My study contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of CSR on 
corporate financial reporting in several ways. First, this paper extends the literature 
on the impact of CSR in either obscuring or increasing transparency in financial 
reporting by reinvestigating the relationship between CSR and earnings quality 
estimated by accrual-based and real earnings management. Second, I also identify 
the moderating effect of manager-shareholder incentive alignment on the relation 
between CSR engagement and accrual-based earnings management. Third, this 
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paper contributes to the literature regarding the impact of the regulatory framework 
as a determinant of accounting quality by investigating the relationship between CSR 
and earnings quality in the context of SOX. From the regulatory perspective, my 
results also imply that SOX as an accounting-related reform is effective in curbing 
CSR firms’ opportunistic financial reporting. Hence, from a broad sense, my results 
speak to the literature on CSR, accounting quality, corporate governance, and 
relevant legislation. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Research hypothesis 
 
Notwithstanding the various prior studies that investigate the relationship 
between CSR and earnings quality, the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between the two is still mixed. On the one hand, various theories and prior empirical 
evidence suggest that firms with high CSR tend to be transparent financial reporting 
reporters. First, ethical theories suggest that firms have to accept social responsibility 
as an ethical obligation (Carroll, 1979; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; 
Phillips et al., 2003). Specifically, ethical theories likely to emphasize principles such 
as ‘the right thing to do’ and hence requires firms practising CSR to pay simultaneous 
attention to the legitimate interests of various stakeholders. Second, political theories 
focus on the relationship between firms and society and highlight firms’ corporate 
citizenship that requires firms to take care of the interest of the community where they 
operate in their decision-making (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Matten and Crane, 
2005). Third, studies anchored on integrative theory suggest that firms practicing CSR 
need to integrate social demand into their decision-making (Agle et al., 1999; Carroll, 
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1979; Swanson, 1995). In addition, several previous studies also highlight the ethical 
view of CSR and suggest that there is a moral imperative for managers to ‘do the right 
thing’ (Carroll, 1979; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Phillips et al., 2003). 
Hence, from the theories of CSR above, it is shown that firms have incentives to be 
socially responsible in their business processes by providing honest, transparent, 
reliable information as an ethical obligation or their way to address the community 
interest and social demand. Moreover, if managers engage in CSR practices owing 
to their moral imperative of ‘do the right thing’, it is also possible for management to 
engage less in earnings management and be ethical in business process by providing 
transparent financial reporting information.  
Apart from the reasons above, firms choose to engage in CSR as a signal of 
their commitment to stakeholders to distinguish themselves from their peers (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). According to Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), firms 
with the superior CSR performance will attempt to obtain a competitive advantage by 
voluntarily disclosing CSR information as a positive signal for corporate reputation 
while firms with inferior CSR performance will avoid CSR disclosure that will adversely 
influence their reputation. Thus, CSR engagement can be considered as a proxy for 
a firm’s reputation or a signal of management ethics (Linthicum et al., 2010). 
Numerous prior studies show that firms’ CSR engagement can be considered as a 
form of reputation-building or maintenance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Linthicum 
et al., 2010). From this perspective, firms that value their reputation tend to protect 
their corporate image and reputation by preventing managers from opportunistic 
behaviours that may potentially damage their reputation. Consistently, Eccles et al 
(2014) and Lins et al (2017) consider CSR as social capital/trust. For instance, Lins 
et al. (2017) find that firms with high CSR engagement enjoy higher stock returns than 
firms with less CSR commitment during the recent financial crisis. They argue that the 
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trust between firms and its stakeholders is built through CSR investment and it pays 
off during the low-trust period. Hence, firms with high CSR engagement likely to 
prevent their social capital from being squandered and inhibit the trust from being 
sabotaged by opportunistic actions, for instance, opportunistic financial reporting. 
Therefore, the motivations from the ethical obligation, moral imperative reputation and 
social capital perspectives suggest a negative relation between CSR and earning 
management.  
Even though numerous theories and empirical evidence predict that firms with 
high CSR engagement are likely to maintain transparency in their financial reporting, 
some empirical studies anchored on agency theory and optimal contracting theory 
also suggest that CSR engagement can exacerbate a firm’s agency problem. For 
instance, McWilliams et al. (2006) find that managers choose to engage in CSR 
activities in order to pave their personal career path and seek self-serving interests. 
Petrovits (2006) finds that managers strategically engage in philanthropy in order to 
meet financial reporting targets. Departing from the clear and primary objective of 
value maximization, managers acting on behalf of non-shareholder stakeholders may 
pursue their own personal benefit instead of shareholders. Particularly, this makes 
the evaluation of managerial performance difficult in a principled way and enables 
managers to pursue their own self-interest benefits at the expense of the interests of 
shareholders and other financial claimants. Hence, managers’ attempt to serve 
various stakeholders instead of only shareholders can exacerbate agency costs. In 
this sense, CSR engagement can be considered as a manifestation of agency 
problems and managers may attempt to please stakeholders in order to pursue their 
own benefits through CSR engagement. For instance, managers may engage in CSR 
activities to entrench themselves in order to achieve greater career development and 
job security. Managers who manipulate earnings may engage in stakeholder-
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orientated activities as a self-entrenchment strategy and intend to gain support from 
stakeholders (Prior et al., 2008). Managers can adopt an employment policy that 
offers generous long-term contracts with suppliers and long-term commitments to 
support environmental or philanthropic institutions as an antitakeover device to create 
stakeholder constituencies supporting the incumbent management (Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005). In addition, Krüger (2015) finds that managers gain a good reputation 
among key stakeholders at expense of shareholders’ interest, reflecting that agency 
problem between principals and agents is aggravated when managers tend to serve 
stakeholders rather than shareholders. Hence, managers can opportunistically 
engage in CSR or use CSR as window-dressing for self-interest. From this 
perspective, if managers’ self-serving incentives and opportunism prevail, it is likely 
that there is a positive relationship between CSR and earnings management. 
Given the different view on the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management, I investigate the effect of SOX on the relation between the two. The 
motivation for investigating the effect of SOX on the relationship between CSR and 
earnings management is because it introduces a series of accounting-related reforms 
that aim to improve corporate transparency, which can be highly relevant and have 
directly impact on firms’ financial reporting behaviour. Specifically, in response to the 
wave of accounting scandals at the beginning of this century, Congress passed the 
SOX with President George W. Bush commenting that this Act is ‘the most far-
reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’2. Collectively, the various accounting-related reforms were introduced with 
the objective of SOX of restoring investor confidence and corporate transparency. 
Owing to the series of corporate scandals and corporate governance failures at the 
                                                          
2 “Year of Reform Puts Corporations on Notice; from Courts to the Boardroom, Conduct of 
CEOs Faces New Scrutiny since Enron,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 13, 2003. 
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beginning of this century, the passage of the SOX was to restore the integrity of 
financial statements by curbing earnings management and accounting fraud (Cohen 
et al., 2008).  
One strand of prior research finds that the levels of accrual-based earnings 
management increased steadily until the passage of SOX in 2002 whereas there is a 
general increase in real earnings management after SOX (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008, 
2010; Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Zang, 2012). On the one hand, accrual-based earnings 
management can be curbed by scrutiny from outsiders and the available accounting 
flexibility. For instance, it can be difficult for a manager to convince a high-quality 
auditor of aggressive accounting estimate than a low-quality auditor and a manager’s 
accrual-based earnings management is also more likely to be detected when 
regulators heighten scrutiny of firms’ accounting practices. Moreover, accrual-based 
earnings management can be also constrained by the flexibility within a firm’s 
accounting systems when a firm are running out of flexibility owing to aggressive 
accounting assumption made in the previous periods. In that case, the firm faces a 
high risk of being detected by auditors and violation of GAAP if it continues accrual-
based earnings management. Given the objective of SOX, it significantly heightens 
the scrutiny from outsiders on accrual-based earnings management which is highly 
subject to examination by outsiders (e.g., auditors, regulators) in the context of SOX. 
The proposed accounting-related reforms of SOX makes firms more incrementally 
likely to be detected by auditors or/and violate GAAP when engage in high accrual-
based earnings management, thus increasing the costs of engaging accrual-based 
earnings management. Moreover, one primary penalty for earnings manipulation is 
litigation. If accrual-based earnings management is more likely to be detected than 
real earnings management, engaging in accrual-based earnings management can 
expose a firm to high litigation risk.  
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On the other hand, firms can manipulate their operating activities through 
temporarily boosting their sales volumes, overproduction and deliberately reducing 
their discretionary expenses in addition to accrual-based earnings management. The 
survey of Graham et al (2005) shows that the aftermath of accounting scandals at 
Enron and WorldCom and the certification requirements imposed by the SOX have 
changed managers’ preferences for the mix between taking accounting versus real 
actions to management earnings. Consistently, the rational expectations equilibrium 
model in Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) also shows that firms engage less in accrual-
based earnings management but increases real earnings management when 
accounting standards become tighter because the marginal benefit of real earnings 
management increases. Prior studies also find there is a trade-off between accrual-
based earnings management and real earnings management and firms generally shift 
from accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management after SOX 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2008, 2010; Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Zang, 2012). Apart from 
heightened scrutiny imposed by SOX on accrual-based earnings management, 
managers are more willing to engage in real earnings management in the post-SOX 
because such manipulation is harder to detect. With the uncertainty inherent in 
business environments, there is no benchmark to decide what a manager should have 
been done in operation decision-making under any particular situation and managers 
are generally protected by the ‘‘business judgment rule’’ which make it harder to hold 
them accountable for suboptimal operation decisions (Lo, 2008). In contrast, accrual-
based earnings management is subject to examination by auditors and regulators, 
who have accounting standards as the benchmark. 
In light of the empirical evidence discussed above, I study the relationship 
between CSR and earnings management in the context of the passage of SOX to test 
whether high-CSR firms response differently to regulatory scrutiny in their financial 
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reporting. Given the different predictions from various theories and mixed empirical 
evidence regarding the association between CSR and earnings management, the 
relationship between CSR and earnings management as well as the influence of the 
passage of SOX on the relation between the two can be empirical questions. Even 
though SOX proposed a wide range of reforms of corporate governance and financial 
reporting, the consequences of the regulatory changes for the financial reporting of 
firms practicing CSR have not yet been studied. Particularly, it is unclear whether 
high-CSR firms engage in more accrual-based earnings management prior to the 
passage of SOX and how the passage of SOX changes managers’ preference for the 
mix between accrual based versus real earnings management for firms practicing 
CSR. It is also not clear whether the general shift from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management also apply to firms practicing CSR in the 
context of increased regulatory scrutiny. On the one hand, if high-CSR firms are 
opportunistic financial reporters, then high-CSR firms are more likely to be wary after 
the passage of SOX and will lower their accrual-based earnings management owing 
to increased regulatory scrutiny (H1a). On the contrary, if high-CSR firms are 
transparent financial reporters and CSR engagement is negatively related to accrual-
based earnings management in the pre-SOX period, the financial reporting behavior 
of CSR firms will not be considerably influenced by the passage of SOX (H1b).  
In terms of real earnings management, in light of Cohen et al (2008) showing 
that there is a general shift from accrual-based earnings management to real earnings 
management in the post-SOX period, if high-CSR firms are opportunistic financial 
reporters and more wary after the SOX, then high-CSR firms are likely to substitute 
real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management in the post-SOX 
period (H2a). However, if high-CSR firms are transparent reporters, there is no 
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significant shift from accrual-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation in the post-SOX period (H2b).  
I follow Kim et al. (2012) and develop two sets of competing hypothesis: 
Opportunistic Financial Reporting Hypothesis and Transparent Financial Reporting 
Hypothesis. 
 
Opportunistic financial reporting hypothesis (Accrual-based earnings 
management):   
H1a. If high-CSR firms are opportunistic financial reporters, the passage of 
SOX will lower the levels of accrual-based earnings management in the post-SOX 
period. 
Transparent financial reporting hypothesis (Accrual-based earnings 
management):  
H1b. If high-CSR firms are transparent financial reporters, the passage of SOX 
has no effect on firms’ financial reporting. 
 
Opportunistic financial reporting hypothesis (Real earnings management):   
H2a. If high-CSR firms are opportunistic financial reporters, there is a shift from 
accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management in the post-SOX 
periods.   
Transparent financial reporting hypothesis (Real earnings management):  
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H2b. If high-CSR firms are transparent financial reporters, there is no shift from 
accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management in the post-SOX 
periods.   
 
Prior literature also investigates the relationship between managerial equity 
incentives and financial reporting behaviors. A number of studies suggest that 
managers whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock price benefit more from 
opportunistic financial reporting behaviors (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns 
and Kedia, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). However, the sensitivity of the 
managers’ wealth to changes in stock price also represents the extent to which 
shareholder-manager interest is aligned (Bhandari and Javakhadze, 2017). A high 
interest-alignment between shareholders and managers can alleviate the agency 
problem, and managers may less likely to engage in opportunistic financial reporting. 
Armstrong et al (2013) suggest that the sensitivity of the managers’ wealth to changes 
in stock price (delta) may have two opposite effects on opportunistic financial reporting. 
On the one hand, delta captures the increase in the value of a manager’s equity 
portfolio from an increase in stock price, thus encouraging managers to engage in 
opportunistic financial reporting behaviors. On the other hand, delta also amplified the 
effect of equity risk on the total riskiness of a manager’s equity portfolio, hence 
discouraging risk-averse managers from engaging risky opportunistic financial 
reporting. Hence, given the opposite effects of managerial equity incentives on 
opportunistic financial reporting, the influence of managerial equity incentives on the 
relationship between CSR and earnings quality is another interesting scope to 
investigate. If opportunistic financial reporting facilitates an increase in stock price 
which benefits both shareholders and managers, firms with high manager-
shareholder incentives alignment (i.e., high delta) are more likely to engage in 
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earnings management. In contrast, if opportunistic financial reporting increases risk 
and alleviate the agency problem, I expect that firms with high manager-shareholder 
incentives alignment (i.e., high delta) are less likely to engage in earnings 
management whereas low-alignment firms tend to engage in more earnings 
management. Accordingly, I expect that the effect of SOX in curbing accrual-based 
earnings management will be stronger for firms with low manager-shareholder 
alignment than the effect on high-alignment firms. To measure the manager-
shareholder incentive alignment, I use DELTA calculated as dollar change in wealth 
associated with a 1% change the firm’s stock price. In line with these arguments I 
postulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The relationship between CSR and earnings management is more 
pronounced for firms with low manager-shareholder incentives alignment. 
 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
 
My sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 15,844 firm-year observations 
over the period of 1993 to 2015. My final sample includes all firms that meet the 
following criteria: The firm is in the MSCI ESG Research database, the firm is publicly 
traded and has financial data available from the COMPUSTAT. I further exclude firms 
in the financial industry (firms with primary two-digit SIC codes between 60-69) and 
utility industry (firms with primary two-digit SIC codes 49). I also exclude firms with 
negative values of sales, assets, common value of equity or market capitalization. 
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When testing the role of manager-shareholder incentive alignment, I merge my final 
data with the compensation data from Execucomp and Lalitha Naveen’s website, 
which lowers my sample to 11,255 observations.  
 
3.2 Measures of CSR  
 
To measure a firm’s CSR performance, I use data from MSCI ESG Research, 
which is the successor of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. (KLD). For simplicity, I 
refer to this database as KLD. KLD is an independent investment research firm 
specializing in compiling rating of firms’ CSR performance and it started to track firms’ 
social performance since 1991. Over time, KLD has expanded its coverage and 
included CSR strengths and weaknesses for a large subset of its constituent firms. 
The database covers firms that comprise the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 and the 
Domini 400 Social Index until 2000. In 2001, it further extended its coverage to firms 
in the Russell 1,000 Index. In terms of the validity of the database, the KLD database 
has been extensively employed in a large number of previous studies. The KLD 
database compiles CSR scores of firms based on a wide variety of sources, including 
company filings, government data, nongovernmental organization data, and more 
than 14 thousand global media sources. It contains firms’ social ratings along seven 
dimensions, including community, employee relations, diversity, environment, human 
rights, product quality, and corporate governance. The database also includes five 
exclusionary screen categories by identifying whether a firm’s operation involves in 
alcohol, firearms, gambling, tobacco, nuclear power, and military contracting 
industries that are usually considered as the ‘sin’ industries. For each dimension, 
there are positive indicators representing a firm’s strength and negative indicators 
representing a firm’s weaknesses in certain social areas.  
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I construct my CSR scores by using CSR strengths and weaknesses in six 
dimensions: community, employee relations, diversity, environment, product quality, 
and human rights, with a higher net CSR scores demonstrating better social 
performance3. I exclude the exclusionary categories because these dimensions do 
not pertain to firms’ discretionary activities. I follow previous studies (Kim et al., 2012; 
Lins et al., 2017; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) and exclude corporate governance 
dimension because it is controversial to consider corporate governance as part of 
CSR. My primary measure of CSR, RAW_CSR, is estimated as total strengths minus 
total concerns from the six aforementioned CSR dimensions.  
Despite the simple summation method to calculate a firm’s overall CSR score 
enjoys prevalence in extant studies, Manescu (2009) finds that the comparison 
between scores across years and dimensions can be spurious as the number of 
strengths and concern indicators for most dimensions varies as the KLD database 
develops over time. Deng et al. (2013) tackle this issue by constructing the adjusted 
KLD CSR score which is calculated by dividing the strengths and weaknesses for 
each dimension by the number of strength and weakness scores for the specific 
dimension and summing up the adjusted total strength score and adjusted total 
weaknesses score. By employing the adjusted CSR score, each included dimension 
shares equal weight, thus mitigating any bias caused by any indicators on the social 
performance of firms in the relatively irrelevant industry4. Similarly, Lins et al. (2017) 
also use this adjusted KLD CSR measure to overcome the variation in the maximum 
number of strengths and concerns across time. I, therefore, employ this adjusted CSR 
                                                          
3 As a robustness check, I also follow Kim et al (2012) and use CSR scores that exclude 
human rights category. These results (untabulated) continue to hold when I move the human 
rights category from the CSR measure. 
4 As mentioned earlier, the KLD database also includes five exclusionary screen categories 
by identifying whether a firm’s operation involves in alcohol, firearms, gambling, tobacco, 
nuclear power, and military contracting industries that are usually considered as the ‘sin’ 
industries. I follow previous Kim et al (2012) and exclude the exclusionary categories because 
these dimensions do not pertain to firms’ discretionary activities. 
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score (AD_CSR) adopted in Deng et al. (2013) and Lins et al. (2017) as the alternative 
measure of a firm’s CSR performance in the robustness tests.  
 
3.3 Measures of earnings management 
 
Accrual-based accounting provides managers with discretion in financial 
reporting and managers can report their preferred levels of earnings by circumventing 
accounting rules in various approaches, such as accelerating the recognition of 
revenues, deferring the recognition of costs or shifting income from future periods to 
the present. While managers can manipulate earnings without break any accounting 
rules, earnings manipulation distorts the true financial position of a firm, and the 
managed earnings are less informative, therefore making it more difficult for investors 
to evaluate a firm (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). In addition to accrual-based 
earnings management, recent research also finds a general shift away from accrual-
based earnings management to real activities manipulation (Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo 
and Zhou, 2006). Therefore, I also investigate real earnings management measures, 
including abnormal cash from operation, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. 
 
3.3.1 Accrual-based earnings management measures 
 
A large number of previous studies on earnings management (Dechow et al., 
1995; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005; Minutti-
Meza, 2013) adopt discretionary accruals as the measure for earnings management. 
Given the less restrictive data requirements of a cross-sectional version of the 
modified Jones model, I estimate discretionary accrual by using the performance-
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adjusted modified Jones model suggested in Kothari et al. (2005)5. I include lagged 
return on assets (ROAt-1) as a regressor in the regression model to control for the 
effect of performance on measured discretionary accruals and I estimate the 
discretionary accruals for each year using all firm-year observations. For each year i 
estimate the model for every industry classified by two-digit SIC code. Given firms 
may have different incentives for earnings manipulation that involves either income-
increasing or income-decreasing accruals, I follow previous studies and use the 
absolute value of discretionary accrual to capture the magnitude of earnings 
management for my main analyses (Kim et al., 2012; Klein, 2002; Minutti-Meza, 2013). 













+ 𝑘4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + ℰ𝑖𝑡 
     
where, for fiscal year t and firm i, TAAC stands for the total accruals defined 
as TAACit = EBXIit – OCFit, the difference between earnings before extraordinary items 
(EBXI) and cash flow from operations (OCF). The cash-flow statement approach 
advocated in Hribar and Collins (2002) is deemed to be superior to the balance-sheet 
approach to estimate total accruals because the error in the latter approach is 
correlated with a firm’s economic characteristics, which lowers the discretionary 
accrual model’s power to detect earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005). ∆Sales 
and ∆Receivable stand for changes in sales and receivables, respectively. PPEit is 
the gross property, plant and equipment, and Asset it represents the total book value 
                                                          
5 As a robustness check, instead of using performance-adjusted modified Jones model as 
suggested in Kothari et al. (Kothari et al., 2005), I also use modified Jones model in Dechow 
et al. (1995) to estimate earnings management. In the robustness section, my robustness test 
using modified Jones model yields similar results and the results are still qualitatively 
consistent with those reported results. 
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of assets. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets to mitigate heteroscedasticity 
in residuals.  
 
3.3.2 Real earnings management measures 
 
Recent research increasingly pays attention to the prominence of how 
earnings being management through real activities manipulation in addition to 
accrual-based earnings management (Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 
2012). For instance, Gunny (2010) investigates the consequences of real earnings 
manipulation and finds that real activities manipulation has a significant negative 
impact on future operating performance. Moreover, firms manipulate various real 
activities in order to meet certain financial reporting benchmarks to avoid reporting 
annual losses (Roychowdhury, 2006). Specifically, Roychowdhury (2006) finds that 
managers 1) use price discount to temporarily boost firms’ sales; 2) overproduce to 
lower the cost of goods, and 3) lower discretionary expenditure to improve reported 
margins. All these actions deviate from normal business practices and the primary 
purpose is to make certain stakeholders believe that certain financial reporting 
benchmarks have been met and reporting annual losses can be avoided 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). I specifically explore three metrics of real earnings 
management identified in Roychowdhury (2006).  
 
1. Abnormal cash from operation (AB_CFO). Firms can temporarily 
boost sales volumes by offering more lenient credit terms and price discounts. 
However, they are likely to disappear once the credit terms and price are reverted. 
While the current period earnings are boosted via the acceleration of the timing of 
sales, both price discounts, and more lenient credit terms are offered at the 
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expense of lower cash flows in the current period.  
 
2. Abnormal production costs (AB_PROD). Firms can reduce the cost 
of goods sold by overproducing in order to increase earnings. Firms then can 
spread their fixed overhead costs over more units and therefore reduce fixed costs 
per unit. As long as the decrease in fixed costs per unit is not offset by any 
increases in marginal cost per unit, the total cost per unit decreases. As a result, 
the reported cost of goods sold (COGS) is reduced, which leads to higher 
operating margins. However, overproduction also incurs high production costs, 
which will further contribute to higher annual production costs relative to sales, 
and lower cash flows from operation.   
 
3. Abnormal discretionary expenses (AB_EXP). Firms can also 
reduce their discretionary expenses, such as R&D expenditure, advertising 
expenditure, and SG&A expenses. Reduction in these expenses will boost current 
period earnings. It could also lead to higher current period cash flows (at the risk 
of lower future cash flows) if the firm generally paid for such expenses in cash.  
 
In the survey of top executives, Graham et al. (2005) show that managers are 
more willing to use real activities manipulation in comparison with accrual-based 
earnings management. This is because accrual-based earnings management is more 
likely to be scrutinized by auditors and regulators given accounting manipulation can 
have negative economic substances as shown in the notorious accounting scandals 
and frauds at the beginning of this century. Moreover, as the response to accounting 
scandals, more rigorous accounting rules and regulations are set up, which increases 
the litigation risks and makes managers prefer to shift from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) find that managers 
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have shifted away from accrual-based earnings management to real activities 
manipulation after SOX. In addition, several previous studies (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012) also suggest that real earnings management is 
positively associated with the cost of accrual-based earnings management, and 
accrual and real earnings management are negatively associated, indicating that 
there is a tradeoff between these two types of earnings management.  
I follow previous studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Roychowdhury, 2006) to develop my proxies for real earnings management and adopt 
three metrics to estimate the levels of real earnings management: the abnormal levels 
of cash flow from operations (AB_CFO), production costs (AB_PROD) and 
discretionary expenses (AB_EXP).  
I first generate the normal levels of CFO, production costs and discretionary 
expenses using the models in Roychowdhury (2006). I calculate normal CFO as a 
linear function of sales and a change in sales. To adopt this model, I run the following 















For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations is the residual from 
the corresponding industry-year model and the firm-year’s sales and lagged assets.  
The second measure of real earnings management is abnormal production 
costs. Prior studies (Badertscher, 2011; Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Zang, 2012) define production costs as the sum of COGS and change in inventory 
during the year and they express expenses as a linear function of contemporary sales. 
I estimate normal production costs from the following equation and the abnormal 
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The third measure of real activities manipulation is abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), I estimate the 










+  ℰ𝑖𝑡 
  
I also follow previous studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; Irani and Oesch, 
2016; Kim et al., 2012; Zang, 2012) and construct the combined measures of real 
activities manipulation. The abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (AB_CFO) 
and discretionary expenses (AB_EXP) are multiplied by -1 so that higher values of 
AB_CFO and AB_EXP imply that the firm is more likely to engage in real activities 
manipulation. I do not use the AB_PROD multiplied -1 is because higher production 
costs suggest excess production and lower COGS. The combined measure of real 
earnings manipulation (COMBINED) is calculated as  AB_CFO + AB_PROD + 
AB_EXP and higher values of COMBINED imply that the firm is more likely to have 
used real activities manipulation6. I recognize that the combined measure may have 
different implications for earnings, I, therefore, report results corresponding to both 
the combined measures as well as the three individual real earnings management 
                                                          
6 As a robustness check, instead of using COMBINED calculated as AB_CFO + AB_PROD + 
AB_EXP, I also follow Cohen and Zarowin (2008) and  use COMBINED calculated as 
AB_PROD + AB_EXP or AB_CFO + AB_EXP as the alternative combined proxies for 
aggregated real earnings management and the combined real activities manipulation proxies 
decrease as firms engage in more aggressive real earnings management. I do not combine 
AB_PROD and AB_CFO, because previous studies Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) suggest that the same activities can lead to abnormally low CFO and 





3.4 Empirical models 
 
In order to test the relation between CSR and financial reporting behaviors, I 
rely on the following regressions: 
ABS_DAit (or REAL_EMit) = β0 + β1RAW_CSRit + β2RAW_CSRit * SOXit + 
β3SOXit + β4 REAL_EMit (or ABS_DAit) + β5MBit-1 + β6SIZEit-1 + β7LEVit-1+ β8ROAit-1 + 
β9LOSSit + β10RAW_GOVit-1 + β11FirmAgeit + β12BIG4it + β13ADINTit + β14RDINTit + 
Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εit         (1) 
where:   
ABS_DA = Absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary 
accruals are computed through the cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted for performance as in Kothari et al. (2005); 
REAL_EM = AB_CFO, AB_PROD, AB_EXP, or COMBINED: 
1) AB_CFO = The levels of abnormal cash flows from operation multiplied 
by -1 ; 
2) AB_PROD = The levels of abnormal production costs, where 
production costs are defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold and the 
change in inventories; 
3) AB_EXP = The levels of abnormal discretionary expenses, where 
discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses 
and SG&A expenses multiplied by -1; 
4) COMBINED = AB_CFO + AB_PROD + AB_EXP; 




SOX = Indicator variable equal to 1 if in the post-SOX as defined after 2003, 
and 0 otherwise; 
MB = Market-to-book ratio, measured by market value of equity scaled by 
book value of equity; 
SIZE = Firm size, measured by a natural logarithm of the total assets; 
LEV = Leverage ratio, measured as the book value of debt over the book value 
of total assets; 
ROA = Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
LOSS = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a loss for the year, and 0 
otherwise; 
FIRMAGE = Firm age is the number of years since the firm first appears in the 
COMPUSTAT database; 
RAW_GOV = Raw KLD corporate governance scores, calculated by total 
governance strengths minus total governance concerns; 
BIG4 = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the BIG4 
auditors, and 0 otherwise; 
ADINT = Advertising intensity (Advertising expense/sales) for the year; 
RDINT = R&D intensity (R&D expense/sales) for the year; 
 
To test the impact of the passage of SOX on the relationship between CSR 
and earnings quality, I follow Zang (2011) and generate an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the fiscal year is after 2003, and 0 otherwise. I use an interaction term 
RAW_CSR * SOX to test the impact of SOX on the relationship CSR and earnings 
management. In order to mitigate the issue relating to correlated omitted variables, I 
employ a variety of control variables that may potentially affect a firm’s financial 
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reporting behavior and social performance. I control for the effect of growth 
opportunities and firm size (SIZE) by including market-to-book (MB) ratio and a natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets as prior studies show that these two variables are 
correlated with CSR and earnings management (Kim et al., 2012; Klein, 2002; Prior 
et al., 2008; Waddock and Graves, 1997). I also control for the effect of a firm’s 
financial performance and by incorporating return on assets (ROA) in the regression. 
Klein (2002) suggests that firms have incentives to manipulate accounting figures 
when they are about to violate financial covenants. Therefore, I incorporate leverage 
(LEV) to capture the effect of this issue. Consistent with Kim et al. (2012), I also control 
for the effect of firm age (FIRMAGE) in case my results are potentially driven by 
characteristics caused by firms’ different developmental stages. I control for the effect 
of corporate governance in the regression by calculating corporate governance 
(RAW_GOV) in KLD database. Previous studies find there is a nexus between CSR 
and corporate governance (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011) and 
therefore corporate governance can affect both CSR and financial reporting behavior. 
In addition to corporate governance, I also add a dummy variable, BIG4 that equals 1 
if a firm’s auditor is one of the Big4 auditors. Following previous studies (Kim et al., 
2012; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Prior et al., 2008), I also control for the effect of 
research and development and advertising in my regression. I compute R&D intensity 
(RDINT) and advertising intensity (ADINT) as R&D expenditure divided by sales and 
advertising expenditures divided by sales respectively. Given previous studies 
suggest that there is a trade-off between accrual-based earnings management and 
real earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012), I 
control for the effect of real activities manipulation (COMBINED) in the ABS_DA 
regressions and control for the effect of accrual-based earnings management 
(ABS_DA) in the real earnings management regressions. In order to examine the role 
of manager-shareholder incentive alignment on the relationship between CSR and 
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earnings quality during the SOX, I measure the manager-shareholder alignment by 
DELTA (dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change the firm’s stock price) 




4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
In Table 1, I present the descriptive statistics and it shows a mean value of 
0.06 for the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA). The mean value of 
signed discretionary accrual (DA) is -0.03 and is consistent with the level reported by 
Cohen et al. (2008). The mean values of AB_CFO, AB_PRO, and AB_EXP as well 






Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables 
       
 N Mean Median Std.Dev 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Dependent Variable              
ABS_DA 15,844 0.059 0.040 0.067 0.019 0.076 
DA 15,844 -0.031 -0.024 0.084 -0.063 0.011 
AB_CFO 15,844 -0.040 -0.040 0.095 -0.091 0.009 
AB_PROD 15,844 -0.073 -0.068 0.193 -0.179 0.027 
AB_EXP 15,844 -0.054 -0.021 0.224 -0.157 0.065 
COMBINED 15,844 -0.168 -0.135 0.424 -0.392 0.065 
Variable of Interest 
      
RAW_CSR 15,844 0.211 0.00 2.441 -1.00 1.00 
ADJ_CSR 15,844 -0.052 -0.020 0.414 -0.309 0.111 
Control Variables 
      
SOX 15,844 0.810 1.00 0.392 1.00 1.00 
SIZE 15,844 7.405 7.281 1.518 6.308 8.368 
MB 15,844 3.702 2.404 10.586 1.569 3.812 
ROA 15,844 0.051 0.058 0.112 0.018 0.099 
LOSS 15,844 0.179 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.000 
LEV 15,844 0.201 0.186 0.171 0.039 0.309 
ADINT 15,844 0.014 0.000 0.040 0.00 0.011 
RDINT 15,844 0.058 0.007 0.285 0.000 0.061 
RAW_GOV 15,844 -0.262 0.000 0.690 -1.00 0.00 
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FIRMAGE 15,844 3.156 3.135 0.635 2.708 3.761 
BIG4 15,844 0.886 1.000 0.317 1.000 1.000 
DELTA(in $000s) 11,255 723.540 197.820 1682.910 63.990 607.320 
 
      
The Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 15,844 firm-year observations over the period between 1993 and 2015. This table 
presents the number of observations, the mean, the median, the standard deviation, and the values for the first and the third quartile for all the variables 
in Model 1.  
 
ABS_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are computed through the cross-sectional modified Jones model 
adjusted for performance as in Kothari et al. (2005). AB_CFO is the levels of abnormal cash flows from operation multiplied by -1. AB_PROD is the 
levels of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories. AB_EXP is 
the levels of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses and SG&A expenses 
multiplied by -1. COMBINED is the combined real earnings management proxy calculated by AB_CFO + AB_PROD + AB_EXP. RAW_CSR is the raw 
KLD CSR scores, calculated by total strengths minus total concerns. ADJ_CSR is the adjusted KLD CSR scores followed by Deng et al (2013) and 
Lins et al (2017).  
 
SOX is the indicator variable equal to 1 if in the post-SOX as defined after 2003, and 0 otherwise. SIZE is firm size measured by a natural logarithm of 
the total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio, measured by market value of equity scaled by book value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, 
measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise. LEV is the leverage ratio, measured as the book value of debt over the book value of total assets. ADINT is the advertising 
intensity for the year. RDINT is the R&D intensity for the year. RAW_GOV is the corporate governance score from KLD database. FIRMAGE is firm 
age measured by the number of years since the firm first appears in COMPUSTAT database. BIG4 is the indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the BIG4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Delta is from compensation data from Execucomp and Lalitha Naveen’s website for examining the influence of manager-shareholder incentives 




My primary variable of interest, RAW_CSR, is slightly positive with a mean 
value of 0.21 and median value of 0 and my alternative CSR measure, AD_CSR, is 
slightly negative with a mean value of -0.05, median value of -0.02 and standard 
deviation of 0.41. In terms of control variables, the mean value of ROA is 0.05, 
indicating that CSR firms in my sample are, on average, profitable firms. I also find 
the mean value of corporate governance (RAW_GOV) is negative, suggesting on 
average my sample firms have more corporate governance concerns than strengths. 
In addition, most of the sample firms are audited by one of the Big4 auditors. 
Regarding manager-shareholder incentives alignment proxy Delta (dollar change in 
wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price), I find Delta has a mean 
of 724 and a median of 198 with standard deviation of 1683. This is close to Coles et 
al. (2014) results with a mean of 789.00 and a median of 250.00 with a standard 





Correlations among CSR Score, Earnings Management Proxies and Other Control Variables 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. RAW_CSR 1        
2. ADJ_CSR 0.909*** 1       
3. ABS_DA -0.017** -0.005 1      
4. AB_CFO -0.123*** -0.101*** -0.081*** 1     
5. AB_PROD -0.147*** -0.130*** -0.084*** 0.452*** 1    
6. AB_EXP -0.086*** -0.077*** -0.199*** 0.088*** 0.727*** 1   
7. COMBINED -0.140*** -0.123*** -0.162*** 0.477*** 0.941*** 0.879*** 1  
8. SOX -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.038*** 0.018** 0.078*** -0.024*** 0.027*** 1 
9. SIZE 0.295*** 0.220*** -0.149*** -0.089*** 0.103*** 0.211*** 0.138*** -0.155*** 
10. MB 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.036*** -0.068*** -0.103*** -0.093*** -0.111*** -0.030*** 
11. ROA 0.094*** 0.072*** -0.276*** -0.458*** -0.207*** 0.132*** -0.128*** -0.057*** 
12. LOSS -0.082*** -0.064*** 0.300*** 0.289*** 0.073*** -0.162*** 0.0130 0.062*** 
13. LEV 0.0004 0.001 -0.016** 0.100*** 0.127*** 0.147*** 0.158*** -0.059*** 
14. ADINT 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.023*** -0.012 -0.184*** -0.281*** -0.235*** -0.021*** 
15. RDINT 0.017** 0.0100 0.085*** 0.084*** -0.069*** -0.252*** -0.145*** 0.028*** 
16. RAW_GOV 0.023*** 0.053*** 0.011 0.019** -0.010 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
17. FIRMAGE 0.143*** 0.106*** -0.151*** 0.040*** 0.100*** 0.208*** 0.164*** -0.196*** 




Correlations among CSR Score, Earnings Management Proxies and Other Control Variables (continue) 
           
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
9. SIZE 1          
10. MB 0.009 1         
11. ROA 0.125*** 0.041*** 1        
12. LOSS -0.177*** 0.005 -0.642*** 1       
13. LEV 0.346*** 0.105*** -0.173*** 0.095*** 1      
14. ADINT 0.018** 0.053*** -0.005 0.006 -0.014* 1     
15. RDINT -0.094*** 0.032*** -0.264*** 0.145*** -0.091*** 0.252*** 1    
16. RAW_GOV -0.206*** -0.005 0.001 -0.007 -0.036*** -0.007 -0.011 1   
17. FIRMAGE 0.398*** -0.002 0.110*** -0.152*** 0.085*** -0.017** -0.067*** -0.037*** 1  





Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for selected variables. I 
find a negative correlation between CSR and the levels of discretionary accrual 
(ABS_DA) as well as other real earnings management proxies (AB_CFO, AB_PROD, 
AB_EXP, and COMBINED) which suggests that my sample firms with higher CSR 
engagement are less likely to engage in both types of earnings management.  
 
4.2 CSR and discretionary accruals in the pre- and post-SOX period 
 
Table 3 shows the main results of the multivariate regression of accrual-based 
earnings management using the absolute value of discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management measures. My results show that the estimated coefficient on 
CSR is positive and statistically significant in the accrual-based earnings 
management model (column 1), suggesting that firms with higher CSR engagement 
tend to have larger magnitude of discretionary accruals and manage their earnings 
more aggressively prior to SOX. Specifically, increasing one point in CSR score 
increases absolute discretionary accruals by 0.16%. In contrast to the positive 
coefficient of RAW_CSR, the coefficient on RAW_CSR * SOX is significantly negative. 
My results show that the magnitude of earnings management of firms practicing CSR 
has been significantly curbed owing to the increased regulatory scrutiny imposed by 
the passage of SOX. Given the interaction term captures the marginal effect of CSR 
on accrual-based earning management for the post-SOX period relative to the pre-
SOX period, my results suggest that firms with high CSR engagement tend to have 
more accrual-based earnings management but CSR engagement becomes less 
influential in affecting accrual-based earnings management for the post-SOX period. 
In particular, the increase in the absolute discretionary accruals by one point in CSR 
is mostly offset by the passage of SOX (=0.0016-0.0013) for the post-SOX period. 
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Overall, my results also suggest that the regulatory constraints imposed by SOX have 
been effective in reducing the opportunistic financial reporting and firms practicing 
CSR tend to engage less in accrual-based earnings management in the post-SOX 
period in comparison with the pre-SOX period. From a regulatory perspective, my 
results demonstrate that SOX as an accounting-related reform at least succeeds in 
constraining certain accrual-based earnings management behavior. Therefore, my 
hypothesis H1a is supported. For control variables, I find the estimated coefficient for 
the combined real earnings management (COMEBINED) is negative and significant, 
implying that firms choose to engage in more aggressive accrual-based earnings 
management are less likely to engage in real earnings management, and vice versa. 
This result is consistent with numerous extant studies which suggest that there is a 
trade-off between accrual-based earnings management and real activities 
manipulation (Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2011). In addition, I find 
that larger and older firms tend to engage less in accrual-based earnings 
management. One potential interpretation is that larger and older firms treasure their 
reputation and corporate image more, and therefore tend to engage less in any 
opportunistic behaviors that may cause litigation risks and potentially damage their 
reputation. Moreover, I observe that firms with higher debt are less likely to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management, which potentially reflects these firms are more 
likely to be monitored by debt holders (Park and Shin, 2004). Finally, I find firms with 
better corporate governance structures are less likely to conduct earnings 
management whereas firms with high-growth opportunities and losses are more likely 

















RAW_CSR 0.0016** -0.0026*** -0.0130*** -0.0112*** -0.0267*** 
 (2.48) (-2.91) (-5.55) (-4.25) (-5.17) 
SOX -0.0291*** 0.0178*** 0.0514*** -0.0060 0.0632** 
 (-6.42) (3.68) (4.35) (-0.49) (2.57) 
RAW_CSR * SOX -0.0013** -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0033 
 (-2.01) (-0.65) (0.06) (-1.12) (-0.64) 
COMBINED -0.0195***     
 (-9.20)     
ABS_DA  -0.2268*** -0.1448*** -0.3650*** -0.7366*** 
  (-11.94) (-4.25) (-8.97) (-9.58) 
MB 0.0002** -0.0004** -0.0014** -0.0018** -0.0036** 
 (2.02) (-2.02) (-2.08) (-2.23) (-2.16) 
SIZE -0.0032*** -0.0022* 0.0200*** 0.0276*** 0.0454*** 
 (-5.02) (-1.93) (5.73) (7.66) (6.07) 
LEV -0.0139*** -0.0040 0.0461** 0.1646*** 0.2068*** 
 (-2.87) (-0.51) (2.05) (6.67) (4.19) 
ROA 0.0210** -0.2474*** -0.2356*** 0.1752*** -0.3077*** 
 (2.45) (-16.31) (-7.96) (4.58) (-4.70) 
LOSS 0.0487*** 0.0588*** 0.0243*** -0.0331*** 0.0500*** 
 (21.47) (20.48) (4.44) (-5.17) (4.18) 
FIRMAGE -0.0083*** 0.0113*** 0.0172** 0.0373*** 0.0657*** 
 (-7.22) (4.85) (2.40) (5.03) (4.23) 
RAW_GOV -0.0020** 0.0036** 0.0077* 0.0128*** 0.0240*** 
 (-2.20) (2.41) (1.94) (3.22) (2.86) 
ADINT -0.0380** -0.0228 -0.7569** -1.3634** -2.1430** 
 (-2.13) (-0.86) (-2.40) (-2.46) (-2.45) 
RDINT 0.0070 0.0103*** -0.0287 -0.0901 -0.1085 
 (1.25) (3.61) (-1.00) (-1.64) (-1.29) 
BIG4 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0065 -0.0221** -0.0301 
 (-0.47) (-0.40) (-0.62) (-1.97) (-1.33) 
 
 
    
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 15,844 15,844 15,844 15,844 15,844 
ADJUSTED R2 0.172 0.264 0.181 0.277 0.218 
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*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 




4.3 CSR and real earnings management in the pre- and post-SOX period 
 
Column 2 to 5 in Table 3 also report the results of multiple regressions using 
measures of real earnings management. In all the regressions of real earnings 
management, the estimated coefficients on CSR are all negative and significant. My 
evidence, therefore, suggests that firms with better CSR performance are less likely 
to involve in earnings management by practicing abnormal business practice in their 
operations. To control for the trade-off effect between accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management, I also control for accrual-based 
earnings management as a control variable in my real earnings management 
regressions. The coefficients on the absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
ABS_DA, are negative and significant, confirming the trade-off effect between the two 
types of earnings management. In terms of other control variables, the coefficients on 
MB is negative and significant for all real earnings management variables, suggesting 
that firms with high growth options are less likely to engage in real earnings 
management. I also find the coefficients on ROA for AB_CFO, AB_PROD and 
COMBINED are negative and significant, showing that firms with better profitability 
are generally less likely to engage in real earnings management. In contrast, the 
positive and significant estimated coefficient on AB_EXP suggests profitable firm are 
more likely to engage in real earnings manipulation via abnormal discretionary 
expenses. In addition, the coefficients on FIRMAGE and RAW_GOV are positive and 
significant for real earnings management variables, indicating that older firms and 
better-governed firms are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. 
Consistent with the accrual-based earnings management regressions, I 
interact CSR with the indicator variable SOX to observe the influence of SOX on the 
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relationship between CSR and real earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) find 
that managers have shifted away from accrual-based earnings management to real 
activities manipulation after SOX. The coefficients of SOX indicator variables reflect 
the general shift from accrual-based earnings management to real earnings 
management from pre- to post-SOX period. The four interaction terms between CSR 
and SOX in all real earnings management models capture the marginal effects of CSR 
on real earnings management in the post-SOX period. The insignificant coefficients 
show that firms practicing CSR do not tend to shift from accrual-based earnings 
management to real activities manipulation from pre- to post-SOX periods. Hence, my 
hypothesis H2b is supported. 
 
4.4 Managerial equity incentives 
 
In this section, I investigate whether the manager-shareholder incentive 
alignment acts as a moderator for the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management. Specifically, I estimate my main models for the subsamples with high 
and low manager-shareholder incentive alignment by using respective median values 
of Delta (dollar change in wealth associated with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price). 
I predict that firms practicing CSR with high manager-shareholder incentive alignment 
are less likely to engage in the earnings management whereas firms practicing CSR 
with low manager-shareholder incentive alignment tend to engage in more 
opportunistic financial reporting behaviors. However, it is also possible that firms with 
high manager-shareholder incentives alignment are more likely to engage in earnings 
management if earnings management facilitates an increase in stock price which 
benefits both shareholders and managers.  
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In the first column of Table 4, I find the estimated coefficients RAW_CSR and 
RAW_CSR * SOX are not significant for the high manager-shareholder incentive 
alignment subsamples. In contrast, I find the estimated coefficient on CSR is positive 
and significant at the 1% level for firms with low manager-shareholder incentive 
alignment in column 2 of Table 4, indicating that low-alignment firms practicing CSR 
are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management. Accordingly, I find 
the estimated coefficient on interaction term RAW_CSR * SOX is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, showing that firms with low manager-
shareholder incentive alignment receive more constraining effect by regulatory 
scrutiny imposed by the passage of SOX. My further analysis shows that the 
estimated coefficients on RAW_CSR and RAW_CSR * SOX in low-alignment 
subsamples are significantly different from the two groups. In terms of real earnings 
management, I find the coefficients on RAW_CSR are negative and indicate that firms 
practicing CSR engage less in real earnings management and I do not find any 
significant results on interaction term RAW_CSR * SOX. The insignificant coefficients 
on the interactions are consistent with the result in Table 3 for real earnings 
management and suggest that high-CSR firms are less likely to substitute real 
earnings management for accrual-based earnings management in the post-SOX 
period. In addition, I do not find the estimated coefficients on RAW_CSR and 





The Moderating Effect of Manager-Shareholder Incentive Alignment on the 












ABS_DA ABS_DA COMBINED COMBINED 
RAW_CSR 0.0005 0.0028*** -0.0185*** -0.0141** 
 (0.94) (2.97) (-3.14) (-2.04) 
SOX -0.0146** 0.0087 0.0376 -0.0587 
 (-2.25) (1.07) (0.68) (-0.94) 
RAW_CSR * SOX -0.0004 -0.0023** -0.0024 -0.0090 
 (-0.86) (-2.40) (-0.40) (-1.16) 
COMBINED -0.0142*** -0.0169***   
 (-5.56) (-5.71)   
ABS_DA   -0.7138*** -0.5058*** 
   (-4.05) (-4.95) 
MB 0.0003 0.0003** -0.0141*** -0.0025 
 (1.56) (2.36) (-4.51) (-1.27) 
SIZE -0.0013** -0.0049*** 0.0411*** 0.0714*** 
 (-2.12) (-3.97) (3.88) (5.81) 
LEV -0.0155*** -0.0136* 0.0350 0.1520** 
 (-2.82) (-1.77) (0.49) (2.08) 
ROA 0.0549*** 0.0131 -1.0767*** -0.2762*** 
 (3.05) (0.99) (-7.16) (-3.30) 
LOSS 0.0477*** 0.0513*** 0.0802*** 0.0574*** 
 (10.88) (15.16) (2.89) (3.70) 
FIRMAGE -0.0087*** -0.0083*** 0.0646*** 0.0468** 
 (-6.50) (-4.75) (2.75) (2.09) 
RAW_GOV -0.0011 -0.0025 0.0018 0.0313** 
 (-1.22) (-1.61) (0.17) (2.53) 
ADINT -0.0011 -0.0409 -3.7033*** -4.4617*** 
 (-0.05) (-0.99) (-10.21) (-8.29) 
RDINT 0.0492* 0.0034 -0.9327*** -0.1212 
 (1.71) (1.00) (-2.66) (-1.58) 
BIG4 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0242 -0.0369 
 (-0.11) (-0.39) (-0.53) (-1.26) 
     
Difference Test (RAW_CSR) 0.0301*** 0.6046 
Difference Test  
(RAW_CSR * SOX) 
0.0779* 0.4775 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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N 5,632 5,623 5,632 5,623 
ADJUSTED R2 0.200 0.165 0.389 0.233 
     
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 
adjusted by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
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4.5 Analysis of instrumental variable estimation 
 
Despite employing an extensive list of control variables helps to reduce 
omitted variable bias in estimating the relationship between CSR and earnings quality, 
I cannot rule out the possibility that the results from regressions could still suffer from 
endogeneity bias caused by unobservable omitted variables. To address endogeneity 
concerns, I perform the 2SLS regression by taking the instrumental variable 
estimation approach, which seeks variables that are highly correlated with CSR but 
does not influence a firm’s financial reporting except through CSR. Consistent with 
the spirit of Lin et al (2011) and Laeven and Levine (2009), I follow previous research 
(Bozzolan et al., 2015; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Ferrell et al., 2016) and adopt the mean 
of CSR in year t of all firms belonging to firm i’s 2-digit SIC code as an instrument for 
the CSR performance of firm i in year t. The fundamental incentive for using this 
instrumental variable is that CSR orientation tends to correlated in given industries 
(Bozzolan et al., 2015; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997), but 
arguably the industry-level CSR is not related to the financial reporting behavior of a 
single firm. 
In Table 5, my results show that CSR is positively and significantly correlated 
with industry-level CSR performance in the first stage. My 2SLS tests confirm the 
positive and significant relationship between CSR and accrual-based earnings 
management in the pre-SOX period and also show that the accrual-based earnings 
management has been effectively curbed by the passage of SOX, which is consistent 
with my OLS regression results. For real earnings management in Table 5, I also find 
industry-level CSR is also a reasonable instrument for firms’ CSR as it is positively 
and significantly related to CSR in the first stage. The results of my 2SLS tests are 
consistent with the results of my baseline regression models for real earnings 
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management. Specifically, I find firms practicing CSR are less likely to engage in real 
earnings management in the pre-SOX period and I do not find a significant shift from 
accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management in the post-SOX 






Accrual-Based/Real Earnings Management on CSR: 2SLS 
 
2SLS: 1st Stage 
 




 2SLS: 2nd 
Stage 
 
RAW_CSR  ABS_DA  RAW_CSR  COMBINED 
RAW_CSR 
  0.0040***    -0.0475*** 
 
  (2.60)    (-3.76) 
SOX 
  -0.0103**    0.0901*** 
 
  (-2.06)    (3.19) 
RAW_CSR * SOX 
  -0.0033**     -0.0223 
 

















   
 
   
CONTROLS Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
 Yes 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
 Yes 
YEAR DUMMIES Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
 Yes 
N 15,844 
 15,844  15,844  15,844 
First-stage F-statistic 41.72    27.08   
First stage Cragg-Donald F-test statistics 433.47 
 
 
 438.06   
First-stage Cragg and Donald Test  (p-value < 0.001)    
(p-value < 




4.6 Robustness tests 
 
So far, the results of my study found that firms with higher CSR engagement 
are more likely to engage in aggressive accrual-based earnings management but less 
likely to engage in real earnings management in the pre-SOX period. After the 
passage of SOX, my results indicate that firms practicing CSR generally become more 
transparent in their financial reporting. On the one hand, after the passage of SOX, 
CSR firms’ discretionary accruals have been largely offset by the improved regulatory 
scrutiny. On the other hand, instead of shifting from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management, firms practicing CSR show no significant 
evidence of engaging in real activities manipulation in the post-SOX period. Overall, 
my results suggest that the passage of SOX makes firms practicing CSR more 
transparent in both accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management. I obtain the above results by using the simple summation approach to 
calculate a firm’s overall CSR score and interact it with SOX dummy as the variable 
of interest in this study. Manescu (2009) finds that the comparison between scores 
across years and dimensions can be spurious as the number of strengths and concern 
indicators for most dimensions varies as the KLD database develops over time. I 
therefore follow previous studies (Deng et al., 2013; Lins et al., 2017) and develop the 
adjusted CSR score as the alternative CSR measure by dividing the strengths and 
weaknesses for each dimension by the number of strength and weakness scores for 
the specific dimension and summing up the adjusted total strength scores and 
adjusted total weaknesses scores. In addition to the alternative measure of CSR, I 
also calculate discretionary accruals as in Dechow et al. (1995) as the alternative 
measure of discretionary accruals in the robustness tests. Furthermore, instead of 
using the combined measure of real earnings management (COMBINED), I also 
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follow Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and use COMBINED calculated as AB_PROD + 
AB_EXP or AB_CFO + AB_EXP as the alternative combined proxies for aggregated 
real earnings management7. Overall, the results from my robustness tests are similar 
to the results reported for my baseline models. I report the results of robustness tests 
in Table 6 and Table 7. With regards to the influence of SOX on accrual-based 
earnings management and real earnings management, the results of robustness tests 
confirm that SOX effectively curbs accrual-based earnings management whereas the 
positive and significant coefficients of SOX on real earnings management shows that 
the post-SOX period also witnesses more real earnings management owing to the 
increased regulatory scrutiny on accrual-based earnings management. Consistently, 
I find firms with higher CSR engagement have higher levels of aggressive accrual-
based earnings management prior to the passage of SOX whereas this 
aggressiveness of accrual-based earnings management has been significantly 
lowered by the passage of SOX. Moreover, the robustness tests also confirm that that 
firms with higher CSR engagement are less likely to engage in real earnings 
management before the SOX period and also are less likely to substitute real earnings 
management for accrual-based earnings management in the post-SOX period. 
Overall, the results for the robustness test confirm my conjecture that socially 
responsible firms are more transparent in their financial reporting after the passage of 
SOX.   
                                                          
7 Consistently, I multiply the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (AB_CFO) and 
discretionary expenses (AB_EXP) by -1 so that higher values of AB_CFO and AB_EXP imply 





Accrual-Based Earnings Management and Real Earnings Manipulation on Alternative CSR 












ADJ_CSR 0.0104** -0.0151*** -0.0756*** -0.0627*** -0.1534*** 
 (2.53) (-2.62) (-4.90) (-3.65) (-4.53) 
SOX -0.0291*** 0.0161*** 0.0463*** -0.0129 0.0495** 
 (-6.44) (3.35) (3.91) (-1.05) (2.02) 
ADJ_CSR * SOX -0.0088** 0.0003 0.0166 -0.0016 0.0153 
 (-2.11) (0.06) (1.05) (-0.10) (0.45) 
COMBINED -0.0196***     
 (-9.28)     
ABS_DA  -0.2277*** -0.1495*** -0.3698*** -0.7471*** 
  (-11.97) (-4.36) (-9.02) (-9.64) 
MB 0.0002** -0.0004** -0.0015** -0.0019** -0.0037** 
 (2.02) (-2.03) (-2.09) (-2.23) (-2.16) 
SIZE -0.0030*** -0.0031*** 0.0166*** 0.0238*** 0.0373*** 
 (-5.08) (-2.71) (4.75) (6.56) (4.95) 
LEV -0.0141*** -0.0024 0.0525** 0.1717*** 0.2219*** 
 (-2.92) (-0.30) (2.31) (6.88) (4.45) 
ROA 0.0210** -0.2479*** -0.2371*** 0.1734*** -0.3116*** 
 (2.45) (-16.33) (-7.96) (4.51) (-4.72) 
LOSS 0.0488*** 0.0588*** 0.0246*** -0.0329*** 0.0506*** 
 (21.48) (20.47) (4.46) (-5.12) (4.20) 
FIRMAGE -0.0083*** 0.0112*** 0.0170** 0.0370*** 0.0652*** 
 (-7.20) (4.79) (2.35) (4.95) (4.16) 
ADJ_GOV -0.0131*** 0.0221*** 0.0380* 0.0701*** 0.1302*** 
 (-2.76) (2.87) (1.84) (3.36) (2.95) 
ADINT -0.0381** -0.0251 -0.7673** -1.3745** -2.1670** 
 (-2.14) (-0.93) (-2.40) (-2.46) (-2.44) 
RDINT 0.0070 0.0101*** -0.0295 -0.0910 -0.1104 
 (1.25) (3.49) (-1.01) (-1.64) (-1.30) 
BIG4 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0066 -0.0224** -0.0307 
 (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.63) (-1.99) (-1.35) 
 
 
    
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 15,844 15,844 15,844 15,844 15,844 
ADJUSTED R2 0.172 0.262 0.175 0.271 0.211 
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*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a 





Alternative Accrual-Based Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management on 
CSR 

















RAW_CSR 0.0014** -0.0028*** -0.0131*** -0.0114*** -0.0273*** 
 (2.18) (-3.06) (-5.62) (-4.29) (-5.24) 
SOX -0.0274*** 0.0200*** 0.0540*** -0.0039 0.0702*** 
 (-6.20) (4.10) (4.56) (-0.31) (2.84) 
RAW_CSR * SOX -0.0014** -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0032 
 (-2.13) (-0.57) (0.10) (-1.11) (-0.61) 
ALT_COMBINED -0.0145***     
 (-6.89)     
ALT_ABS_DA  -0.1655*** -0.0653** -0.3171*** -0.5479*** 
  (-8.55) (-1.97) (-7.92) (-7.30) 
MB 0.0002* -0.0004** -0.0014** -0.0018** -0.0037** 
 (1.82) (-2.05) (-2.08) (-2.24) (-2.17) 
SIZE -0.0036*** -0.0020* 0.0203*** 0.0278*** 0.0461*** 
 (-5.56) (-1.71) (5.81) (7.66) (6.12) 
LEV -0.0138*** -0.0027 0.0477** 0.1658*** 0.2108*** 
 (-2.75) (-0.34) (2.11) (6.69) (4.25) 
ROA -0.0116 -0.2548*** -0.2400*** 0.1631*** -0.3317*** 
 (-1.27) (-16.39) (-8.08) (4.27) (-5.02) 
LOSS 0.0497*** 0.0560*** 0.0206*** -0.0351*** 0.0414*** 
 (21.35) (19.16) (3.70) (-5.43) (3.41) 
FIRMAGE -0.0082*** 0.0120*** 0.0180** 0.0379*** 0.0678*** 
 (-6.94) (5.08) (2.51) (5.08) (4.34) 
ADJ_GOV -0.0012 0.0039** 0.0079** 0.0132*** 0.0250*** 
 (-1.35) (2.57) (2.00) (3.29) (2.95) 
ADINT -0.0436** -0.0257 -0.7582** -1.3687** -2.1527** 
 (-2.39) (-0.95) (-2.39) (-2.46) (-2.44) 
RDINT 0.0091* 0.0100*** -0.0293 -0.0900 -0.1093 
 (1.74) (3.33) (-1.01) (-1.63) (-1.28) 
BIG4 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0065 -0.0222** -0.0307 
 (-0.66) (-0.41) (-0.61) (-1.97) (-1.33) 
 
 
    
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 15,844 15,844 15,844 15,844 15,844 
ADJUSTED R2 0.178 0.254 0.179 0.274 0.213 




*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by 






This paper extends the literature on CSR by investigating how firms practicing 
CSR respond differently from other firms in their financial reporting in the context of 
changing regulatory regimes by considering the passage of SOX in 2002. Despite 
recent literature has been permeating with the reference to the evidence that firms 
with better CSR performance present more transparent and honest financial reporting 
practices (Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012), some studies also support 
the opportunistic use of CSR from agency cost perspective (Chih et al., 2008; Prior et 
al., 2008). My paper does not aim to declare a victor in this long-standing debate. In 
fact, my results show CSR firms are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management but less likely to engage in real earnings management in the pre-SOX 
period. Consistent with prior literature, I also find an overall trend that accrual-based 
earnings management generally decreases whereas real earnings manipulation 
increases after the passage of SOX. For firms practicing CSR, I find the accrual-based 
earnings management has been significantly lowered by the passage of SOX and I 
do not find evidence of firms practicing CSR significantly shift from accrual-based 
earnings management to real earnings management in the post-SOX period. Given 
real activities manipulation is generally believed to have more severe consequences 
than accrual-based earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; Graham et al., 
2005; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), my results indicate that when facing the trade-off 
between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management, 
socially responsible firms tend to choose the earnings management that is less costly. 
My results are consistent with the notion that firms with better CSR performance are 
less likely to engage in costly real earnings management strategy. Moreover, I find 
the relationship between CSR and accrual-based earnings management is 
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moderated by the effect of manager-shareholder incentive alignment. My results show 
that firms practicing CSR with low manager-shareholder incentive alignment are more 
likely to engage in accrual-based earnings management and received more 
constraining effect in the post-SOX period. 
Overall, my results suggest firms practicing CSR present more transparent 
financial reporting practices in the post-SOX period. My findings suggest that the 
passage of SOX is effective in curbing CSR firms’ accounting manipulations and the 
results contribute to the debate over the role of CSR and also speak to the literature 







Do Employee-Friendly Firms Invest More Efficiently? Evidence from 
Employment Decisions 
 
“I don’t think that the market really understands how to value employee treatment and 
wellness and benefits… They don’t think about the employee long-term morale or 
anything like that.”  
—Brian Krzanich, Intel’s CEO, quoted in Forbes, 12/12/2017 
 
“You take care of your employees, they’ll take care of your customers, the business 
will thrive, and your shareholders will benefit. We’ve always believed that, and we’ve 
never wavered.”  




Irrespective of firm size, employees can be seen as a firm’s most valuable 
asset and a critical source of corporate success in modern knowledge-based 
economies. Prior studies have shown firms can gain competitive advantages by 
hiring, developing and retaining human capital (Becker, 1962; Coff, 1997; Lazear and 
Shaw, 2007; Teece, 2011). Many firms increasingly invest in employee-friendly 
treatment and employee welfare schemes to address the challenge of recruiting and 
retaining human capital to maintain a competitive advantage.8 For instance, Colgate-
Palmolive provides its employees with nutrition guidance, on-site fitness classes, 
bike-to-work programs, financial seminars and, in some locations, back-up child care 
services and flexible work arrangements (Forbes, 2017). Delta has rewarded its 
employee by paying out nearly $5 billion through its profit-sharing program within the 
                                                          





past five years (Forbes, 2017). In this study, I investigate the impact of employee-
friendly treatment on firms’ labor investment efficiency by examining whether 
employee treatment is associated with lower deviations of labor investment from the 
level justified by economic fundamentals. I further investigate whether labor 
investment efficiency and underlying employee treatment practices are associated 
with firm performance.  
Employee-friendly treatment can potentially affect labor investment efficiency 
in several ways.9 First, employee-friendly treatment could affect labor investment 
efficiency via favorable reputation and high talents attractiveness with both current 
employees and potential applicants. Hiring and firing employees can expose firms to 
the labor market friction. Should employee-friendly policies help firms to improve 
employee retention and facilitate easier recruitment via the interest alignment 
between employees and firms, employee-friendly firms will be less exposed to labor 
market friction (Akerlof, 1982; Chow, 1983; Edmans et al., 2016; Salop, 1979; Stigler, 
1962; Turban and Greening, 1997; Weiss, 1980; Zingales, 2000).  
Second, in line with stakeholder theory (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991), a firm’s employee-friendly policies 
signal its ability to honor the implicit claims and likely to contribute to satisfied 
employees. If this reduces industrial actions (e.g., strike) or improves productivity, 
financial stakeholders are less likely to increase costly explicit claims and employee-
friendly firms are likely to enjoy better access to finance and lower financing costs 
(Cheng et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). This could facilitate 
investment in productive opportunities as well as in labor.  
                                                          
9 In light of previous studies of employee treatment (Bae et al. 2011; Cronqvist et al. 2009; 
Ertugrul 2013; Faleye and Trahan 2011; Ghaly et al. 2015; Verwijmeren and Derwall 2010), I 
use employee-friendly treatment, employee-friendly policies, employee welfare, employee 
welfare schemes and other similar phrases interchangeably to broadly characterize a firm’s 
investment in employee benefits. In Appendix 2, I list the components of the employee-friendly 
treatment variables from KLD. 
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Third, the human capital theory of corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales, 
2000, 1998; Zingales, 2000) suggests that the focus of corporate governance for 
modern firms should shift from a focus on agency problems between managers and 
shareholders to explore treatment of the labor force, an increasing focus of power and 
rents in the modern firms. If employee-friendly treatment facilitates better corporate 
governance, firms with employee-friendly policies are less likely to make suboptimal 
labor investment decisions.  
Finally, research also suggests that employee treatment may be a 
manifestation of agency problems (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Ben-Nasr and 
Ghouma, 2018; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Landier et al., 
2007; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Employee-friendly treatment can have a detrimental 
effect on labor investment efficiency if entrenched CEOs engage in empire building 
and over-invest in labor force, or conversely pursue peaceful life and turn down 
profitable investment projects and under-invest in labor. These conflicting arguments 
and mixed empirical results leave the impact of employee treatment on labor 
investment efficiency as an empirical question. 
My research question is important for several reasons. First, labor is one of 
the two inputs in the neoclassical model of the firm (i.e., capital and labor) required to 
produce output. It is curious that previous studies on employee treatment have not 
focused on its impact on employees. Second, the neoclassical model views labor as 
a variable factor that does not involve adjustment costs. However, previous literature 
suggests that labor frictions exist and the associated costs can be substantial and 
efficient investment in human capital can be a crucial element of corporate decision-
making (Danthine and Donaldson, 2002; Diamond, 1982; Farmer et al., 1985; 
Hamermesh, 1989; Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; 
Pissarides, 2011; Yashiv, 2007). Third, Matsa (2018) also indicate that labor is 
different from capital because human capital cannot be owned, and can act 
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strategically by choosing where to work and whether to quit and can pressure 
management to be sensitive to their needs. Finally, previous research finds that firms 
may gain competitive advantages by hiring and retaining scarce human capital 
(Becker, 1962; Coff, 1997; Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Teece, 2011). Hence, exploring 
whether employee treatment influences hiring and firing is strategically and financially 
important.  
In order to examine the relation between employee-friendly treatment and 
labor investment efficiency, I use firms’ net hiring, measured as the percentage 
change in the number of employees (Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007). The main proxy for 
labor investment efficiency is the absolute value of the difference between the 
observed level of labor investment and that justified by economic fundamentals. This 
difference represents the abnormal net hiring that captures the amount of net hiring 
not attributable to underlying economic factors. Therefore, the absolute value of 
abnormal net hiring is an inverse measure of labor investment efficiency: the lower 
the value, the higher the labor investment efficiency. The employee treatment 
indicator is obtained from MSCI ESG Research, formerly known as KLD. The KLD 
database has been extensively employed in previous studies of employee welfare 
(Bae et al., 2011; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; 
Ghaly et al., 2015; Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010). I use KLD’s ‘Employee Relations’ 
metrics and I follow prior studies by summing identified strengths minus identified 
concerns in any given year. These strengths and concerns include union relations, 
cash profit sharing, employee involvement, and retirement benefits. I construct 
employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) as an index of employee-friendliness by summing 
over the indicator variables for strength and concern and then subtracting total 
concerns from total strength for each firm. 
Using a sample of 20,583 U.S. firm-year observations that represents more 
than 3,000 individual firms over the period from 1995 to 2015, the results show that 
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employee-friendly policies are associated with higher labor investment efficiency. As 
well as being statistically significant, the results also show that the impact of employee 
treatment on labor investment efficiency is economically important: a one standard 
deviation increase in employee treatment is associated with a 4.3% decrease in 
abnormal net hiring, which indicates improved labor investment efficiency. Consistent 
with prior studies, I also find that employee-friendly treatment is positively associated 
with better financial performance as measured by labor productivity, profitability, and 
production efficiency. I also shed new light on the effect of labor investment efficiency 
directly on firm performance and find that abnormal labor investment (i.e., labor 
investment inefficiency) leads to a significant deterioration in all firm performance 
measures.  
Testing the link between employee treatment and a firm’s labor investment 
efficiency is challenging because it is difficult to prove causality in the absence of an 
exogenous shock. It could be argued that efficient labor investment provides the 
resources for management to treat their employees well, rather than employee-
friendly treatment generating efficient labor investment decisions. It could also be that 
omitted variables (e.g., management competence, strategic position or corporate 
culture) influence both employee treatment and labor investment efficiency. I use 
several approaches to address the endogeneity problem. First, I use firm fixed effects 
in the baseline models to mitigate the impact of unobservable firm-specific time-
invariant omitted variables. This is a simple development from previous studies but 
has a strong impact on the influence of omitted correlated variables. Second, I also 
gain confidence from the analysis of non-labor social dimensions that serve as the 
placebo test. If a firm’s good employee treatment is merely a reflection of a firm’s 
social performance/social capital, or omitted variables such as performance, 
management competence and/or strategic advantage are driving the results, I would 
expect other non-labor social dimensions to also have a significant relationship with 
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labor investment efficiency. The results show no significant results on other social 
dimensions and leave employee-friendly treatment as a plausible indicator of labor 
investment efficiency. Moreover, I further address the endogeneity concern by using 
instrumental variables under the Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation and by 
employing propensity score matching (PSM) approaches. The results from 2SLS and 
PSM approaches confirm the main results. In spite of various attempts to address the 
endogeneity and consistent results of additional tests, it is difficult to demonstrate 
causality without the benefit of an exogenous shock. To overcome this challenge, I 
follow prior studies (Buchanan et al., 2018; Lins et al., 2017) and treat the 2008-2009 
financial crisis as an exogenous shock to firms and use it to disentangle the relation 
between employee treatment and labor investment efficiency. I adopt a difference-in-
difference (DID) approach and use non-employee-friendly firms as a control group to 
isolate the effect of employee-friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency. I find 
that employee-friendly firms have higher labor investment efficiency than non-
employee-friendly firms in the post-crisis period whereas employee-friendly firms 
suffer more inefficient labor investment during the financial crisis. This suggests that 
the effect of employee treatment on labor investment efficiency varies with economic 
conditions and the costs of adopting employee-friendly treatment can outweigh the 
benefits during financially difficult periods.  
I also perform several tests to ensure the robustness of the findings. I find that 
the results are robust to the use of two alternative measures of employee treatment, 
to four different measures of labor investment efficiency, and to the inclusion of 
various additional governance and earnings quality controls in the models.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide novel 
evidence that firms’ employee-friendly treatment facilitate firms to have more efficient 
labor investment. Hiring and firing employees exposes firms to the labor market 
frictions and how firms can efficiently invest in labor can be paramount for corporate 
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decision-making (Benmelech et al., 2011; Campello et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2014; 
Matsa, 2018). Moreover, human capital can act strategically by choosing where to 
work and whether to quit. Our study investigates the role of employee-friendly policies 
in addressing employees’ needs and the interest-alignment between firms and their 
employees and shows that firms’ commitment to employee well-being helps firms to 
expose less to the labor market frictions via efficient hiring and retention.  
Second, our study adds to the growing literature examining the influence of 
firms’ non-financial stakeholders on firm performance (Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 
2016; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018). Specifically, 
recent studies investigate the impact of employee-friendly policies on long-term 
shareholder returns (Edmans, 2011), acquisition performance (Ertugrul, 2013), 
abnormal stock returns (Faleye and Trahan, 2011),  firm value (Fauver et al., 2018) 
and stock price crash risk (Ben-Nasr and Ghouma, 2018). Nevertheless, it has not 
examined the empirical question of whether labor investment efficiency affects firm 
performance. Our study attempts to fill this void in the literature by focusing on the 
influence of both employee-friendly treatment and labor investment efficiency on firm 
performance. Despite previous studies already shows that employee-friendly 
treatment is associated with better performance, our evidence shows that employee-
friendly treatment is associated with firm performance both directly and, additionally, 
via its link with labor investment efficiency. Hence, our study extends the recent 
literature by addressing the economic implications of employee treatment and labor 
investment efficiency for firms’ value creation. 
Third, recent studies also find that firms with high CSR engagement enjoy low 
information asymmetry and have higher capital investment efficiency (Benlemlih and 
Bitar, 2018; Cook et al., 2018; Cui et al., 2018). Our study is related but distinct from 
their studies as our study particularly focuses on one of the important dimensions of 
84 
 
CSR, employee treatment and relations and extend investment efficiency to labor and 
employment decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
investigate the relationship between employee treatment and labor investment 
efficiency.  
Fourth, we also add to the burgeoning literature on labor investment efficiency 
by focusing on firms’ commitment to employee well-being. Previous literature has 
documented that financial reporting quality, stock price informativeness, institutional 
investors’ horizons, and laborism can be influential factors for labor investment 
efficiency (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2016, 2014). 
Our study contributes to this emerging stream of literature on the determinants of 
labor investment efficiency by showing employee treatment is also one of the 
determinants of labor investment efficiency. 
 
2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Recent studies have addressed firms’ employee treatment schemes and their 
relevance to firm performance. Many previous studies show that employee-friendly 
treatment schemes have favorable impact on firms’ operation and performance 
(Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2016; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; 
Fauver et al., 2018). For example, Edmans (2011) finds that employee satisfaction is 
positively associated with long-term shareholder returns. Fauver et al. (2018) use a 
sample from 43 countries over the period 2013 to 2014 and find that firms with 
employee-friendly culture are valued higher and perform better. Mao and Weathers 
(2015) and Chen et al. (2016) also find that firms treating their employees well 
produce more and better patents. The empirical evidence above suggests that 
employee-friendly treatment schemes are in line with the benefits to shareholders. 
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Another stream of literature examines the impact of employee treatment on firms’ 
capital structure decisions and financial policies (Bae et al., 2011; Chemmanur et al., 
2013; Ghaly et al., 2015; Simintzi et al., 2015). For instance, Bae et al. (2011) show 
that firms treating their employees well maintain low debt ratios and suggest that 
treating employees well is an important element of their financing policies. Ghaly et 
al. (2015) also find that firms that are strongly committed to employee well-being tend 
to hold more cash.  
Employee-friendly treatment could potentially contribute to higher labor 
investment efficiency in three ways. First, one potential channel through which 
employee-friendly treatment can affect labor investment efficiency is where a firm’s 
reputation for employee friendliness is known by both current and potential employees 
in the labor market. Employees of firms that devote material corporate resources to 
employee-friendly treatment perceive their current jobs as superior to alternatives and 
are likely to be collaborative (Flammer and Luo, 2017). The gift exchange model of 
efficiency wage theory (Akerlof, 1982) also suggests that employees consider 
employee-friendly benefits as a gift and reciprocate by exerting greater efforts in their 
work. Thus, for employees, employee-friendly treatment encourages nurturing and 
constraining mechanisms that facilitate alignment of interests between employees 
and their firms, and the benefits of the current position lead to lower employee 
turnover (Salop, 1979; Zingales, 2000). As a result, firms can better anticipate their 
employment needs, which may lower the risk of over-investing or under-investing in 
labor. Equally, employee-friendly treatment helps firms to attract applicants from the 
labor market (Chow, 1983; Stigler, 1962; Turban and Greening, 1997; Weiss, 1980). 
Prior research suggests that application decisions are related to corporate reputation, 
and that job seekers’ perception of employers is related to the information available 
about the firm (Gatewood et al., 1993). Hence, the impact of employee-friendly 
treatment on reputation can be influential for both firms’ retention and recruitment. 
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Edmans et al. (2016) also suggest that the retention and recruitment benefits of 
satisfied employees are particularly important in flexible labor markets such as the 
U.S. Firms with a good reputation for employee treatment will find it relatively easy to 
attract employees and are less likely to suffer labor under-investment.  
Second, stakeholder theory suggests that financial stakeholders are more 
likely to increase costly explicit claims if they doubt a firm’s ability to honor its implicit 
claims to non-financial stakeholders (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). A firm’s failure to achieve good 
employee relations can lead to low employee morale and high employee turnover, 
which can ultimately erode the firm's reputation in the labor market. This may cause 
parties to implicit contracts to doubt a firm’s ability to honor its implicit claims and 
ultimately transform those agreements into costly explicit contracts (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987). For example, external capital suppliers may increase the cost of 
capital in order to compensate for the potential risk to future cash flows and value 
being adversely affected by unsatisfied non-financial stakeholders (e.g., strike, 
boycott). Several recent studies also highlight the influence of external financing costs 
in constraining firms’ employment decisions (Benmelech et al., 2011; Campello et al., 
2010; Matsa, 2018). In contrast, prior studies find that firms having harmonious 
relations with their stakeholders enjoy better access to finance and lower financing 
costs (Cheng et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011).10 As a result, 
profitable investments are less likely to be missed and firms face lower risks of labor 
under-investment owing to financial pressure. 
Third, Rajan and Zingales (2000, 1998) and Zingales (2000) formalize the 
human capital theory of corporate governance suggesting that the focus of corporate 
                                                          
10 Similar views arise within the broader CSR literature (see e.g., Benlemlih and Bitar, 2018; 
Cheng et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2013; Cook et al., 2018; Cui et al., 2018; Ferrell et al., 2016; 
Kim et al., 2012) and a recent paper by Flammer and Luo (2017) shows that a large number 
of CSR programs are employee-related.  
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governance for the modern firms will shift from addressing agency problems between 
managers and shareholders to exploring the treatment of general labor force. In this 
model employee treatment is a crucial component of the governance structure (Guo 
et al., 2016). Consistent with the human capital theory of corporate governance, 
several studies highlight the positive effect of employee-friendly treatment on 
corporate governance (Ferrell et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016). For instance, Guo et al., 
(2016) find that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of internal 
control weaknesses and firms with employee-friendly treatment have a significantly 
lower propensity for employee-related material weaknesses and financial 
restatements. Moreover, Ferrell et al., (2016) also find that firms with fewer agency 
problems tend to engage more in CSR activities and suggest that such activities 
reduce the adverse impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value. 
In contrast to the positive view regarding employee-friendliness, some studies 
also find that employee-friendly treatment can be a manifestation of agency problems 
and therefore hampers firms’ performance (Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Ben-Nasr and 
Ghouma, 2018; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Landier et al., 2007; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
A firm’s investment in employee benefits can exacerbate its agency problems as 
managers may seek a good relationship with subordinates by overpaying them 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For instance, earlier research finds that employee-
friendly treatment can aggravate agency costs by serving as an antitakeover device 
and a tool to help underperforming managers avoid dismissal (Atanassov and Kim, 
2009; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Similarly, Cronqvist et al. (2009) show that 
entrenched CEOs are more likely to adopt employee-friendly practices and Landier 
et al. (2007) shows that managers adopt employee-friendly treatment to improve their 
social interactions with the labor force to gain private benefits. In these cases, 
employee-friendly treatment can exacerbate agency problems and is expected to 
have a detrimental effect on labor investment efficiency. Entrenched CEOs are likely 
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to adopt employee-friendly practices and engage in empire building by over-investing 
in the labor force. Also, underperforming CEOs may use employee-friendly treatment 
as a tool to avoid dismissal or prefer to enjoy a peaceful life by giving up profitable 
labor investment projects and under-invest in labor.  
Overall, whether employee-friendly treatment facilitates higher labor 
investment efficiency is an empirical question. In light of the prior studies showing that 
employee-friendly treatment generally has a favorable impact on firms’ operations, I 
hypothesize that employee-friendly treatment enables firms to have lower deviations 
of labor investment from the employment level justified by economic fundamentals, 
namely higher labor investment efficiency and develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Employee treatment is positively associated with labor investment 
efficiency. 
 
I further examine the impact of both employee friendliness and abnormal net 
hiring on firm performance. I expect that one of the channels via which employee-
friendly treatment and labor investment efficiency can affect value creation is through 
financial performance. In light of the previous literature suggesting that employee-
friendly policies generally have a positive influence on value creation, I hence expect 
that firms treating their employees well enjoy better firm performance. Conversely, 
abnormal net hiring suggests a deviation from the employment level justified by 
underlying economics and signals inefficient labor investment and we, therefore, 
predict that abnormal net hiring has a negative impact on a firm’s performance. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between employee 
treatment and firm performance but a negative relation between abnormal net hiring 




Hypothesis 2: Employee treatment is positively associated with firm performance 
whereas abnormal net hiring is negatively associated with firm performance. 
 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Measure of employee treatment 
 
In order to assess a firm’s employee treatment, I use data from KLD which is 
based on a variety of sources, including company filings, government data, 
nongovernmental organization data, and more than 14,000 global media sources. 
Following previous studies of employee treatment and welfare (Bae et al., 2011; 
Cronqvist et al., 2009; Ertugrul, 2013; Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015; 
Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010), I construct the employee treatment variable using 
KLD’s rating on ‘Employee Relations’, with a higher net score demonstrating better 
employee treatment. the primary measure of employee treatment, EMP_TREAT, is 
estimated by adding identified strengths and subtracting identified concerns included 
in ‘Employee Relations’ dimensions each year. The employee treatment variable 
contains labor-relevant strengths covering union relations, cash profit sharing, 
employee involvement, and retirement benefits. Following Ertugrul  (2013) and Ghaly 
et al. (2015), I also include the ‘work/life benefits’ indicator from the ‘Diversity’ 
dimension. For employee treatment concerns, I include concerns regarding union 
relations, health and safety, retirement benefits, workforce reductions, and other 
concerns. I construct EMP_TREAT as an index of employee-friendliness by summing 
the indicator variable for strengths and subtracting concerns for each firm. I list the 
KLD components of the employee treatment proxy in Appendix 2. 
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In the robustness tests, I test alternative employee treatment measures and 
use both the Fortune magazine’s list of the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For In 
America’, available from the personal website of Alex Edmans11, plus the employee-
relevant components available from the ASSET4 database, including Health & Safety, 
Employment Quality, Training and Development, and Diversity and Opportunities. 
 
3.2 Measure of labor investment efficiency 
 
To measure labor investment, I use firms’ net hiring, the percentage change 
in the number of employees (Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007). I follow previous literature 
(Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014) and estimate labor investment 
efficiency as the absolute value of the difference between the observed level of labor 
investment and that justified by economic fundamentals. Abnormal net hiring is the 
absolute value of the residuals from the following equation (Model 1). The lower the 
value the higher the labor investment efficiency. Following previous studies (Ben-Nasr 
and Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014; Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007), I use equation one to 
estimate abnormal net hiring but also use several alternative approaches in the 
robustness section. 
 
𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡  =   𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁2𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁3𝑖𝑡−1 +
                                                          
11 The ‘workforce reduction’ concern indicates the company has made significant reduction in 
its workforce in recent years, which may directly link with the percentage change in the number 
of employees. In untabulated robustness checks, I also use two alternative employee 
treatment variables that exclude ‘workforce reduction’ or replace ‘workforce reduction’ with 
‘‘work/life benefits’’ concern, and I find the results are qualitatively similar. 
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𝛽15𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁4𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐼𝑁5𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                        
(1) 
 
NET HIRE is the percentage change in employees; SALES_G is the 
percentage change in sale revenue; ROA is net income scaled by beginning of the 
year total assets; RETURN is the annual stock return; SIZE P is the percentile of the 
log of market value of equity at the beginning of the year; LIQ is the ratio of cash and 
short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities; LEV is the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year; and LOSSBIN is an indicator 
variable for each 0.005 interval of prior year ROA from 0 to -0.025. In all cases, i 
indicates the firm and t the year. 
Consistent with prior studies (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014; 
Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007), I find NET HIREit is positively associated with sale growth 
(SALES_Git, SALES_Git-1), profitability (∆ROAit-1, ROAit), stock return (RETURNit), 
firm size (SIZEit−1), and liquidity (LIQit−1, ∆LIQit−1) and negatively associated with 
current year changes in profitability (∆ROAit) and small reported losses (LOSSBINit−1) 
variables; liquidity (∆LIQit) and leverage (LEVit−1). I report the descriptive statistics and 
results for Model 1 in Appendix 3. 
 
3.3 Empirical models 
 
My primary analysis of the relationship between employee treatment and labor 
investment efficiency is based on equation two: 
 
 𝐴𝐵_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐴𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 +
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𝛽10𝑆𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐷_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐷_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽14𝐴𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                             
(2) 
 
Following previous studies (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014), 
AB NETHIRE is the absolute value of the difference between actual net hiring and the 
expected level; EMP_TREAT is the employee treatment score constructed from the 
KLD database; MTB is the ratio of market to book value of common equity at the 
beginning of the year; SIZE is the log of market value of equity at the beginning of the 
year; LIQ is the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current 
liabilities; LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
DIVD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends in the previous year, 
0 otherwise; TANGIBLES is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets 
at the beginning of the year; LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 
reported a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise; LABINT is the ratio of employees to 
total assets at the beginning of the year; SD CFO is the standard deviation of cash 
flow from operation over year t-5 to t-1; SD SALES is the standard deviation of sales 
revenue over year t-5 to t-1; SD NETHIRE is the standard deviation of percentage 
change in employees over year t-5 to t-1; UNION is the industry-level rate of labor 
unionization for year t-1; AB INVEST is the absolute value of the residual from the 
model (Biddle et al., 2009) INVESTit = β0 + β1SALESGROWTHit−1 + εit; and i identifies 
the firm and t the year. I also include firm and year fixed effects to control for the time-
invariant unobservable firm characteristics and time-specific changes in economic 
conditions. All regressions are estimated with heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors that are clustered by firm.  
My analyses on the impact of employee treatment and abnormal net hiring on 




𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐵_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐵_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽9𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸_𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                     
(3) 
 
PERFORMANCEit is one of three indicators of firm performance as measured 
by labor productivity (SALES), profitability (ROA) and production efficiency 
(PRO_EFF). SALES is employee productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of 
sales divided by the number of employees; ROA is return on assets; PRO_EFF is 
firm-level production efficiency (Charnes et al., 1978; Demerjian et al., 2012), which 
measures the efficiency of a firm relative to the most efficient firm in the same industry 
estimated by data envelope analysis (DEA).12 DEA calculates a firm’s production 
efficiency and uses an optimization procedure to maximize the ratio of outputs to 
inputs. Demerjian et al. (2012) form an efficient frontier by measuring the amount and 
mix of resources used to generate revenue by the firms within each industry. Firms 
operating on the frontier are assigned a score of one; the lower the score, the further 
it is from the frontier. I follow Faleye and Trahan (2011) and include corporate 
                                                          
12 The production efficiency data is from Demerjian et al. (2012). DEA calculates a firm’s 
production efficiency and uses an optimization procedure to maximize the ratio of outputs to 
inputs. Demerjian et al (2012) consider one output and seven inputs, all derived from firms’ 
publicly available financial reports. Revenue is the sole output measure; we characterize an 
able management team as one that generates the highest level of revenue from a given set 
of inputs. They consider the seven inputs into the revenue production process: Net Property, 
Plant, and Equipment (PP&E); Net Operating Leases; Net R&D; Purchased Goodwill; Other 
Intangible Assets; Cost of Inventory; and Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses 
(SG&A). I obtain the data from the website: http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html. 




governance (GOVERN) as an additional control variable. I include firm and year fixed 
effect and cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
In addition to the tests above, I further investigate whether the effect of 
employee-friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency is common to most 
periods or unique to periods of limited financial resources. Several previous studies 
(Bharath et al., 2013; Buchanan et al., 2018; Lins et al., 2017, 2013) use the 2008-
2009 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to firms. For instance, Lins et al. (2017) 
investigate the value of CSR during the financial crisis and find that high-CSR firms 
experienced high stock returns, profitability and growth and sales per employee 
relative to low-CSR firms during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Buchanan et al. (2018) 
find that CSR firms have higher firm values before the financial crisis but experience 
more loss in firm value during the crisis. Following these studies, I use the 2008-2009 
financial crisis as an exogenous shock to firms and use it to disentangle the relation 
between employee treatment and labor investment efficiency. I follow Lins et al. 
(2017) and Buchanan et al. (2018) and apply difference-in-difference (DID) model 
with continuous treatment and include firm and time fixed effects to circumvent the 
endogeneity problem (Meyer, 1995; Roberts and Whited, 2012). I follow Lins et al. 
(2017) and construct a panel for all the firms in the sample starting in 2007, prior to 
the onset of the crisis, and ending in 2015. For this panel, I estimate the following DID 
regression models: 
 
𝐴𝐵_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝐹𝑅𝐷𝑖2006 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                 




𝐴𝐵_𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐻𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑃_𝐹𝑅𝐷𝑖2006 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                  
(5)                                                                                                                                          
 
Consistent with Lins et al. (2017) and Buchanan et al. (2018), I construct 
EMP_FRD by measuring firm’s employee treatment in the year 2006 to address the 
concern that firms change their employee treatment policies in anticipation of, or in 
response to, the influence from the recent financial crisis. To investigate changes in 
labor investment efficiency for employee-friendly firms surrounding the financial crisis, 
I define employee-friendly firms (EMP_FRD) as one that has positive employee 
treatment scores as of the end of the year 2006. Then, I use a propensity score 
matching (PSM) approach to construct comparable non-employee-friendly firms as 
the control group in five dimensions: market-to-book, firm size, liquidity, leverage, and 
industry defined according to Fama-French 48 industries classification. CRISIS is a 
dummy variable set to one for the year 2008 and 2009. POST_CRISIS is a dummy 
variable set to one in the period 2010 to 2015. Other control variables (CONTROLS) 
are the same as those adopted in Model 2. Following Lins et al. (2017), I include firm 
and year fixed effect and cluster standard errors at the firm level.13 
 




                                                          
13 I also follow Lins et al. (2017) and double cluster standard errors by firm and time, and I find 
the results are qualitatively similar. 
96 
 
The sample selection begins with all KLD firm-year from 1990-2015. I merge 
the data with COMPUSTAT for financial data and CRSP to obtain total annual stock 
return and also exclude observations from financial services (primary two-digit SIC 
codes between 60-69). I estimate the expected level of investment in labor based on 
economic fundamentals using Model 1 for all firms listed in COMPUSTAT during the 
period between 1991 and 2016. I calculate the inverse proxy of labor investment 
efficiency as absolute values of the difference between the observed and the 
expected values of labor investment. I obtain the industry-level rate of industry 
unionization from the website of UNIONSTATS which provides time-variant estimates 
of union membership and coverage data by industry. After merging with the above 
databases, the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 20,583 firm-year 
observations from more than 3,000 U.S. firms. In order to test the impact of employee 
treatment and abnormal net hiring on firm performance, I exclude firm-years with 
insufficient data to compute Model 3, resulting in a test sample of 12,669 to 13,681 
firm-years observations.  
 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate results 
 
In order to obtain the primary measure of abnormal net hiring, I first estimate 
Model 1. I report the descriptive statistics and results of Model 1 in Appendix A-3. 
Following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 
99th percentiles of their respective distribution to reduce the influence of outliers. the 
descriptive statistics for the percentage change in the number of employees and other 
control variables are comparable to those reported in Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), Jung 
et al. (2014) and Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016). The results and the sign of each 
variable are consistent with the results of these prior studies, and the model provides 
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reasonable estimates for the expected level of net hiring. The absolute value of the 
difference between actual net hiring and the expected level is the measure of 
abnormal net hiring, AB NETHIRE, an inverse measure of labor investment efficiency.  
In panel A of Table 1, I present descriptive statistics for the variables used in 
Models 2 and 3. The dependent variable, AB NETHIRE, has a mean of 0.12 and a 
median of 0.08 with one standard deviation of 0.18. This is close to Jung et al. (2014) 
results with a mean of 0.11 and a median of 0.07 with a standard deviation of 0.13 for 
abnormal net hiring. I also divided the variable into two subsamples based on the sign 
of abnormal net hiring. Positive abnormal net hiring (OVER LABOR) indicates that a 
firm’s actual net hiring is greater than expected (i.e., labor over-investment) whilst 
negative abnormal net hiring (UNDER LABOR) indicates that actual net hiring is less 
than expected (i.e., labor under-investment). Consistent with Ghaly et al. (2015), the 
main variable of interest, EMP TREAT, ranges from -4 to 4 with a mean of -0.08 and 
median of 0, suggesting that the number of firms with negative employee treatment 
scores outweigh the number of firms with positive employee treatment scores. The 
descriptive statistics of other control variables are generally consistent with Biddle et 
al. (2009) and Jung et al. (2014). For Model 3, the descriptive statistics include three 
firm performance measures, SALES, ROA and PRO_EFF and corporate governance 
(GOVERN). In Panel B of Table 1, I report the frequency of firms in the sample by 
year plus the mean employee treatment and abnormal net hiring variables per year. 
Given KLD only covers firms that comprise the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 and the 
Domini 400 Social Index until 2000, the sample by year before 2002 is relatively small. 
In 2001, it further extended its coverage to firms in the Russell 1,000 Index, which 









Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in Model 2 and Model 3 
       
 N Mean Median Std.Dev 25th Per 75th Per 
             
AB_NETHIREit 20,583 0.122 0.075 0.181 0.037 0.137 
OVER_LABORit 6,527 0.162 0.072 0.273 0.028 0.169 
UNDER_LABORit 14,056 -0.103 -0.076 0.110 -0.130 -0.040 
EMP_TREATit 20,583 -0.077 0.000 0.804 0.000 0.000 
MTBit-1 20,583 3.206 2.263 3.930 1.479 3.725 
SIZEit-1 20,583 7.253 7.117 1.558 6.100 8.275 
LIQit-1 20,583 1.870 1.240 2.063 0.770 2.136 
LEVit-1 20,583 0.243 0.206 0.247 0.032 0.356 
DIVDit-1 20,583 0.469 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
TANGIBLESit-1 20,583 0.289 0.213 0.237 0.099 0.428 
LOSSit-1 20,583 0.209 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.000 
LABINTit-1 20,583 0.006 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.006 
SD_CFOit-1 20,583 0.053 0.037 0.058 0.022 0.062 
SD_SALESit-1 20,583 0.144 0.103 0.135 0.060 0.180 
SD_NETHIREit-1 20,583 0.177 0.111 0.237 0.061 0.201 
UNIONit-1 20,583 0.104 0.074 0.089 0.040 0.143 
INVESTit 20,583 0.108 0.084 0.171 0.046 0.120 
SALESit 13,681 5.682 5.640 0.880 5.190 6.130 
ROAit 13,681 0.044 0.054 0.127 0.017 0.097 
PRO_EFFit 12,669 0.345 0.294 0.168 0.240 0.399 
GOVERNANCEit-1 13,681 -0.274 0.000 0.687 -1.000 0.000 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 20,583 firm-year observations 
over the period between 1995 and 2015. This table presents the number of observations, 
the mean, the median, the standard deviation, and the values for the first and the third 







Panel B: Mean Abnormal Net Hiring and Employee Treatment 
Scores by Year 
    
Year N AB_NETHIRE EMP_TREAT 
    
1995 299 0.111 0.264 
1996 303 0.102 0.261 
1997 313 0.098 0.304 
1998 323 0.120 0.368 
1999 324 0.120 0.352 
2000 326 0.125 0.322 
2001 494 0.149 0.180 
2002 642 0.103 0.040 
2003 1,375 0.137 -0.183 
2004 1,432 0.141 -0.271 
2005 1,285 0.129 -0.310 
2006 1,276 0.126 -0.365 
2007 1,218 0.123 -0.352 
2008 1,348 0.119 -0.346 
2009 1,409 0.128 -0.302 
2010 1,471 0.127 -0.094 
2011 1,429 0.117 -0.052 
2012 1,424 0.112 0.060 
2013 1,437 0.110 0.174 
2014 1,333 0.112 0.140 
2015 1,122 0.113 0.199 
        
Panel B of Table 1 presents the mean abnormal net hiring 
(AB_NETHIRE) and employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) by year 




In Panel C of Table 1, I contrast the descriptive statistics of firms with positive, 
zero, and negative employee treatment scores. I define firms with positive employee 
treatment scores as employee-friendly firms, and firms with negative employee 
treatment scores as non-employee-friendly firms. The comparison indicates that firms 
with employee-friendly treatment policies have a lower mean (median) abnormal net 
hiring of 10.6% (7%) than those with negative employee treatment of 12.8% (8.2%). 
These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for both the mean and 
median. Neutral firms generally fall in the middle between the two groups with a mean 
of 12.4% and a median of 7.5% for abnormal net hiring. The differences for the firm 
performance variables are also all statistically significant at the 1% level, with firms 
with positive employee treatment outperforming those with negative.  
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables in Model 
2 and 3. I find a negative and significant correlation between the employee treatment 
score (EMP TREAT) and the level of abnormal net hiring (AB NETHIRE), indicating 
that firms with good employee treatment practices are generally associated with a 
higher level of labor investment efficiency. The correlations among other variables are 
consistent with the expectations. For instance, I find firms with higher growth options 
(MTB), higher levels of liquidity (LIQ) and higher concurrent abnormal non-labor 
investments (INVEST) are more likely to have higher abnormal net hiring. However, 
larger firms (SIZE), firms paying dividends in the past (DIVD) and firms with a higher 
level of tangibility (TANGIBLES) are negatively associated with abnormal net hiring. 
In addition, I generally find abnormal net hiring is negatively associated with firm 






Panel C: Descriptive Statistics by Employee-Friendly versus Non-Employee-Friendly Firms 















AB_NETHIREit 3,030 0.106 0.070 
 13,079 0.124 0.075  4,474 0.128 0.082  < 0.001 < 0.001 
OVER_LABORit 886 0.133 0.061 
 4,402 0.166 0.075  1,239 0.171 0.071  < 0.001 0.010 
UNDER_LABORit 2,144 -0.095 -0.073 
 8,677 -0.102 -0.075  3,235 -0.111 -0.084  < 0.001 < 0.001 
EMP_TREATit 3,030 1.271 1.000 
 13,079 0.000 0.000  4,474 -1.215 -1.000  < 0.001 < 0.001 
MTBit-1 3,030 3.814 2.640 
 13,079 3.154 2.219  4,474 2.948 2.179  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SIZEit-1 3,030 8.260 8.330 
 13,079 7.032 6.900  4,474 7.220 7.102  < 0.001 < 0.001 
LIQit-1 3,030 1.692 1.153 
 13,079 1.974 1.323  4,474 1.687 1.090  0.905 0.001 
LEVit-1 3,030 0.240 0.211 
 13,079 0.238 0.194  4,474 0.260 0.231  < 0.001 0.006 
DIVDit-1 3,030 0.603 1.000  13,079 0.430 0.000  4,474 0.494 0.000  < 0.001 < 0.001 
TANGIBLESit-1 3,030 0.314 0.251  13,079 0.275 0.195  4,474 0.313 0.249  0.944 0.688 
LOSSit-1 3,030 0.134 0.000  13,079 0.213 0.000   4,474 0.248 0.000  < 0.001 < 0.001 
LABINTit-1 3,030 0.004 0.002  13,079 0.006 0.003  4,474 0.007 0.004  < 0.001 < 0.001 
INVESTit 3,030 0.095 0.072  13,079 0.113 0.085  4,474 0.104 0.086  0.003 < 0.001 
SD_CFOit-1 3,030 0.046 0.034  13,079 0.055 0.038   4,474 0.055 0.037  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SD_SALESit-1 3,030 0.120 0.090  13,079 0.146 0.105  4,474 0.152 0.109  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SD_NETHIREit-1 3,030 0.152 0.092  13,079 0.179 0.113  4,474 0.189 0.115  < 0.001 < 0.001 
UNIONit-1 3,030 0.127 0.093  13,079 0.099 0.074  4,474 0.104 0.078  < 0.001 < 0.001 
SALESit 2,165 5.830 5.771  8,569 5.693 5.656  2,947 5.542 5.504  < 0.001 < 0.001 
ROAit 2,165  0.063   0.066  8,569 0.042 0.053  2,947  0.038 0.048  < 0.001 < 0.001 
PRO_EFFit 1,966 0.434 0.370  7,985 0.324 0.281  2,718 0.341 0.293  < 0.001 < 0.001 
GOVERNANCEit-1 2,165 -0.291 0.000  8,569 -0.247 0.000   2,947 -0.342 0.000  0.017 0.010 
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Panel C of Table 1 reports the average values of the firm characteristics for the full sample and subsamples based on the sign of the employee treatment 
scores. I also report the significance of the differences in means and medians between firms with positive and negative employee treatment scores. The 







Correlations among Employee Treatment, Abnormal Net Hiring, and Other Variables 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. AB_NETHIRE 1        
2. EMP_TREAT -0.030*** 1       
3. MTB 0.023*** 0.070*** 1      
4. SIZE -0.108*** 0.153*** 0.192*** 1     
5. LIQ 0.146*** 0.024*** 0.051*** -0.198*** 1    
6. LEV 0.036*** -0.037*** -0.018*** 0.108*** -0.224*** 1   
7. DIVD -0.123*** 0.042*** -0.013* 0.369*** -0.268*** 0.046*** 1  
8. TANGIBLES -0.072*** -0.021*** -0.114*** 0.147*** -0.327*** 0.255*** 0.251*** 1 
9. LOSS 0.102*** -0.074*** -0.017** -0.300*** 0.161*** 0.057*** -0.272*** -0.079*** 
10. LABINT -0.038*** -0.081*** 0.00400 -0.100*** -0.105*** -0.087*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 
11. INVEST 0.332*** -0.00900 0.064*** -0.093*** 0.074*** 0.040*** -0.096*** -0.041*** 
12. SD_CFO 0.170*** -0.029*** 0.159*** -0.289*** 0.253*** -0.075*** -0.275*** -0.227*** 
13. SD_SALES 0.097*** -0.061*** 0.029*** -0.199*** 0.00200 0.00100 -0.147*** -0.184*** 
14 SD_NETHIRE 0.141*** -0.044*** 0.000 -0.109*** 0.069*** 0.108*** -0.184*** -0.083*** 
15. UNION -0.020*** 0.061*** -0.067*** 0.095*** -0.026*** 0.061*** 0.136*** 0.205*** 
16. SALES -0.040*** 0.094*** -0.024*** 0.200*** -0.100*** 0.097*** 0.086*** 0.134*** 
17. ROA -0.149*** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.234*** -0.154*** -0.077*** 0.189*** 0.045*** 
18 PRO_EFF -0.012* 0.159*** 0.146*** 0.521*** -0.087*** 0.017** 0.158*** -0.018** 







            
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
9. LOSSit-1 1           
10. LABINTit-1 -0.067*** 1          
11. INVESTit 0.088*** -0.027*** 1         
12. SD_CFOit-1 0.266*** -0.036*** 0.200*** 1        
13. SD_SALESit-1 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.081*** 0.335*** 1       
14 SD_NETHIREit-1 0.133*** -0.053*** 0.070*** 0.161*** 0.205*** 1      
15. UNIONit-1 -0.031*** -0.155*** -0.047*** -0.095*** -0.076*** -0.00100 1     
16. SALESit -0.074*** -0.498*** -0.00900 -0.019*** 0.083*** -0.00500 0.101*** 1    
17. ROAit -0.430*** 0.086*** -0.223*** -0.316*** -0.032*** -0.133*** 0.013* 0.150*** 1   
18 PRO_EFF -0.168*** -0.059*** -0.00100 -0.062*** 0.00100 -0.050*** -0.038*** 0.278*** 0.239*** 1  
19. GOVERNANCEit-1 0.00700 0.027*** 0.0110 0.032*** -0.00100 -0.016** 0.042*** -0.030*** -0.013* -0.144*** 1 
            
This table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation between all variables included in Equation 2 and Equation 3. 






4.1 The Impact of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Labor Investment  
 
Table 3 shows the main results for the relationship between employee 
treatment scores (EMP TREAT) and abnormal net hiring. Column 1 shows the results 
for the baseline regression model using the absolute value of the residual, AB 
NETHIRE, as the dependent variable, and the estimated coefficient on EMP TREAT 
is negatively and statistically significant. The results support the hypothesis, 
suggesting that higher employee treatment scores are associated with lower 
deviations of labor investment from the level justified by economic fundamentals, i.e., 
higher labor investment efficiency. Moreover, I find EMP TREAT is also economically 
highly significant. The results show that a one standard deviation increase in 
employee treatment is associated with a 4.3% decrease in labor investment 
inefficiency.14 I also find that larger firms and firms with a higher level of tangibility 
exhibit more efficient labor investments, whilst those with a higher level of liquidity, 
leverage and higher abnormal non-labor investments are more likely to suffer 
inefficient labor investment.   
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, I re-estimate the baseline model based on the 
subsamples of firms that exhibit overinvestment (actual net hiring greater than 
expected, i.e., positive abnormal net hiring) and underinvestment (actual net hiring 
less than expected, i.e., negative abnormal net hiring) of labor. The results suggest 
                                                          
14 The sample average value AB NETHIRE is 0.122. The coefficient for EMP_TREAT is equal 
to -0.0065 and its standard deviation is equal to 0.804. A one standard deviation increase in 
EMP_TREAT is associated with a 4.3% decrease in labor investment inefficiency (-
0.00652*0.804/0.122) = -0.043. 
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that firms with employee-friendly treatment face lower propensities of both labor 
overinvestment and underinvestment. In column 4 of Table 3, I use the Fama-
MacBeth approach to estimate the baseline regression model and I find the results 
are similar to the main results in column 1. Finally, in column 5, I restrict the sample 
to firms with positive (EMP_TREAT>0) or negative (EMP_TREAT<0), but not neutral 
(EMP_TREAT=0) employee treatment performance and the results are consistent 
with the result reported in column 1. The negative relation between employee 
treatment (EMP TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB NETHIRE) in all regressions is 
inconsistent with the view that employee-friendly treatment is a manifestation of 
agency costs, which would imply an impact on labor investment but not divestment. 





The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring 
      
















NETHIRE       
EMP_TREATit -0.0065*** -0.0134** 0.0043*** -0.0043*** -0.0076** 
 (-3.19) (-2.01) (2.77) (-4.03) (-2.48) 
MTBit-1 0.0003 0.0031** 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0008 
 (0.52) (2.58) (1.40) (-1.35) (-1.11) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0891*** -0.1343* 0.0535** -0.0184 -0.0941* 
 (-3.27) (-1.75) (2.48) (-1.72) (-1.87) 
LIQit-1 0.0090*** 0.0123*** -0.0022 0.0114*** 0.0058* 
 (4.65) (2.94) (-1.22) (4.15) (1.70) 
LEVit-1 0.0351*** 0.0551* -0.0561*** 0.0361*** 0.0269 
 (3.27) (1.77) (-6.96) (5.54) (1.61) 
DIVDit-1 0.0073 0.0078 -0.0068* -0.0147*** -0.0014 
 (1.20) (0.39) (-1.84) (-3.61) (-0.14) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0606** -0.0791 0.0518** -0.0087 -0.0610 
 (-2.15) (-1.19) (1.98) (-1.26) (-1.36) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0037 -0.0035 -0.0070** 0.0151** -0.0003 
 (-0.86) (-0.28) (-2.05) (2.09) (-0.04) 
LABINTit-1 -1.9138** -11.1029*** -2.2398*** -0.4089*** -1.2774 
 (-2.09) (-3.78) (-4.40) (-3.03) (-1.15) 
INVESTit 0.3249*** 0.4249*** -0.2339*** 0.3678*** 0.4287*** 
 (5.49) (10.43) (-5.16) (8.63) (9.67) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.0194 0.0276 -0.0243 0.0882* 0.0583 
 (0.30) (0.21) (-0.45) (1.95) (0.58) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0135 0.0378 0.0238* 0.0702** 0.0294 
 (0.70) (0.66) (1.67) (2.70) (0.84) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.1537*** -0.3022*** 0.0095 0.0607*** -0.2360*** 
 (-8.47) (-6.86) (1.25) (4.67) (-4.81) 
UNIONit-1 0.0352 0.0587 0.0182 -0.0007 0.1302** 
 (0.90) (0.46) (0.62) (-0.05) (2.13) 
      
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
N 20,583 6,527 14,056 20,583 7,210 
Adjusted R2 25.4% 31.4% 28.3% 18.0% 31.7% 
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This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on employee treatment 
and other control variables over the sample period between 1995 and 2015. Column 1 
shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on employee treatment 
and control variables. Column 2 shows the results regressing labor overinvestment 
(OVER_LABOR) on employee treatment and control variables. Column 3 shows the 
results regressing labor underinvestment (UNDER_LABOR) on employee treatment and 
control variables. Column 4 presents the results of a Fama-MacBeth regression. Column 5 
excludes the firms with neutral employee treatment scores (EMP_TREAT = 0). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 
adjusted by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
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4.1.1 Over- and Under-Hiring (Firing) 
 
My results so far show that employee-friendly treatment is associated with 
higher labor investment efficiency. In order to further investigate the potential channel 
through which employee-friendly treatment contributes to higher labor investment 
efficiency I further decompose over- and underinvestment, based on whether the 
expected level of net hiring from Model (1) is positive or negative. In Table 4, column 
1 and 2, I further decompose labor overinvestment into over-hiring (OVERHIRING) 
and under-firing (UNDERFIRING) based on the actual net hiring and expected 
amount. I define over-hiring (OVERHIRING) as actual net hiring exceeds the 
expected amount when expected net hiring is positive and under-firing 
(UNDERFIRING) as actual net hiring exceeds the expected amount when expected 
net hiring is negative. In the same vein, I decompose labor underinvestment into 
under-hiring (UNDERHIRING) and over-firing (OVERFIRING) in column 3 and 4. By 
further decomposing over- and underinvestment, I can test whether the favorable 
impact of employee treatment on labor investment efficiency is from the benefits of 
employee retention within firms or improved recruitment. I re-estimate the baseline 
model for each subsample and the results show that the estimated coefficient on EMP 
TREAT is negative and statistically significant for over-hiring (OVERHIRING) and 
positive and statistically significant for under-hiring (UNDERHIRING). Hence, the 
results indicate that employee-friendly treatment contributes to higher labor 
investment efficiency by reducing both over and under-hiring but have little effect on 






Potential Mechanism: Over- and Under-Hiring (Firing) 














EMP_TREATit -0.0071** -0.0098 0.0041*** -0.0078 
 
(-2.11) (-0.28) (3.20) (-0.85) 
MTBit-1 0.0029*** -0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 
(3.03) (-0.28) (1.62) (0.36) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0689* 0.1514 0.0545** -0.0077 
 
(-1.75) (0.60) (2.22) (-0.09) 
LIQit-1 0.0068** -0.0054 -0.0007 -0.0051 
 
(2.63) (-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.92) 
LEVit-1 0.0335 -0.1221 -0.0538*** -0.1772** 
 
(1.53) (-1.31) (-6.63) (-2.78) 
DIVDit-1 0.0048 -0.0577 -0.0038 -0.0218 
 
(0.49) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-0.74) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0355 0.0189 0.0485* 0.3347*** 
 
(-0.79) (0.10) (1.95) (3.30) 
LOSSit-1 0.0050 0.0622** -0.0060* -0.0073 
 
(0.63) (2.35) (-1.77) (-0.63) 
LABINTit-1 -4.3269*** -30.6010* -1.7338*** -9.5145*** 
 
(-3.25) (-1.91) (-3.70) (-4.31) 
INVESTit 0.2338*** 0.0844 -0.2335*** 0.2220 
 
(9.70) (0.77) (-5.87) (1.21) 
SD_CFOit-1 -0.0090 0.4069 -0.0513 -0.1990 
 
(-0.12) (1.44) (-0.89) (-0.64) 
SD_SALESit-1 -0.0218 0.3168 0.0204 0.0654 
 
(-0.70) (1.35) (1.41) (0.73) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.1081*** -0.3740** 0.0037 0.0775** 
 
(-5.02) (-2.18) (0.50) (2.15) 
UNIONit-1 0.0846 0.5654 0.0227 -0.2335 
 
(1.03) (1.48) (0.69) (-1.48) 
     
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,716 811 12,791 1,265 
Adjusted R2 29.8% 40.8% 33.8% 18.4% 
     
Column 1 to 4 present the results of estimating the baseline model on various subsets of 
the sample from 1995 to 2015. Overhiring is the actual net hiring that exceeds the expected 
amount, when expected net hiring is positive (Column 1). Underfiring is the actual net hiring 
that exceeds the expected amount when expected net hiring is negative (Column 2). 
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Underhiring is actual net hiring that is less than the expected amount when the expected 
amount if positive (Column 3). Overfiring is actual net hiring that is less than the expected 
amount when the expected amount is negative (Column 4).  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels. All test statistics 
and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a one-




4.1.2 Financial Crisis as an Exogenous Shock 
 
My evidence so far shows that employee-friendly treatment is associated with 
high labor investment efficiency across our sample period. In the decomposition of 
over- and underinvestment test earlier, I find that the favourable influence of 
employee-friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency is primary driven by 
effective hiring in expansion periods (i.e., the expected level of net hiring is positive 
and the economic fundamentals suggest a firm’s labor force should expand). In 
contrast, I do not find significant evidence indicating the positive effect of employee-
friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency in contraction period (i.e., underfiring 
and overfiring, when the expected level of net hiring is negative and the economic 
fundamentals suggest a firm’s labor force should contract). One significant period for 
firms’ labor force contraction can be financial crisis when firms face limited financial 
resources over an uncertain duration and are more likely to significantly contract their 
investments (Almeida et al., 2012). In this section, I follow Lins et al. (2017) and 
Buchanan et al. (2018) and use the 2008-2009 financial crisis as an exogenous shock 
to investigate whether the positive impact of employee-friendly treatment on labor 
investment efficiency is unique to the financial crisis or common to most periods. 
Following Lins et al. (2017) and Buchanan et al. (2018), I apply a difference-
in-difference (DID) model with continuous treatment and include firm and time fixed 
effects and use non-employee-friendly firms as a control group to difference out 
possible confounding factors and isolate the effect of employee treatment on labor 
investment efficiency. As for Lins et al. (2017), I construct a panel for all the firms in 
our sample starting in 2007, prior to the onset of the crisis, and ending in 2015. The 
firm’s employee-friendly treatment dummy (EMP_FRD) itself is absorbed by the firm 
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fixed effects and financial crisis dummies (CRISIS and POST_CRISIS) are absorbed 
by the year fixed effects. To capture the DID of employee-friendly firms’ labor 
investment efficiency, the key variables of interest are the interaction terms, 
EMP_FRD * CRISIS in Model 4 and EMP_FRD * POST_CRISIS in Model 5.  
In Table 5, I present the results of the DID regressions for the different 
response of labor investment efficiency to the financial crisis and post-financial crisis 
period between employee-friendly firms and non-employee-friendly firms. Specifically, 
I find the coefficient of interest, EMP_FRD * CRISIS, is positive and statistically 
significant. This evidence suggests that firms with employee-friendly policies find it 
difficult to adjust their labor investment efficiently during financial turmoil periods. In 
contrast, I find the coefficient estimate on the interaction term EMP_FRD * 
POST_CRISIS, is negative and significant, which suggests that the favourable effect 
of employee-friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency found during the post-
crisis period. Buchanan et al. (2018) find that CSR firms have higher firm values in 
the non-financial crisis period but experience more loss in firm value during the crisis. 
Specifically, they find that CSR engagement enhances firm value through reduced 
conflict of interest between managers and non-investing stakeholders in non-financial 
crisis period whereas CSR-related costs can outweigh conflict resolution benefits 
during the financial crisis. My results reflect their findings and show that employee-
friendly treatment facilitates efficient labor investment in the post-financial crisis period 
but not during the financial turmoil period. In light of Buchanan et al. (2018), one 
potential reason could be that firms’ financial resources become more valuable and 
the expected return on investment falls in financial crisis period, agency conflicts can 
be severe and outweigh conflict resolution benefits. Overall, the results in Table 5 
suggest that the effect of employee-friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency 
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varies with economic conditions and the costs of adopting employee-friendly policies 




The Different Response of Labor Investment Efficiency to the Financial Crisis and 









   
 
EMP_FRD2006 * CRISISt 0.0428***  0.0233** 





  (-3.39) (-2.36) 
MTBit-1 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0028 
 (-1.63) (-1.84) (-1.43) 
SIZEit-1 -0.1568 -0.1547 -0.1540 
 (-1.38) (-1.35) (-1.35) 
LIQit-1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
LEVit-1 0.0124 0.0136 0.0125 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.37) 
DIVDit-1 0.0365 0.0360 0.0362 
 (1.24) (1.23) (1.23) 
TANGIBLESit-1 0.1011 0.0851 0.0868 
 (0.79) (0.67) (0.68) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0091 -0.0080 -0.0085 
 (-0.74) (-0.67) (-0.70) 
LABINTit-1 0.2551 0.1803 0.1943 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
INVESTit 0.6579*** 0.6576*** 0.6572*** 
 (4.29) (4.30) (4.29) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.4237 0.4210 0.4192 
 (0.84) (0.83) (0.83) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0417 0.0361 0.0386 
 (0.64) (0.55) (0.59) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.0827 -0.0854 -0.0852 
 (-1.25) (-1.32) (-1.31) 
UNIONit-1 0.2707* 0.2625* 0.2637* 
 (2.01) (1.93) (1.94) 
   
 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,446 1,446 1,446 
Adjusted R2 24.0% 24.0% 24.0% 
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This table presents the results from the DID regression of labor investment efficiency on the 
indicators of employee-friendly firms (EMP_FRD) and financial crisis (CRISIS) or post-
financial crisis (POST_CRISIS). EMP_FRD is set equal to one if a firm has positive 
employee treatment scores as of the year 2006, and zero otherwise. CRISIS is set equal to 
one if the time period is between 2008 and 2009, and equals zero otherwise. Other variables 
are the same in Model 2 and are defined in Appendix 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted 





4.2 The Impact of Employee Treatment and Abnormal Net Hiring on Firm 
Performance 
 
To demonstrate the economic implications of employee treatment (EMP 
TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB NETHIRE), I investigate the impact of employee 
treatment and abnormal net hiring on three measures of firm performance: sales per 
employee (SALES), return on assets (ROA) and production efficiency (PRO_EFF). 
Given that previous research (Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2016; Ertugrul, 2013; 
Faleye and Trahan, 2011; Fauver et al., 2018) suggests that employee-friendly 
policies positively influence value creation, I expect that firms treating their employees 
well will have better performance. In contrast, given abnormal net hiring captures the 
deviation of labor investment from the employment level justified by a firm’s underlying 
economics, I predict that abnormal net hiring has a negative impact on firm 
performance. 
The results in Table 6 confirm the predictions in Hypothesis 2. I find the 
estimated coefficients on employee treatment are positive and significant when the 
return on assets (ROA) and production efficiency (PRO_EFF) are the dependent 
variables, indicating that employee-friendly treatment positively enhances firm 
performance. However, I do not find significant results for sales per employee 
(SALES). On the other hand, I find that the coefficients of abnormal net hiring (AB 
NETHIRE) are all negative and statistically significant, suggesting that abnormal net 
hiring adversely affect firms’ labor productivity, profitability, and production efficiency. 
Moreover, I also find EMP_TREAT and AB_NETHIRE are also economically highly 
significant. The results show that a one standard deviation increase in employee 
treatment and abnormal net hiring is associated with a 9.2% increase and a 12.4% 
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decrease in ROA respectively. 15  Overall, the tests for the impact of employee 
treatment and abnormal net hiring on firm performance suggest that employee-
friendly treatment policies enhance firm performance whereas sub-optimal net hiring 
is costly in terms of firm performance.  
 
                                                          
15 The sample average value ROA is 0.044. The coefficient for EMP_TREAT is equal to 
0.00501 and its standard deviation is equal to 0.804. A one standard deviation increases in 
EMP_TREAT is associated with a 9.2% increase in ROA (0.00501*0.804/0.044) = 0.092. The 
coefficient for AB_NETHIRE is equal to -0.034 and its standard deviation is equal to 0.161. A 
one standard deviation increases in AB_NETHIRE is associated with a 12.4% decrease in 














    
EMP_TREATit-1 -0.0002 0.0050*** 0.0119*** 
 (-0.03) (3.62) (5.22) 
AB_NETHIREit-1 -0.1137*** -0.0350*** -0.0136* 
 (-3.80) (-3.66) (-1.78) 
SIZEit-1 0.4890*** 0.1338*** 0.1445*** 
 (4.57) (5.52) (5.73) 
LIQit-1 -0.0314*** -0.0011 -0.0030* 
 (-3.69) (-0.72) (-1.84) 
LEVit-1 -0.0648** -0.0339*** -0.0147 
 (-2.15) (-2.89) (-1.44) 
MTBit-1 -0.0007 0.0031*** 0.0016*** 
 (-0.40) (4.87) (3.54) 
PPEit-1 -0.0080 -0.0035 -0.0316 
 (-0.07) (-0.16) (-1.01) 
INVESTit-1 -0.2744*** -0.0316* 0.0345*** 
 (-7.63) (-1.79) (4.13) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0257** -0.0165*** -0.0030 
 (-2.26) (-4.32) (-0.89) 
SALESGROWTH1it-1 0.3088*** 0.0577*** 0.0516*** 
 (10.42) (7.65) (6.88) 
SALESGROWTH2it-1 0.1685*** 0.0321*** 0.0202*** 
 (5.39) (5.78) (4.36) 
GOVERNANCEit-1 0.0054 0.0031** -0.0044** 
 (1.07) (2.07) (-2.15) 
  
  
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 13,681 13,681 12,669 
Adjusted R2 92.9% 57.8% 69.4% 
    
This table presents the results from regressing labor productivity, profitability and production 
efficiency on employee treatment, abnormal net hiring and other control variables as 
dependent variables. Column 1 shows the results of the regression using employee 
productivity measured as the natural logarithm of sales per employee as the dependent 
variable. Column 2 shows the results of the regression using the return on assets as the 
dependent variable. Column 3 shows the results of the regression using production 




4.3 Endogeneity Concerns 
 
4.3.1 Omitted Variable and Reverse Causality Concern: Non-Labor 
Dimensions of CSR  
 
In this section, I examine the non-labor dimensions of firms’ social 
performance on labor investment efficiency. Bouslah et al. (2013) argue that the 
aggregate CSR measure may confound the influence of individual CSR dimensions 
and therefore each individual CSR dimension should be considered separately. The 
main reason for me to investigate the impact of the dimensions of CSR other than 
employee treatment on abnormal net hiring is to help rule out reverse causality and 
omitted correlated variables as explanations for the statistically significant association 
I report in the previous section. If a firm’s good employee treatment is merely a 
reflection of a firm’s overall social performance/social capital, or omitted variables 
such as performance, management competence and/or strategic advantage are 
driving the results, I might expect that characteristic to similarly affect other 
dimensions of CSR. If I find a significant effect on other elements of CSR, it is strongly 
suggestive that the result for employee treatment may be driven by endogeneity. 
 I test the impact of each dimension of CSR on abnormal net hiring in Table 
7, which serves as a placebo test to indicate whether the abnormal net hiring is 
negatively associated with a firm’s social performance or only with employee 
treatment. Five social dimensions are very different from employee treatment: 
Environment; Community; Diversity; Product; and Human Rights. The other, 
employee relations, includes but extends, the dimensions I labeled employee 
treatment. If reverse causality or omitted variables drive the relationship, I should 
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observe significant results between abnormal net hiring and these additional social 
dimensions. If it is employee treatment policies that drive more efficient labor 
investment, I should only observe significant results between employee relations and 

































   
 (0.68)   
   
COMMUNITYit  -0.0000  
   
  (-0.01)  
   
EMP_RELATIONit 
  -0.0048*** 
   
   (-3.18) 
   
DIVERSITYit    -0.0022   
    
(-1.48)   
PRODUCTit    
 0.0007  
    
 (0.25)  
HUMAN_RIGHTSit    
  0.0012 
    
  (0.25) 
MTBit-1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.53) (0.53) (0.49) (0.50) (0.53) (0.53) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0888*** -0.0882*** -0.0872*** -0.0860*** -0.0883*** -0.0883*** 
 
(-3.25) (-3.23) (-3.20) (-3.14) (-3.23) (-3.24) 
LIQit-1 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 
 
(4.62) (4.64) (4.67) (4.63) (4.64) (4.64) 
LEVit-1 0.0350*** 0.0351*** 0.0351*** 0.0352*** 0.0350*** 0.0351*** 
 
(3.26) (3.27) (3.28) (3.28) (3.27) (3.27) 
DIVDit-1 0.0073 0.0073 0.0075 0.0073 0.0073 0.0073 
 
(1.21) (1.20) (1.24) (1.21) (1.20) (1.21) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0617** -0.0618** -0.0603** -0.0612** -0.0619** -0.0621** 
 
(-2.19) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-2.17) (-2.20) (-2.21) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0031 
 
(-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.81) (-0.69) (-0.72) (-0.72) 
LABINTit-1 -1.9619** -1.9536** -1.8941** -1.9397** -1.9548** -1.9561** 
 
(-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.07) (-2.12) (-2.14) (-2.14) 
INVESTit 0.3246*** 0.3246*** 0.3248*** 0.3247*** 0.3246*** 0.3247*** 
 
(5.49) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) (5.49) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.0227 0.0228 0.0205 0.0217 0.0228 0.0227 
 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0138 0.0136 0.0131 0.0136 0.0136 0.0136 
 
(0.71) (0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.71) (0.70) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.1535*** -0.1536*** -0.1539*** -0.1539*** -0.1536*** -0.1536*** 
 
(-8.50) (-8.51) (-8.49) (-8.54) (-8.51) (-8.51) 
UNIONit-1 0.0297 0.0304 0.0330 0.0308 0.0304 0.0304 
 (0.77) (0.78) (0.85) (0.79) (0.78) (0.78) 
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Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20,583 20,583 20,583 20,583 20,583 20,583 
Adjusted R2 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 25.4% 
       
This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on individual components of CSR and 
other control variables over the period between 1995 and 2015. The individual components of CSR are 
environment (ENVIRONMENT), community (COMMUNITY), employee relations (EMP_RELATION), 
diversity (DIVERSITY), product (PRODUCT) and human rights (HUMAN_RIGHTS).  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a one-




In Table 7, the results show that only the employee relation variable is 
significantly associated with abnormal net hiring 16 . These results are therefore 
consistent with the contention that it is the employee-related social dimensions that 
affect abnormal net hiring instead of a firm’s social performance/social capital in 
general. They are also inconsistent with the contention that labor investment 
efficiency impacts on CSR, or that labor investment efficiency and CSR are both 
caused by an omitted correlated variable such as management competence or 
competitive advantage. 
 
4.3.2 Reverse causality: 2SLS estimation using instrumental variables  
 
Despite examining the non-labor dimensions of social performance, and 
incorporating an extensive list of control variables, I cannot rule out the possibility that 
the results suffer from endogeneity. For instance, it could be argued that firms with 
high labor investment efficiency provide the resources for management to specifically 
treat their employees well, rather than employee-friendly treatment generating 
efficient labor investment decisions. In order to address this concern, I use an 
instrumental variable approach. First, as an instrument for employee treatment of firm 
i in year t, I use the average employee treatment scores of firms with headquarters 
located in the same state. Prior research shows that physical proximity can be an 
important factor for corporate policies (Jiraporn et al., 2014; Wang and Pirinsky, 
2010), and employee welfare and treatment practices are likely to be affected by firms’ 
geographic proximity. In addition, in the spirit of Lin et al. (2011) and Laeven and 
                                                          
16 Here, I use the ‘employee relations’ (EMP REL) from the KLD to proxy for a firm’s employee 
treatment in the CSR dimensions tests. Given the two variables, ‘employee treatment’ and 
‘employee relations’ share most of the employee treatment components, an overlap between 
the results for ‘employee treatment’ and’ employee relations’ is to be expected. In untabulated 
results, I find the results are consistent if I use the ‘employee treatment’ (EMP TREAT).   
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Levine (2009), I follow prior studies (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Ferrell et al., 2016) and use 
the mean of the employee treatment score in year t of all firms belonging to firm i’s 2-
digit SIC code as an instrument for the employee treatment of firm i in year t. The 
underlying motivation for using these instrumental variables is that a firm’s employee 
treatment policies tend to be correlated within given industries or states, but the 
industry-level and state-level employee treatment is not related to the labor 
investment efficiency of a single firm.   
 In Table 8, I report results for Model 2 and 3 using instrumental variables 
estimated using 2SLS. The first column of each set of test reports the first-stage 
results, indicating a strong correlation between the firm and both state and industry 
employee treatment levels. The second column of each set of test presents the results 
from the second stage regression estimated using 2SLS. These results confirm the 
negative and significant association between employee treatment and abnormal net 
hiring, which is consistent with the results generated from the baseline OLS 
regressions. Moreover, the results also generally indicate that the favorable impact of 
employee-friendly treatment, and the detrimental impact of abnormal net hiring on firm 
performance. In untabulated results, I generate similar results using GMM and LIML. 
Across all models, the two instrumental variables pass both the Cragg and Donald 




The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring and the Effect of Employee Treatment and Abnormal Net Hiring on Employee 
Productivity, Profitability and Production Efficiency 






































       
EMP_TREAT 
 
-0.0207***  -0.0176  0.0029*  0.0340*** 
 
 
(-2.64)  (-1.05)  (1.71)  (5.12) 
AB_NETHIRE 
 
  -0.1161***  -0.0290***  -0.0131* 
 
 
  (-3.87)  (-4.69)  (-1.76) 
EMP_TREAT_STATE 0.7252***  0.6935***  0.6935***  0.6088***  
 
(11.52)  (13.12)  (13.12)  (8.28)  
EMP_TREAT_INDUSTRY 0.8701***   0.8279***   0.8279***  0.8477***  
 (13.21)  (15.30)  (15.30)  (14.90)  
  
       
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 18,428 18,428 13,565 13,565 13,565 13,565 12,064 12,064 
Adjusted R2 51.2% 35.6% 54.8% 94.7% 54.8% 63.4% 54.8% 73.4% 
 
 
       
First-stage F-statistic 23.96  36.69  36.69  25.95  
First stage Cragg-Donald F-
test statistics 
777.64  1023.45  1023.45  758.27  
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This table presents the results from instrumental variable regressions that control for the endogeneity of employee treatment. I employ two instruments: 
(1) the mean of the employee treatment score of firms having headquarters located in the same state (EMP_TREAT_STATE) and (2) the mean of the 
employee treatment score in year t of all firms belonging to firm i’s 2-digit SIC code (EMP_TREAT_INDUSTRY). Section (1) presents the 2SLS 
estimation results for Model 2 of the study to test the relationship between employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE). 
Section (2) to Section (5)  present the 2SLS estimation results for Model 3 of the study to test the impact of employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and 
abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on employee productivity, profitability, and production efficiency (SALES, ROA and PRO_EFF). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  




4.3.3 Fortune’s Best 100 List, ASSET4 and PSM approach 
 
My results so far suggest that employee-friendly treatment policies, as 
indicated by KLD, are consistent with lower levels of abnormal net hiring (i.e., higher 
labor investment efficiency) and better firm performance. The KLD database is widely 
available and has considerable credibility from its widespread use in prior research. 
However, some previous studies have also used Fortune magazine’s list of the ‘100 
Best Companies to Work For’ (Fortune List hereafter) as an alternative indicator of 
employee treatment (Bae et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2016; Edmans, 2011; Faleye and 
Trahan, 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2016). If effective, this would be a 
valuable alternative which would provide a useful robustness test. One potential 
concern is that the Fortune List will be biased towards large and successful firms. 
Given this reservation, a better contrast between the performance of the Fortune List 
firms and other firms might be achieved using the propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach. I use the PSM approach by matching control firms with firms listed in the 
Fortune List based on growth option (MTB), firm size (SIZE), liquidity (LIQ) and 
leverage (LEV) plus industry and year. Firms listed in the Fortune List are viewed as 
treated firms and I select the nearest neighbor as the control firm. I find that the 
Fortune List produces results which are compatible with those based on the KLD 
employee treatment score and the PSM results in Table 9 confirm that employee-
friendly firms generally enjoy low abnormal net hiring, i.e., higher labor investment 
efficiency and better financial performance. To examine the robustness of the results, 
I further use an alternative employee treatment proxy from the ASSET4 database. 
The employee-relevant variables in ASSET4 are under the Social category and I 
construct the employee treatment proxy from four employee-relevant variables: 
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Health & Safety, Employment Quality, Training and Development, and Diversity and 
Opportunities. In untabulated results, I find the relationship between abnormal net 
hiring and employee treatment is still negative and statistically significant at 1% level 














DIFF T-stat N 
       
EMP_TREAT ATT 0.853 0.069 0.784 11.72*** 435 
 
      
ET_STRENGTH ATT 1.260 0.561 0.6989 11.81*** 435 
 
      







ASSET4 ATT 254.605 210.031 44.574 4.68*** 239 
       
AB_NETHIRE ATT 0.089 0.107 -0.018 -2.09** 435 
       
SALES ATT 5.688 5.397 0.292 2.68*** 435 
       
ROA ATT 0.111 0.099 0.012 1.90* 435 
       
PRO_EFF ATT 0.523 0.451 0.072 5.28*** 433 
       
This table presents the results from using a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to 
compare the employee-friendly firms with non-employee-friendly firms in several dimensions. I 
consider firms in the Fortune's '100 Best Companies to Work For' list as employee-friendly firms 
and use the PSM approach to construct comparable firms that are not listed in the Fortune's '100 
Best Companies to Work For' list as the control group in several dimensions: market-to-book, 
firm size, liquidity, leverage, industry defined according to Fama-French 48 industries 
classification and same year.  
  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted by a 





4.4 Subsample Analysis 
 
In this section, I further investigate whether the impact of employee-friendly treatment 
on labor investment efficiency varies in the cross-section. First, I examine whether the 
impact is stronger for human capital-intensive firms. I follow Ghaly et al. (2015) and 
measure the human capital intensity of the firm using the ratio of R&D expenditure to 
total sales because R&D-intensive firms require higher levels of expertise and 
education. I consider a firm as human-capital-intensive if the firm with above-median 
R&D expenditure to total sales. The first two columns in Table 10 shows the results 
of the regressions for the two subsamples based on the R&D intensity. I find the 
coefficient on employee treatment is negative and significant for the subsample of 
firms with high human capital intensity. In contrast, I find the coefficient of employee 
treatment is smaller and insignificant for the subsample with low human capital 
intensity. Second, I further divide the firms into two subsamples based on whether a 
firm belongs to a human-capital-intensive industry. Following prior studies (Ertugrul, 
2013; Ghaly et al., 2015), I define a firm as human-capital-intensive if the firm belongs 
to telecommunications, high-tech, and healthcare industries17. The results in Table 10 
show that the coefficient on employee treatment is larger and more significant for firms 
operating in these human-capital-intensive industries. Third, I follow previous studies 
(Belo et al., 2014; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly et al., 2017) and construct the 
labor skills proxy by collecting JobZones data from Occupational Information Network 
and gather the data on the number of employees by occupation from the Occupational 
Employment Statistics (OES) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In column 5 
and 6, I find the coefficient for EMP_TREAT is negative and significant at the 5% level 
                                                          
17 I include the following two- and three-digit SIC codes: 283, 357, 36, 384, 48 and 80.  
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in both sub-samples but is lower in absolute value for the high labor skills group. 
Overall, the results of the human capital tests (human capital-intensive firms, industry 
and labor skills) are consistent with the argument that human-capital-intensive firms 
face higher labor adjustment costs and the favorable effect of employee-friendly 
treatment on labor investment efficiency is stronger. Fourth, I test whether the impact 
of employee treatment on labor investment efficiency is more pronounced for firms 
operating in industries with higher product market competition18. Again, the results 
show that the coefficient for EMP_TREAT is larger for the high product market 
competition group, suggesting that employee friendliness provides competitive 
advantages when market competition is strong. Fifth, I test whether the relation 
between employee treatment and labor investment efficiency varies with the degree 
of interest alignment between employees and firms. I split the sample into two 
subgroups based on firms’ employee stock options (ESO). Specifically, I follow Core 
and Guay (2002) and use the logarithm of incentive granted to split the sample19. The 
results show that employee-friendliness functions better to lower the propensity of 
inefficient labor investment for firms with better alignments of interests between 
employees and firms. Finally, I split the sample into two subgroups based on firms’ 
labor union measured by the industry level of unionization. When the negotiation 
power of labor unions is strong, firms are less likely to able to hire and fire efficiently. 
Consistently, the results confirm the conjecture and show that the effect of employee-
friendliness in reducing abnormal net hiring is lower where strong labor unions exist. 
                                                          
18 The product market competition is measured by product market fluidity from Hoberg et al. 
(2014), which reflects changes in a firm's product space due to moves made by the firm's 
product market competitors. A higher value of fluidity indicates that a firm faces greater 
competitive threats in its product markets. I obtain the data from the website: 
http://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu.  
19 I follow previous studies on non-executive stock options and collect firm-level option data 
for all employees and senior executives from Compustat and Execucomp (Babenko et al., 
2011; Chang et al., 2015; Core and Guay, 2001; Hochberg and Lindsey, 2010). Due to the 
availability of the option data, the option data is from 2004-2013. See Core and Guay (2002) 





The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring: Subsample Analysis 
AB_NETHIRE 
 Human Capital  
Intensive Firms 
Human Capital  
Intensive Industries 
Labor Skills 
 High Low High Low High Low 
EMP_TREATit -0.0058*** -0.0031 -0.0100*** -0.0036** -0.0052** -0.0041** 
 (-2.75) (-1.35) (-2.80) (-2.13) (-1.97) (-2.00) 
MTBit-1 -0.0000 -0.0010* -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (-0.05) (-1.78) (-0.50) (-1.22) (-0.65) (-0.41) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0217* -0.0225* -0.0204 -0.0217** -0.0269** -0.0306*** 
 (-1.88) (-1.87) (-1.09) (-2.36) (-1.99) (-2.80) 
LIQit-1 0.0079*** 0.0129*** 0.0076*** 0.0111*** 0.0085*** 0.0093*** 
 (10.60) (9.26) (7.69) (11.30) (9.88) (7.57) 
LEVit-1 0.0205*** 0.0411*** 0.0404*** 0.0257*** 0.0295*** 0.0281*** 
 (2.87) (5.59) (4.04) (4.28) (3.71) (4.10) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0068* -0.0148*** 0.0015 -0.0136*** -0.0067 -0.0090*** 
 (-1.78) (-3.86) (0.22) (-4.66) (-1.44) (-2.64) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0099 -0.0067 -0.0085 -0.0034 -0.0167* 0.0034 
 (-0.91) (-0.90) (-0.45) (-0.58) (-1.80) (0.44) 
LOSSit-1 0.0118*** -0.0020 0.0153** 0.0024 0.0095* 0.0015 
 (2.84) (-0.39) (2.42) (0.66) (1.95) (0.35) 
LABINTit-1 -0.4790** -0.2644** -0.3280 -0.2971*** -1.1986*** -0.2395** 
 (-2.18) (-2.02) (-0.56) (-2.74) (-2.64) (-2.14) 
INVESTit 0.3509*** 0.2877*** 0.2808*** 0.3425*** 0.2467*** 0.5042*** 
 (33.63) (30.74) (21.82) (40.50) (26.77) (40.76) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.1546*** 0.0741 0.2022*** 0.1215*** 0.2085*** 0.0402 
 (5.46) (1.42) (5.26) (3.40) (6.40) (0.99) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0076 0.0689*** -0.0352 0.0662*** 0.0445*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.51) (5.39) (-1.46) (6.35) (2.80) (3.13) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0707*** 0.0538*** 0.0736*** 0.0558*** 0.0584*** 0.0596*** 
 (9.61) (7.44) (6.59) (9.68) (7.31) (8.38) 
UNIONit-1 0.0026 0.0105 0.0279 0.0089 -0.0367 0.0257 
 (0.12) (0.59) (0.65) (0.61) (-1.34) (1.59) 
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,445 9,138 5,238 15,345 9,556 9,270 





TABLE 10 (Continue) 
The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring: Subsample Analysis 
AB_NETHIRE 





 High Low High Low High Low 
EMP_TREATit -0.0068*** -0.0033* -0.0058** -0.0029 -0.0042** -0.0054** 
 (-2.64) (-1.70) (-2.14) (-0.60) (-2.15) (-2.29) 
MTBit-1 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0027** -0.0005 -0.0002 
 (-1.05) (-0.38) (-0.72) (2.39) (-1.02) (-0.52) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0195 -0.0338*** -0.0242 -0.0090 -0.0295** -0.0213* 
 (-1.43) (-3.24) (-0.81) (-0.31) (-2.56) (-1.80) 
LIQit-1 0.0095*** 0.0067*** 0.0044** 0.0104*** 0.0072*** 0.0102*** 
 (10.75) (6.43) (2.29) (5.41) (7.79) (11.41) 
LEVit-1 0.0305*** 0.0284*** 0.0501*** 0.0313** 0.0230*** 0.0325*** 
 (4.12) (3.87) (4.17) (2.04) (3.10) (4.63) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0012 -0.0127*** -0.0058 -0.0173** -0.0100*** -0.0100*** 
 (-0.24) (-3.87) (-0.93) (-2.39) (-2.65) (-2.59) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0108 -0.0152* -0.0211 0.0043 -0.0194** -0.0047 
 (-1.25) (-1.92) (-1.51) (0.26) (-2.36) (-0.58) 
LOSSit-1 0.0079 0.0011 0.0004 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0128*** 
 (1.63) (0.26) (0.05) (0.10) (-0.09) (2.84) 
LABINTit-1 -0.3448 -0.1687 -0.2537 -0.2186 -0.9295** -0.3367*** 
 (-1.39) (-1.46) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-2.52) (-2.73) 
INVESTit 0.2869*** 0.3787*** 0.3499*** 0.4334*** 0.4617*** 0.2635*** 
 (30.93) (31.78) (17.27) (18.21) (36.07) (30.97) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.1728*** 0.0920** 0.1545** 0.0888 -0.0033 0.2143*** 
 (5.39) (2.19) (2.07) (1.18) (-0.08) (7.17) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0337** 0.0530*** 0.0038 0.0419 0.0679*** 0.0296** 
 (2.31) (4.10) (0.14) (1.40) (4.54) (2.31) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0661*** 0.0466*** 0.0183 0.0401** 0.0665*** 0.0522*** 
 (8.98) (6.12) (1.33) (2.46) (9.61) (6.85) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0097 0.0304* -0.0123 0.0583 0.0358* -0.3013*** 
 (-0.42) (1.73) (-0.40) (1.49) (1.88) (-3.73) 
       
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,686 9,685 2,258 2,253 9,754 10,829 




4.5 Robustness Tests: Alternative Labor Investment Efficiency  
 
To examine the robustness of the results, I further consider alternative 
measures for labor investment efficiency. Prior research has also tested the sensitivity 
of the estimation process to alternative definitions of labor investment efficiency. First, 
following Cella (2009), I use a firm’s industry median level of net hiring as a proxy for 
the optimal level. Second, I follow Biddle et al. (2009) and estimate a firm-specific 
model of labor investment as a function of sales growth and use the absolute value 
of the residuals as the proxy for deviations from expected investment in labor. Third, 
I use the augmented version of Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) model and re-estimate Model 
1 with additional variables, including capital expenditure, research and development 
expenses, acquisition expenses, the lagged value of observed labor investment, 
unionization rate and the logarithm of GDP per capita. Fourth, I also use the Pinnuck 
and Lillis (2007) model with both year and industry fixed effect to estimate the 
abnormal net hiring. Overall, the robustness tests in Table 11, using the alternative 





Alternative Employee Treatment and Labor Investment Efficiency Proxies 
     
 
 Cella (2009)  Biddle (2009) 
  Augmented  
Pinnuck and 
Lillis (2007) 
Pinnuck and Lillis 
















EMP_TREATit -0.0057*** -0.0060*** -0.0051** -0.0058*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.85) (-2.40) (-2.84) 
MTBit-1 0.0011** 0.0006 0.0008 0.0003 
 (2.05) (1.05) (1.42) (0.51) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0671** -0.0673** -0.0828*** -0.0913*** 
 (-2.48) (-2.36) (-2.69) (-3.35) 
LIQit-1 0.0092*** 0.0080*** 0.0081*** 0.0088*** 
 (4.43) (3.95) (4.15) (4.53) 
LEVit-1 -0.0070 0.0289*** 0.0240** 0.0266** 
 (-0.52) (2.60) (2.08) (2.49) 
DIVDit-1 0.0029 0.0079 0.0063 0.0050 
 (0.46) (1.25) (0.98) (0.84) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0676** -0.0617** -0.0761*** -0.0611** 
 (-2.56) (-2.11) (-2.64) (-2.18) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0014 0.0068 -0.0026 -0.0014 
 (-0.32) (1.55) (-0.58) (-0.33) 
LABINTit-1 -2.5555*** -2.8015*** -1.8496** -2.2275** 
 (-2.73) (-2.78) (-1.98) (-2.49) 
INVESTit 0.2722*** 0.3500*** 0.3006*** 0.3267*** 
 (6.52) (5.53) (5.46) (5.54) 
SD_CFOit-1 -0.0331 0.0414 -0.0305 0.0254 
 (-0.49) (0.60) (-0.46) (0.39) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0361* 0.0034 0.0062 0.0121 
 (1.86) (0.16) (0.33) (0.62) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.1595*** -0.1604*** -0.1746*** -0.1568*** 
 (-8.51) (-8.49) (-8.99) (-8.61) 
UNIONit-1 0.0312 0.0129 0.0875** 0.0498 
 (0.72) (0.32) (2.19) (1.25) 
     
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20,583 20,583 19,994 20,583 
Adjusted R2 23.8% 26.1% 24.0% 25.5% 
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This table presents the results from regressing the alternative measure of abnormal net 
hiring on employee treatment and other control variables over the period between 1995 and 
2015. Column 1 shows the results of regression using the alternative abnormal net hiring is 
based on Cella (2009). Column 2 shows the results of regression using the alternative 
abnormal net hiring is based on Biddle (2009). Column 3 shows the results of regression 
using the alternative abnormal net hiring is based on augmented Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). 
Column4 shows the results of regression using the alternative abnormal net hiring based 
on Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) with both year and industry fixed effect. 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted 




4.6 Additional Control Variables  
 
 I test the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional control 
variables that were not included in the baseline model because the data requirements 
lead to additional sample loss. As corporate governance and the influence of 
institutional investor may potentially affect investment policies and employee 
treatment, I add governance proxies, corporate governance, and institutional 
ownership to the baseline regression. As Jung et al. (2014) also find that high-quality 
financial reporting aids more efficient investments in labor I also include financial 
reporting quality as a control variable in the regression. I use discretionary accruals 
as the proxy for financial reporting quality and this using the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model suggested in Kothari et al. (2005). I estimate the model for 
every industry classified by the two-digit SIC code for each year. Following previous 
studies, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the proxy for financial 
reporting quality. The larger the absolute value of discretionary accruals, the lower 
the level of financial reporting quality. As a further test, I replace the Kothari et al. 
(2005) earnings quality measure using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach but 
the results are largely unchanged. In Appendix A-4, I report the results including the 




In this study, I investigate whether employee treatment affects firms’ labor 
investment efficiency and financial performance. The results show that employee-
friendly policies lead to better labor investment efficiency. The evidence shows that 
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the economic impact of employee treatment for labor investment efficiency is also 
considerable. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in employee 
treatment is associated with a 4.3% decrease in labor investment inefficiency. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that employee treatment is positively associated with 
firm performance both directly and via its link with labor investment efficiency. In 
particular, the results show that employee-friendly practices generally have a 
favorable impact on financial performance whereas abnormal net hiring is negatively 
related to labor productivity, ROA and production efficiency. 
My results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and continue to hold when 
I adopt instrumental variables estimation, PSM, alternative measures for both 
employee treatment and labor investment efficiency, or include additional control 
variables. I have followed previous research in the selection of sensitivity tests but I 
additionally use firm-fixed effects, rather than the more usual industry fixed effects. I 
also find the use of non-labor social dimensions as a placebo test is a helpful 
approach to test for endogeneity in terms of omitted variables. The underlying 
assumption is that if good employee treatment is merely a reflection of a firm’s social 
performance/social capital, or omitted variables such as performance, management 
competence and/or strategic advantage, are driving the results, they are also 
expected to have a significant influence on other social dimensions. By replicating the 
analysis with a variety of non-labor CSR categories, the results alleviate this concern 
because non-labor social dimensions do not repeat the significant results of the 
employee treatment variable. However, in a panel data setting, typical for archival 
research of this type, it is difficult to demonstrate causality without the benefit of an 
exogenous shock. I address this challenge, by following recent studies (Buchanan et 
al., 2018; Lins et al., 2017) and consider the 2008-2009 financial crisis as an 
exogenous shock to firms and use it to disentangle the relation between employee 
treatment and labor investment efficiency. Adopting difference-in-difference (DID) 
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methodology that uses non-employee-friendly firms as a control group to isolate the 
effect of employee-friendly treatment on labor investment efficiency, I find that 
employee-friendly firms have higher labor investment efficiency than non-employee-
friendly firms in the post-crisis period whereas employee-friendly firms experience 
more inefficient labor investment during the financial crisis. 
My results suggest that employee treatment policies have important 
implications for employment decisions and the allocation of resources. The results 
are consistent with prior research that demonstrates a positive relationship between 
employee treatment and financial performance, but the research contributes by 
focusing on the relationship between employee treatment and labor investment 
efficiency. I also demonstrate that labor investment efficiency impacts on firm 
performance beyond the direct impact of employee treatment. Taken together, the 
findings highlight the important role of employee-friendly treatment in contributing to 
firms’ investment behavior, efficiency and value creation. Hence, in a broad sense, 
the study also speaks to the literature about stakeholder relationship, employee 










An extensive body of previous research investigates the relations between 
accounting quality and corporate investment. Many previous studies show that high 
quality of financial reporting can increase investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle et al., 
2009; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Lambert et al., 2007). While managers can manage reported earnings by altering 
accounting accruals, extant literature documents that firms may also use real activities 
earnings management as an alternative to accrual-based earnings management 
(Beyer et al., 2010; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Graham et al., 2005; Zang, 2012). In 
particular, numerous previous studies have shown the prevalence of managers 
manipulating reported earnings via changes in real activities after the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 owing to the greater scrutiny on aggressive 
accrual-based earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2005; Lobo 
and Zhou, 2006; Zang, 2012). This notion is consistent with Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2005) model which shows that tighter accounting standards reduce accruals 
management but increase real earnings management. Accrual-based earnings 
management is through the choice of accounting methods rather than changing the 
underlying operating activities of the firm, and is short-lived and has a subsequent 
reversal. In contrast, real earnings management involves ‘departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some 
stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the 
normal course of operations’ (Roychowdhury 2006, p. 337). In a survey by Graham 
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et al (2005) among more than 400 top executives, 80% of survey participants show 
that they would decrease discretionary spending (e.g. R&D, advertising and 
maintenance) to meet certain earnings targets and show a greater willingness to 
engage in real activities rather than accruals to manage reported earnings. 
Despite managers’ preference for real earnings management, Graham et al 
(2005) show that 96.9% of the respondents indicate their preference for achieving a 
smoother earnings path and 78% of the respondents also admit to taking real 
economic actions to achieve smoother earnings. Accounting literature recognizes that 
practice of income smoothing has a long tradition and firms can dampen the 
fluctuations of earnings realizations by using their discretion to engage in accrual-
based earnings smoothing and real earnings smoothing (Acharya and Lambrecht, 
2015; Huang et al., 2009; Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984). However, previous 
accounting literature predominantly focuses on accrual-based earnings smoothing 
and largely neglects real earnings smoothing (Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984). 
Khurana et al (2017) define real earnings smoothing as real economic actions that 
managers undertake to reduce earnings volatility and can be achieved by changing 
the timing or structuring of an operating, investment or financing transactions. For 
instance, managers can smooth earnings by distorting real decisions via production 
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and investment decisions (Acharya and Lambrecht, 2015; Khurana et al., 2017; 
Lambert, 1984)20.  
Despite the prevalent use of real earnings adjustments21 (i.e., real earnings 
management and real earnings smoothing) in practice, little evidence has been 
provided by prior literature on the implications of real earnings adjustments on 
corporate investment and potential costs and benefits of real earnings adjustments. 
This paper fills an important void in the literature by primarily investigating how real 
earnings adjustments influence corporate labor investment. Investigating the 
influence of real earnings adjustments on corporate employment decisions can be 
important for several reasons. First, as one of the two inputs (i.e., capital and labor) 
that neoclassical firms require to produce output, labor costs typically account for 
approximately two-thirds of economy-wide value added (Hamermesh, 1995). While a 
vast amount of literature has long explored the impact of market frictions on 
investment activities, prior literature largely focuses on investment activities related to 
capital instead of labor and little is known about the role that financial reporting plays 
in affecting corporate employment decisions and its propagation. Second, the 
predominant focus of prior studies on capital investment may attribute to the classic 
view that considers labor as solely a variable factor of production that is free of 
                                                          
20 Previous studies show that managers can manipulate real transactions to distort earnings 
in various ways. Apart from the real earnings management via price discounts to temporarily 
increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of 
discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins (Roychowdhury, 2006), previous 
studies also show that managers can manipulate real transactions via managerial discretion 
over R&D expenditures (Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Cheng, 2004; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991), cutting advertising expenditures (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), stock repurchases (Hribar 
et al., 2006); sales of profitable assets (Bartov, 1993; Herrmann et al., 2003), sales price 
reductions (Jackson and Wilcox, 2000), derivative hedging (Barton, 2001; Pincus and 
Rajgopal, 2002) and securitization (Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009). It could be potentially 
possible that a firm could also engage real earnings management by manipulating real 
transactions mentioned above to smooth their earnings. It is outside the scope of this paper to 
examine all of these issues, which can be one of the limitations of this study. In this study, I 
follow Khurana et al (2017) and use real earnings smoothing proxy that consists of real 
activities undertaken to adjust discretionary expenses or production. 




adjustment costs because the timing of labor costs is perfectly matched with the cash 
flow they generate (Dixit et al., 1994). However, previous studies in labor economics 
have already shown that labor has a fixed, or quasi-fixed cost component and labor 
frictions exist in the labor market (Anderson et al., 2003; Danthine and Donaldson, 
2002; Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Oi, 1962; Yashiv, 2007) and 
related labor costs can be substantial (Bhattacharjee et al., 2015; Farmer et al., 1985; 
Hamermesh, 1995; Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996). Consistently, several recent 
papers show that firms need external capital to finance their labor payments and 
capital market frictions can be influential for firms’ ability to recruit, train, and retain an 
effective workforce  (Benmelech et al., 2011; Campello et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2014; 
Matsa, 2018). Finally, prior literature has also shown how firms can obtain competitive 
advantages by hiring, developing and retaining human capital (Becker, 1962; Coff, 
1997; Lazear and Shaw, 2007; Teece, 2011). Hence, investigating how real earnings 
adjustments influence a firm’s investment in labor can be paramount.  
One potential channel for real earnings adjustments to be associated with labor 
investment efficiency is through its impact on the information asymmetry between 
managers and outside capital providers. A vast amount of literature provides evidence 
that agency conflicts and the information asymmetry between managers and outside 
capital providers cause firms to undertake suboptimal levels of investment (e.g., Stein 
2003). Due to the mismatch between labor costs and the cash flow generated, firms 
need to seek external financing for their labor costs throughout the production process. 
As a result, the imperfections in the capital market also apply to labor investment. 
Hence, real earnings adjustment can play a role in affecting firms’ labor investment 
efficiency via the market frictions stemming from information asymmetry between 
managers and outside capital suppliers.  
Previous studies provide mixed empirical evidences on whether earnings 
smoothing reduces or improves the informativeness of firms’ reported current and 
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past earnings about their future earnings and cash flows. The positive view shows 
that earnings smoothing can improve the informativeness if managers use their 
discretion to convey their assessment of future earnings (Demski, 2010; Erickson et 
al., 2016; Gassen and Fülbier, 2015; Goel and Thakor, 2003; Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad, 2002; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). In contrast, the negative view suggests 
that earnings smoothing can also be used to mask true firm performance and 
therefore makes earnings noisier (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Jayaraman, 2008; 
Khurana et al., 2017; Leuz et al., 2003; McInnis, 2010). Graham et al (2005) show 
that one of the incentives for managers to engage in real earnings management is to 
smooth earnings, which implies that earnings management and earnings smoothing 
are not two independent concepts. However, Khurana et al (2017) show that real 
earnings smoothing may have distinctive implications as real earnings management 
because they differ in several significant ways and potentially have different costs. 
First, real earnings management emphasizes on upward earnings management to 
meet earnings targets in influencing investor perception of firm profitability whilst real 
earnings smoothing emphasizes earnings management in influencing investor 
perception of earnings volatility (Khurana et al., 2017). As a result, real earnings 
management targets an earnings level (mean) whereas real earnings smoothing 
targets the volatility (variance) of earnings. Second, the underlying motivations are 
different as myopic managers engaged in real earnings management to meet short-
term benchmarks while real earnings smoothing might be used for managers’ long-
term strategic decisions (Khurana et al., 2017). Third, recent research identifies that 
real earnings management is more common than accrual-based earnings 
management due to a general shift after the passage of SOX in 2002 (Cohen et al., 
2008; Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Even so, real earnings smoothing is more prevalent 
than real earnings management and managers have limited ability to continually 
manage earnings upward (Graham et al., 2005; Khurana et al., 2017).  
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In summary, given the real earnings management distorts accounting 
information and by definition involves suboptimal managerial decisions with 
potentially adverse consequences (Bereskin et al., 2018; Dechow et al., 2010; Kothari 
et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006), I hypothesize that real earnings management is 
negatively associated with labor investment efficiency. One the other hand, given the 
various incentives related to earnings smoothing and mixed empirical evidence, the 
question of whether real earnings smoothing can influence labor investment efficiency 
can only be answered empirically. I further argue that real earnings smoothing is more 
likely to improve labor investment efficiency when the underlying motivation for 
managers to engage in earnings smoothing is to convey private information rather 
than to pursue personal interest. Accordingly, I posit that the association between real 
earnings smoothing and labor investment efficiency is primarily driven by the 
informational component rather than the garbling component of real earnings 
smoothing22. 
To test the hypotheses on the relation between real activities adjustments and 
labor investment efficiency, I use a large sample of 46,761 U.S. firm-year observations 
that represent more than 5,600 unique firms for the period of 1995 to 2016. To 
measure real earnings smoothing, I follow Khurana et al (2017) to derive the primary 
measure of real earnings smoothing by combining two types of real earnings 
smoothing: real earnings smoothing through managerial discretion over expense and 
real earnings smoothing through managerial discretion over production. To measure 
labor investment efficiency, I follow previous studies (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; 
Jung et al., 2014; Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007) and use firms’ net hiring (percentage 
change in the number of employees) to proxy for labor investment. The expected level 
                                                          
22 The informational component captures the informativeness of current earnings about future 




of net hiring captures normal hiring practices based on companies’ fundamental 
economics, whereas the difference between the observed level of labor investment 
and the one justified by economic fundamentals (i.e., abnormal net hiring) serves as 
an inverse measure of labor investment efficiency which captures the unexpected part 
beyond firm’s fundamental economics.  
This study produces several new and significant findings. First, I find that firms 
engaging in more real earnings management have larger magnitudes of abnormal net 
hiring, suggesting real earnings management leads to more inefficient employment 
practices and lowers labor investment efficiency. I find all forms of real earnings 
management activities (abnormal cash flow, overproduction, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses) significantly deteriorate labor investment efficiency. Second, 
in contrast, I find that real earnings smoothing significantly improve labor investment 
efficiency. That is consistent with the informational smoothness hypothesis that real 
earnings smoothing conveys managers’ private information about firms’ future 
profitability and improve labor investment efficiency through reduced information 
asymmetry between managers and outside capital suppliers. Third, I conduct the 
smoothing decomposition tests and find that the positive relation between real 
earnings smoothing and labor investment efficiency is primarily driven by the 
informational component instead of the garbling component of smoothing. This further 
supports the informational smoothness hypothesis. 
I also investigate the mechanisms through which real earnings adjustments 
affect corporate employment decisions. I find that the relation between real earnings 
smoothing and labor investment efficiency holds for both labor overinvestment and 
underinvestment regardless the period of expected expansion and expected 
contraction, suggesting that real earnings smoothing improves labor investment 
efficiency by alleviating both adverse selection and moral hazard. On the contrary, I 
find opposite effects of real earnings management. 
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In additional analyses, I further find that financial constraints play an important 
role in the relationship between real earnings smoothing and labor investment 
efficiency. The results show that the informational effect of real earnings smoothing 
on labor investment efficiency is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of 
financial constraints. The results indicate that managers of financially constrained 
firms have stronger incentives to engage in real earnings smoothing to convey 
information to outside capital suppliers for financing purposes. In particular, I find that 
financially constrained firms with equity-based financing incentives have stronger 
incentives to engage real earnings smoothing to lower the information asymmetry 
between themselves and outside capital suppliers for financing purposes whereas I 
find debt-focused constrained firms may use real earnings smoothing as an earnings 
manipulation tool and lead to a deterioration in labor investment efficiency. The 
findings are consistent with Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) who find that equity 
market and debt market constraints are different in terms of constraints origins and 
asymmetric information is likely a strong driver of financial constraints among firms 
attempting to issue equity, but not for debt market constrained firms. 
My main results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks including (1) 
examine the role of other non-labor investments for the relation between real earnings 
smoothing, real earnings management, and labor investment efficiency; (2) four 
alternative proxies for labor investment efficiency; and (3) consider several additional 
control variables in the baseline regression model. 
The contribution of this paper is manifold. First, prior literature has documented 
that stock price informativeness, laborism, and long-term investors influence firms’ 
labor investment efficiency (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly et al., 2017; Jung et 
al., 2016), I contribute to this growing line of literature on the determinants of labor 
investment efficiency by focusing on the influence of real earnings adjustments on 
labor investment efficiency. The most closely related prior literature to the study is 
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Jung et al. (2014) which emphasizes the role of accruals-based financial reporting 
quality on labor investment efficiency. The research is relevant but distinct from Jung 
et al. (2014) as the study complements their study by providing evidence towards the 
role of real earnings adjustments, an area that is becoming prevalent in practice but 
still under-explored in research for labor investment. From this perspective, the 
research also echoes recent literature that investigates the financing of labor and how 
the frictions in capital market affect firms’ employment decisions (Benmelech et al., 
2011; Campello et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2014; Matsa, 2018) and fills the important 
void in the accounting literature by investigating the impact of real earnings 
adjustments on corporate employment decisions. 
Second, I contribute to prior literature that investigates the effects of real 
earnings management (Francis et al., 2016; Gunny, 2010; Lo, 2008; Roychowdhury, 
2006) by identifying different costs and benefits of real earnings management when 
the underlying incentives are different. Specifically, this study shows that real earnings 
smoothing, as one form of real earnings management, can have a positive effect on 
corporate labor investment. 
Third, I contribute to the under-explored stream of literature on the effects of 
real earnings smoothing. Previous accounting literature has largely focused on 
accrual-based earnings smoothing with little attention paid to real earnings smoothing 
(Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984). The only prior literature is Khurana et al. (2017) 
which finds that real earnings smoothing helps managers withhold bad news which 
results in an increase of firm-specific stock price crash risk. Different from Khurana et 
al. (2017) which highlights the dark side of real earnings smoothing, I shed lights on 
the positive side of real earnings smoothing in increasing firm labor investment 
efficiency. Also, this paper is the first study to decompose real earnings smoothing 
into informational and garbling components, a modified model from Dou et al. (2013) 
and Tucker and Zarowin (2006). The decomposition enables us to understand when 
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real earnings smoothing could be beneficial: when firms’ underlying incentive of 
smoothing is to convey private information. 
Finally, this is the first paper that directly compares the potential costs and 
benefits of real earnings management. Managers can engage in real earnings 
management to smooth earnings (Graham et al., 2005). From the conceptual and 
practical perspective, it is difficult to distinguish earnings smoothing from earnings 
management and they are not two independent concepts. Instead, this study intends 
to show that there can be potential costs and benefits of real earnings adjustments. 
As real earnings management and real earnings smoothing are both real earnings 
adjustments made by managers, the costs and benefits of real earnings management 
is under-explored, particularly when managers engage in real earnings management 
with the objective of smoothing earnings. This paper fills this void by highlighting the 
distinctive implications of real earnings management when underlying incentives are 
different for firms’ employment decisions and therefore will be of interest to both 
scholars and practitioners. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 details the sample, measurements, 
and research design. Section 4 presents and discusses the main empirical results 
and additional analyses and section 5 presents robustness checks. At last, section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
Previous literature shows that firms in practice face capital market imperfections 
stemming from information asymmetry and may either over- or under-invest (e.g., 
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Stein 2003). Prior studies identify moral hazard and adverse selection as the two 
primary imperfections in the market that make firms depart from the optimal 
investment level. On the one hand, moral hazard may lead to managers pursuing self-
serving objectives to maximize their own personal welfare and invest in projects that 
are not in line with shareholder maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which can 
cause either over- or underinvestment depending on the availability of capital 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Blanchard et al., 1994; Jensen, 1986; Lambert et 
al., 2007; Richardson, 2006; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). On the other hand, adverse 
selection costs could induce investment inefficiency if managers are better informed 
than outside capital suppliers and try to time capital issuances to sell overprice 
equities. Investors may respond to this information disadvantage by increasing the 
cost of capital, which consequently lowers the firm’s flexibility in obtaining external 
financing (Baker et al., 2003; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Several prior studies suggest that the capital market imperfection for capital 
investment also applies to labor investment because labor also has a fixed, or quasi-
fixed cost component and labor frictions exist in the labor market (Anderson et al., 
2003; Danthine and Donaldson, 2002; Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1994; Oi, 1962; Yashiv, 2007) and related labor costs can be substantial 
(Bhattacharjee et al., 2015; Farmer et al., 1985; Hamermesh, 1995; Hamermesh and 
Pfann, 1996). In addition, a number of recent studies show that financial market 
imperfections can have significant impact on employment decisions of firms 
(Benmelech et al., 2011; Campello et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2014; Matsa, 2018). Ben-
Nasr and Alshwer (2016) document that stock price informativeness positively affects 
labor investment efficiency as managers could use the information incorporated in 
stock prices when making human capital investment. Their results suggest that better-
informed stock prices could lead to better monitoring of managers which in turn 
reduces managerial moral hazard behavior in inefficient labor investment. Consistent 
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with the role of monitoring, Ghaly et al. (2017) find that monitoring by long-term 
investors could reduce agency conflicts in firms’ labor investment decisions, leading 
to higher labor investment efficiency. Jung et al. (2016) document that laborism which 
captures the presence of left-leaning government, the rigidity of employee protection 
laws, and collectivist culture, is negatively related to labor investment efficiency. They 
posit that a strong laborism will pressure firms to retain existing employees and to 
continue to hire labor even if unnecessary, resulting in deviations of firms’ labor 
investment from the optimal level.  
The most closely related prior literature is Jung et al. (2014) which emphasizes 
on the role of accrual-based financial reporting quality in improving labor investment 
efficiency and find that higher financial reporting quality is associated with higher labor 
investment efficiency. The paper complements Jung et al. (2014) by investigating the 
role of real activities adjustments, an area that is becoming prevalent in practice but 
still under-explored in research.  
 
2.2 Role of Real Earnings Management 
  
Real earnings management refers to managerial decisions to undertake actions 
that change the timing or structuring of an operation, investment and financing 
transaction with the objective to present favorable results. Roychowdhury (2006, p. 
337) defines real earnings management as “management actions that deviate from 
normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain 
earnings thresholds”. Previous research indicates that firms use real activities 
earnings management as an alternative tool for accrual-based earnings management 
to manipulate earnings (Cohen et al., 2008; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Zang, 2012). 
In a survey by Graham et al (2005) among more than 400 top executives, the survey 
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participants show their preference to manipulate earnings through real activities rather 
than through accruals. 
The prevalence of real earnings management may be due to several reasons. 
First, there may be a lack of flexibility for firms to manage accruals because the year-
end shortfall between actual earnings and targets might exceed the extent of accruals 
manipulation or accruals management is constrained by the business operations or 
the accrual manipulation in prior years. In such cases, real earnings management 
provides a more timely and flexible alternative. Second, managing accruals might be 
risky for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) scrutiny and class action 
litigation. In comparison with accrual manipulation, real activities management in 
pricing and production is less likely to attract regulatory scrutiny. Dechow et al. (1996) 
show that SEC enforcement actions are more likely to be associated with earnings 
overstatements but not relate to decisions on pricing, production, and discretionary 
expenses. Cohen et al. (2008) also document that firms switched from accrual-based 
to real earnings management after the passage of SOX in 2002 because of the stricter 
scrutiny in curbing accrual-based earnings management. Third, accrual-based 
earnings management must take place at the end of fiscal year or quarter and 
managers are likely to face uncertainty as to the choice of accounting treatment that 
auditors will allow at that time.   
Linking to the research question, prior literature suggests financial reporting 
quality can facilitate firms to lower the information asymmetries between managers 
and outside capital suppliers and market frictions (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Jung 
et al., 2014; Lambert et al., 2007; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001). On 
the one hand, high quality of financial reporting can curb moral hazard and facilitates 
firms to invest more efficiently through the monitoring functions of corporate 
disclosures (Biddle et al., 2009). The notion is consistent with Bushman and Smith 
(2001) which highlight the governance role of financial reporting and show that high 
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financial reporting quality can help promote the effective governance and monitoring. 
As real earnings management captures the abnormal components of operational 
costs due to managerial discretionary behavior, it represents a distortion to the 
accounting measurement system and therefore indicates lower quality of financial 
reporting (Dechow et al., 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
show that SEO firms engage in real earnings management, and the decline in post-
SEO performance due to the real earnings management is more severe than that due 
to accrual management. Consistently, Kothari et al. (2015) find that managers exhibit 
a greater propensity for real earnings management at the time of a seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) and such real activities manipulation are likely to cause post-SEO 
stock market underperformance. Bereskin et al (2018) find there are significant 
negative consequences associated with real earnings management through altering 
R&D expenditures.  
On the other hand, adverse selection can also cause firms to undertake 
suboptimal levels of investment through higher cost of capital and the lack of flexibility 
in obtaining external financing (Biddle et al., 2009). From equity providers’ 
perspective, Kim and Sohn (2013) find a positive relationship between real earnings 
management and a firm’s cost of equity capital, indicating that capital market 
demands a higher risk premium for these activities as they exacerbate the information 
quality of earnings. From debt holders’ perspective, Ge and Kim (2014) find a positive 
association between real earnings management and the cost of new bond issues, 
suggesting that credit rating agencies and bondholders also require high-risk 
premiums for the increased credit risk due to real earnings management. 
In summary, real earnings management captures the value-destroying 
abnormal components of operational costs due to managerial discretionary behavior. 
It represents a distortion to the accounting measurement system and low quality of 
financial reporting because it exacerbates the reported earnings. Since high-quality 
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financial reporting can potentially mitigate moral hazard problems by enabling more 
efficient contracting and enhancing the monitoring abilities of capital market 
participants, real earnings management therefore can be negatively associated with 
labor investment efficiency. Moreover, a high risk premium required by capital market 
participants for real earnings management can also lead to adverse selection in the 
timing of securities offering. If financing of profitable investment in labor is costly, 
overinvestment in labor also can take place. The discussion above leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Real earnings management is negatively associated with labor 
investment efficiency. 
 
It is noted that there are some counter arguments to the hypothesis above. For 
example, Alissa (2013) finds that firms successfully achieve better credit ratings by 
managing their earnings via real activities. Kim et al. (2010) find that firms use real 
earnings management to avoid violations of debt covenants which consequently 
reduces the cost of debt. Also, Gunny (2010) finds that real earnings management 
can be positively associated with future period earnings and cash flow performance 
for the firms that just meet or beat their earnings benchmarks, which suggests that 
firms can also engage in real earnings management to signal future firm prospects. 
These studies and observations show that real earnings management may also be 
beneficial to firms. If this were the case, I would not obtain empirical results consistent 
with the hypothesis.  
 




Another primary focus of this paper is to examine the role of real earnings 
smoothing in affecting labor investment efficiency. Earnings smoothing can be defined 
as managerial discretionary behavior to intentionally dampen the fluctuations of their 
firms’ earnings realization (Beidleman, 1973). Even though earnings smoothing 
practice has a long tradition, prior accounting literature has largely focused on accrual-
based earnings smoothing with little attention paid to real earnings smoothing, even 
though real earnings smoothing potentially can be more pervasive in practice in 
comparison with accrual-based earnings smoothing (Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 
1984). 
Previous studies provide mixed empirical evidences on whether earnings 
smoothing garbles accounting earnings information or improves the informativenss of 
firms’ reported current and past earnings about their future earnings and cash flows. 
The positive view shows that earnings smoothing can improves the informativenss 
(Demski, 2010; Erickson et al., 2016; Gassen and Fülbier, 2015; Goel and Thakor, 
2003; Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). In particular, 
earnings smoothing can signal good prospect and investors perceive firms with 
smoother earnings to be less risky and therefore require a lower expected return or 
cost of capital (Erickson et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2005; Trueman and Titman, 
1988). Also, creditors also prefer firms with smoother earnings and require a lower 
cost of debt (Gassen and Fülbier, 2015). Following this stream of literature, smoothed 
earnings can provide firms with financing benefits to mitigate the adverse selection 
problems, which facilitates firms to address labor adjustment and therefore higher 
labor investment efficiency. Moreover, prior literature also finds that managers 
engage in earnings smoothing to provide private information about future earnings to 
the market. For example, Goel and Thakor (2003) state that earnings smoothing could 
reduce information asymmetries between managers and external funding providers 
and can encourage liquidity trading by uninformed investors. Also, Dichev and Tang 
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(2009) show that smoother earnings are more persistent and could to be predicted 
better up to five years ahead.  
However, an emerging stream of literature also points out the negative side of 
earnings smoothing (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Jayaraman, 2008; Khurana et al., 
2017; Leuz et al., 2003; McInnis, 2010). In specific, managers have motivations to 
smooth earnings for private gains (e.g., meeting bonus targets) (Healy, 1985) and/or 
ensuring job security (e.g., maximizing tenure) (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). 
Similarly, Leuz et al. (2003) find that managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
smoothing if they could obtain more private benefits. Moreover, Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) find that earnings smoothing decreases the informativeness of reported 
earnings as it deviates from the firm’s underlying performance. Jayaraman (2008) 
also finds that bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading are higher when 
earnings are smoother than cash flows. In addition, Khurana et al. (2017) show that 
firms with higher levels of real earnings smoothing experience a higher level of stock 
price crash risk. 
The survey by Graham et al (2005) shows that managers can engage in real 
earnings management to smooth earnings. Hence, on a conceptual and practical 
level, earnings smoothing and earnings management are not two independent 
concepts. Even though real earnings management and real earnings smoothing are 
both real earnings adjustments made by managers, Khurana et al (2017) suggest that 
the implications of real earnings smoothing can be different from real earnings 
management in several ways. First, real earnings management emphasizes on 
upward earnings management to meet earnings targets in influencing investor 
perception of firm profitability whilst real earnings smoothing emphasizes earnings 
management in influencing investor perception of earnings volatility (Khurana et al., 
2017). As a result, real earnings management targets an earnings level (mean) 
whereas real earnings smoothing targets the volatility (variance) of earnings. Second, 
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the underlying motivations are different as myopic managers engaged in real earnings 
management to meet short-term benchmarks while real earnings smoothing might be 
used for managers’ long-term strategic decisions (Khurana et al., 2017). Third, recent 
research identifies that real earnings management is more common than accrual-
based earnings management due to a general shift after the passage of SOX in 2002 
(Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Even so, real earnings smoothing is more 
prevalent than real earnings management because managers have limited ability to 
continually manage earnings upward (Graham et al., 2005; Khurana et al., 2017). The 
distinctive features between real earnings management and real earnings smoothing 
lead to an open empirical question of whether real earnings smoothing has the same 
implications as real earnings management for corporate labor investment, and the 
potential costs and benefits associated with real earnings adjustment is also under-
explored, particularly when managers engage in real earnings management with the 
objective of smoothing earnings. 
As discussed above, given the two competing views on the role of earnings 
smoothing, the question of whether real earnings smoothing is positively or negatively 
associated with labor investment efficiency can only be answered empirically. I 
develop the second hypothesis as follows (stated in the alternative form): 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Real earnings smoothing is positively associated with labor investment 
efficiency. 
 
One possible explanation of the mixed empirical results regarding smoothing 
may attribute to managers’ underlying motivations to engage in earnings smoothing. 
According to Tucker and Zarowin (2006), managers may smooth earnings in the 
purpose of conveying their private information and assessment of future earnings. In 
such a case, the reported (smoothed) earnings will be more likely to provide 
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informative contents to the outsiders and reduce information asymmetry between 
firms and outside capital suppliers. On the contrary, if managers smooth earnings in 
the purpose of distorting the earnings numbers for personal interest, the reported 
(smoothed) earnings will be more likely to add noise to the market. Dou et al. (2013) 
decompose income smoothing into its informational component and garbling 
component by modifying the approach in Tucker and Zarowin (2006). Specifically, 
they find that firms use earnings smoothing to provide information to their suppliers in 
the presence of incomplete contracts and the effect is driven by the informational 
component instead of the garble component of earnings smoothing. In contrast, 
Amiram and Owens (2018) find that the garbling effect of earnings smoothing can 
dominate debt contract design and associate with a higher cost of debt when 
managers’ private benefits consumption threat is high. 
Hence, if real earnings smoothing improves labor investment efficiency, I expect 
that the positive impact of real earnings smoothing on labor investment efficiency will 
be dominated by the informational components when managers smooth earnings to 
convey information and signal future firm prospect to outside capital suppliers. I, 
therefore, posit the third hypothesis as follows (stated in the alternative form): 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The association between real earnings smoothing and labor 
investment efficiency is driven by the informational component of real earnings 
smoothing. 
 
3 SAMPLE & EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
 




My sample selection begins with all firms in COMPUSTAT and I merge the data 
with CRSP to obtain total annual stock returns. I exclude firm-year observations 
associated with firms in utility (primary two-digit SIC codes 49) and financial services 
(primary two-digit SIC codes between 60-69). I obtain the industry-level rate of 
industry unionization rate from the website of UNIONSTATS which provides estimates 
of union membership and coverage data by industry. For additional tests, I obtain 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13f). The 
final sample for regression analysis consists of 46,761 firm-year observations that 
represent more than 5,600 unique firms for the period from 1995 to 2016. 
 
3.2 Measuring Labor Investment Efficiency  
 
In order to test the hypotheses, I follow the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) two-step 
approach that has been used by numerous prior studies on labor investment efficiency 
(Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly et al., 2017; Jung et al., 2014). I capture 
abnormal net hiring from the following equation: 
 
NETHIREit = β0 + β1SALEGROWTHit−1 + β2SALEGROWTHit + β3∆ROAit + β4∆ROAit−1 
+ β5ROAit + β64RETURNit + β7SIZE Pit−1 + β8LIQit−1 + β9∆LIQit-1 + β10∆LIQit + 
β11LEVit−1 + β12LOSSBIN1it−1 + β13LOSSBIN2it−1 + β14LOSSBIN3it−1 + 
β15LOSSBIN4it−1 + β16LOSSBIN5it−1 + INDUSTRY DUMMIES + εit                                                                                                                                                   
(1)         
 
NETHIREit represents a firm’s net hiring as measured by the difference between 
the number of employees at year t and t-1 scaled by the number of employees at year 
t-1. Following prior studies (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Ghaly et al., 2017; Jung et 
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al., 2014; Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007), I include the following control variables that affect 
hiring. First, I control for the previous-year and current-year sale growth 
(SALEGROWTHit−1, SALEGROWTHit) as it represents change in demand for a firm’s 
products and services and is considered as fundamental determinant of profitability 
and the level of investment a firm should make. Both current year and prior year sales 
growth are included because of the uncertainty as to the time lag between sales 
growth and change in employees. SALEGROWTH is the percentage change in sale 
revenue. Second, I include firms’ previous-year change in profitability, the current-
year change in profitability and current-year profitability (∆ROAit, ∆ROAit−1 and ROAit) 
to control the normal fundamental impact of a change in earnings and the level of 
profitability on the demand for labor, where ROA is the ratio of net income scaled by 
beginning of the year total assets. Third, I include the annual stock return for year t 
(RETURNit) which captures future expected growth that is not captured by sales 
growth measures. Fourth, I include the percentile rank of the logarithm of the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the year to control for firm size (SIZE Pit−1). Firm 
size can proxy for life cycle of a firm which may affect employment growth rates and 
entry into a more mature, lower investment stage of the firm’s life cycle and also the 
likelihood of firms facing cash flow shortages because smaller firms are more likely to 
have cash flow problems leading them to reduce discretionary investments. Fifth, I 
include firms’ previous-year liquidity, previous-year change in liquidity and current-
year change in liquidity (LIQit−1, ∆LIQit-1 and ∆LIQit) where LIQ is the ratio of cash and 
short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities. These variables are 
included to control for changes in employment due to cash flow shortages and short-
term liquidity problems. Sixth, I control for the previous-year leverage calculated as 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year (LEVit−1). 
Leverage is included to control for long-term financing requirement and for reduced 
funds available for investment, which may trigger delay in hiring or retrenchment of 
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employees. Finally, I control for small reported losses (LOSSBINit−1) dummies which 
are indicators for each 0.005 interval of prior year ROA from 0 to -0.0025.  
I apply the estimated coefficients using Equation 1 to each firm-year observation 
to calculate the expected level of net hiring. Following prior studies, I use the absolute 
value of the abnormal net hiring as the inverse proxy for measuring labor investment 
efficiency and the abnormal net hiring is defined as the difference between the actual 
change in a firm’s labor force and the expected change based on economic 
fundamentals. A higher value of abnormal net hiring indicates a higher deviation of 
actual labor investment from its expected value and therefore suggests a lower level 
of labor investment efficiency. 
 
3.3 Measuring Real Earnings Management 
 
I follow previous studies to develop the proxies for real earnings management 
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006), I adopt three 
metrics to estimate the level of real earnings management: the abnormal levels of 
cash flow from operations (REM_ABCFO), production costs (REM_PROD) and 
discretionary expenses (REM_DEXP).  
I firstly generate the normal levels of CFO, production costs and discretionary 
expenses using the models in Roychowdhury (2006). I calculate normal CFO as a 
linear function of sales and changes in sales. To adopt this model, I run the following 

















For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations is the residual from the 
corresponding industry-year model and the firm-year sales and lagged assets.  
The second measure of real earnings management is abnormal production 
costs. Prior studies (Badertscher, 2011; Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Zang, 2012) define production costs as the sum of COGS and change in inventory 
during the year and they express expenses as a linear function of contemporary sales. 
I estimate normal production costs from the following equation and the abnormal 
















+ ℰ𝑖𝑡                     
(3) 
 
The third measure of real activities manipulation is abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Following  Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), I estimate the 










+  ℰ𝑖𝑡           
(4) 
 
Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kim et al. (2012), I also construct the 
combined measures of real activities manipulation by aggregating the three individual 
real activities manipulation proxies. I multiply REM_ABCFO and REM_DEXP by 
negative one so that REM_ABCFO and REM_DEXP increases as firms engage in 
more real activities management. I construct the combined real earnings 
management measure, REM_COMBINED as REM_ABCFO + REM_PROD + 
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REM_DEXP and the higher values indicate more real activities management.23  I 
recognize that the combined measure may overlook the different implications of 
individual proxies for earnings, we, therefore, report results corresponding to both the 
combined measures as well as the three individual real earnings management 
proxies, respectively. 
 
3.4 Measuring Real Earnings Smoothing 
 
In line with Khurana et al. (2017), the real earnings smoothing proxy consists of 
real activities undertaken to adjust discretionary expenses or production. To elaborate, 
I measure real smoothing through managerial discretion over expenses using the 
negative correlation between the managed component of earnings attributed to 
adjustment of discretionary expenses and pre-managed earnings. I define the 
managed component of earnings attributed to the adjustment of discretionary 
expenses as negative one times abnormal discretionary expenses estimated using 
the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Larger values of the managed component of 
earnings imply more income-increasing real earnings management via discretionary 
expenses. The pre-managed earnings are calculated as earnings minus the managed 
component of earnings attributed to the adjustment of discretionary expenses. 
Following that, I calculated the correlation between the managed component of 
                                                          
23 As a robustness check, instead of using COMBINED calculated as AB_CFO + AB_PROD 
+ AB_EXP, I also use COMBINED calculated as AB_EXP + AB_PROD or AB_CFO + AB_EXP 
as the alternative combined proxies for aggregated real earnings management and the 
combined real activities manipulation proxies increases as firms engage in more aggressive 
real earnings management. I do not combine AB_PROD and AB_CFO, because previous 
studies Roychowdhury (Roychowdhury, 2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest that 
the same activities can lead to abnormally low CFO and abnormally high production costs, 
which leads to double counting if I add these two variables. The robustness tests using 
alternative proxies for aggregated real earnings management yield similar results and are 
qualitatively consistent with those reported results. 
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earnings attributed to discretionary expenses and the pre-managed earnings over the 
rolling five-year window ending in the current year. To ease the interpretation, I 
multiply the correlation by negative one and label it as RES_DEXP. Higher values of 
RES_DEXP imply more real earnings smoothing.  
Similarly, I measure real smoothing through managerial discretion over 
production using the negative correlation between the managed component of 
earnings attributed to adjustment of production and pre-managed earnings. I define 
the managed component of earnings attributed to the adjustment of production as 
abnormal production costs estimated using the Roychowdhury (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
model. The pre-managed earnings are calculated as earnings minus the managed 
component of earnings attributed to adjustment of production. Next, I calculate the 
correlation between the managed component of earnings attributed to production and 
the pre-managed earnings over the rolling five-year window ending in the current year. 
I then multiply the correlation by negative one and label it as RES_PROD so that 
higher values of RES_PROD imply more real earnings smoothing. 
In order to capture the total effects of real smoothing and to mitigate 
measurement errors in each individual proxy for real smoothing, I follow Khurana et 
al. (2017) and combine RES_DEXP and RES_PROD to construct RES_COMBINED, 
as the primary measure for real earnings smoothing. Consistent with Khurana et al. 
(2017), the values of RES_DEXP and RES_PROD can range from -1 to 1 separately 
and the values of RES_COMBINED range from -2 to 2.  
 
3.5 Empirical Model 
 
 To test the impact of smoothness and real earnings management on labor 




|AB_NETHIREit| = β0 + β1RES_COMBINEDit−1/REM_COMBINEDit−1 + β2MTBit−1 
+ β3SIZEit−1 + β4LIQit−1 + β5LEVit−1 + β6DIVDit−1 + β7TANGIBLESit−1 + β8LOSSit−1 
+ β9LABINTit−1 + β10SDCFOit−1 + β11SDSALESit−1 + β12SDNETHIREit−1 + 
β13UNIONit−1 + β14ABINVESTit + INDUSTRY DUMMIES + YEAR DUMMIES + εit                                                                  
(5)      
                                                              
Following previous literature (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Biddle et al., 2009; 
Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Jung et al., 2014), I control for the following control variables 
that are likely to be associated with hiring, including growth options (MTBit−1), firm size 
(SIZEit−1), liquidity (LIQit−1), leverage (LEVit−1), dividend payout (DIDVit−1), tangibility 
(TANGIBLEit−1), loss occurrence (LOSSit-1) and labor intensity (LABINTit−1). I also 
consider the volatilities for three variables, including firms’ cash flow (SD CFOit−1), 
sales (SD SALESit−1) and net hiring (SD NETHIREit−1) volatilities over the period from t-
1 to t-5. Moreover, I include industry-level unionization rate control for labor protection 
owing to organized labor. I measure UNIONit−1 using industry-level unionization rates to 
proxy for whether firms in a given industry that have a high level of labor protection. 
Finally, to control for the potential effect of other non-labor investment decisions on 
abnormal net hiring, I include AB INVESTit, which measures the magnitude of non-labor 
investments deviating from their expected level. As in Biddle et al. (2009), I use the 
absolute value of the residuals from the regression of non-labor investment (INVESTit) 
on sales growth (SALESGROWTHit−1), where INVESTit is the sum of capital 
expenditures, acquisition expenditures, and research and development expenditures, 
minus cash receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment, scaled by lagged 
total assets. Industry fixed effect and year fixed effect are included to control for the 
variations in labor investment over time and across industries. All standard errors are 






4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
To proxy for labor investment efficiency, I use the absolute value of abnormal 
net hiring which is the difference between the actual change in a firm’s labor force and 
the expected change based on fundamental economic factors estimated by Equation 
1. The absolute value of abnormal net hiring is the inverse proxy for labor investment 
efficiency and a high level of abnormal net hiring suggests a high deviation of actual 
labor investment from its expected value. In Table 1, Panel A summarizes the 
descriptive statistics and Panel B provides the estimated results for Equation 1. In 
order to minimize the impact of outliers, I follow Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and 
winsorize all continuous variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective 
distribution. Overall, the signs of variables are in line with expectation and the results 
from Equation 1 are comparable to those prior studies (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; 
Jung et al., 2014; Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007). The abnormal net hiring is used as the 





Panel A   
 
   
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in Equation 1 
   
 
   
 N Mean Std.Dev 25th Per Median 75th Per 
Variable              
NET_HIREit 112,882 0.078 0.365 -0.062 0.021 0.139 
SALESGROWTHit 112,882 0.183 0.737 -0.050 0.069 0.222 
SALESGROWTHit-1 112,882 0.254 0.912 -0.035 0.084 0.257 
ΔROAit 112,882 0.017 0.311 -0.043 0.006 0.050 
ΔROAit-1 112,882 0.006 0.305 -0.045 0.006 0.050 
ROAit 112,882 -0.090 0.486 -0.084 0.027 0.082 
RETURNit 112,882 0.232 1.246 -0.314 0.000 0.350 
SIZEit-1 112,882 5.213 2.438 3.458 5.162 6.895 
LIQit-1 112,882 2.002 2.563 0.721 1.197 2.189 
ΔLIQit-1 112,882 0.227 1.274 -0.229 -0.011 0.241 
ΔLIQit 112,882 0.148 0.962 -0.235 -0.018 0.216 
LEVit-1 112,882 0.286 0.387 0.029 0.198 0.386 
   
 
   
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 112,882 firm-year observations over the 
period between 1991 and 2016. This table presents the number of observations, the mean, 
the median, the standard deviation, and the values for the first and the third quartile for all 
the variables in Equation 1. 
  
The primary estimate of expected net hiring is based on the model of Pinnuck and Lillies 
(2007). NET_HIRE is the percentage change in employees. SALE_GROWTH is the 
percentage change in sale revenue. ROA is net income scaled by the beginning of the year 
total asset. RETURN is the annual stock return for year t. SIZE_R is the log of the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the year, ranked into percentiles. LIQ is the ratio of cash 
and short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities. LEV is the ratio of long 






Panel B   
Regression Results (Dependent Variable = NET_HIRE) 






   
 
SALESGROWTHit + 0.1751*** 
  (44.50) 
SALESGROWTHit-1 + 0.0224*** 
  (10.89) 
ROAit + 0.0293*** 
  (6.42) 
ΔROAit - -0.1090*** 
  (-17.30) 
ΔROAit-1 + 0.0260*** 
  (4.54) 
RETURNit + 0.0262*** 
  (20.90) 
SIZE_Pit-1 + 0.0079*** 
  (13.09) 
LIQit-1 + -0.0019 
  (-1.01) 
ΔLIQit +/- 0.0135*** 
  (9.71) 
ΔLIQit-1 + 0.0890*** 
  (22.95) 
LEVit-1 +/- 0.0009 
  (0.21) 
LOSSBIN1it-1 - -0.0220*** 
  (-2.81) 
LOSSBIN2it-1 - -0.0231*** 
  (-3.24) 
LOSSBIN3it-1 - -0.0351*** 
  (-4.83) 
LOSSBIN4it-1 - -0.0266*** 
  (-3.38) 
LOSSBIN5it-1 - -0.0377*** 
  (-4.75) 
 
  




Adjusted R2  0.171 
   
170 
 
This table presents the results from regressing the percentage change in employees 
on variables capturing underlying economic fundamentals over the period between 
1991 and 2016.  
  
t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West corrected standard errors.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
171 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the variables used to estimate the 
primary baseline regression of Equation 5. The average (median) of abnormal net 
hiring, AB_NETHIRE, is equal to 0.14 (0.08) with standard deviation of 0.13. This is 
highly comparable to Jung et al (2014) which has mean (median) of abnormal net 
hiring of 0.11 (0.07) with standard deviation of 0.13. One of the variables of interest, 
real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED), has a mean (median) of 1.46 (1.68) and 
standard deviation of 0.60. Two real earnings smoothing components, RES_DEXP 
and RES_PROD, have a mean (median) of 0.67 (0.85) and 0.78 (0.91) respectively. 
The descriptive statistics of real earnings smoothing proxies is highly comparable to 
Khurana et al (2017) which has real earnings smoothing with mean (median) of 1.49 
(1.70) and standard deviation of 0.55 24 . In terms of real earnings management 
proxies, the mean (median) the combined real earnings management proxy 
(REM_COMBINED) is equal to -0.10 (-0.09). The individual real earnings 
management proxies: negative abnormal cash flow, abnormal production and 
negative abnormal discretionary expenses (REM_ABCFO, REM_PROD, and 
REM_DEXP) have mean (median) of -0.04 (0.05), -0.05 (-0.05) and -0.01 (0.01) 
respectively. The descriptive statistics of other control variables in Equation (5) are 
comparable to related studies (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; Biddle et al., 2009; Jung 
et al., 2014).  
                                                          
24 Apart from the comparison of descriptive statistics, I also replicate the study of Khurana et 
al (2018) on the influence of real earnings smoothing on stock price crash risk. My results are 
highly similar and comparable with the results of Khurana et al (2018). I provide the replication 





Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in Equation (5)  
       
 N Mean Std.Dev 25th Per Median 75th Per 
             
AB_NETHIREit 46,761 0.1433 0.2149 0.0388 0.0827 0.1614 
OVER_LABORit 16,651 0.1849 0.3130 0.0327 0.0832 0.1913 
UNDER_LABORit 30,110 -0.1203 0.1269 -0.1512 -0.0825 -0.0418 
RES_COMBINEDit-1 46,761 1.4550 0.6028  1.2153 1.6828 1.8935 
RES_DEXPit-1 46,761 0.6734 0.4184 0.5518 0.8545 0.9608 
RES_PRODit-1 46,761 0.7817 0.3300 0.7468 0.9146 0.9735 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 46,761 -0.1001 0.5719  -0.3459 -0.0889 0.1455 
REM_ABCFOit-1 46,761 -0.0375 0.2343 -0.1211 0.0507 0.0195 
REM_PRODit-1 46,761 -0.0519 0.2593 -0.1674 -0.0498 0.0586 
REM_DEXPit-1 46,761 -0.0107 0.3956 -0.1228 0.0086 0.1331 
MTBit-1 46,761  2.6155 3.8119 1.0761 1.8443 3.1648 
SIZEit-1 46,761 0.5496 0.2920 0.2972  0.5753 0.8115 
LIQit-1 46,761 1.7666 2.0044 0.7560 1.1962 2.0032 
LEVit-1 46,761 0.2561 0.3282 0.0310 0.1909 0.3532 
DIVDit-1 46,761 0.3729 0.4836 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
TANGIBLESit-1 46,761 0.2598 0.2172 0.0923 0.1970 0.3648 
LOSSit-1 46,761 0.3036 0.4598 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
LABINTit-1 46,761 0.0091 0.0240 0.0025 0.0048 0.0092 
INVESTit 46,761 11.7524 68.9415 4.8070 8.8246 12.4683 
SD_CFOit-1 46,761 0.0743 0.0860  0.0288 0.0489 0.0846  
SD_SALESit-1 46,761 0.1949 0.1963 0.0751 0.1338 0.2377 
SD_NETHIREit-1 46,761 0.2132 0.2821 0.0725 0.1324 0.2396  
UNIONit-1 46,761 0.0911 0.0791 0.0338 0.0700 0.1250 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 46,761 firm-year observations over the 
period between 1995 and 2016. This table presents the number of observations, the mean, 
the median, the standard deviation, and the values for the first and the third quartile for all 
the variables in Equation 5. 
 
AB_NETHIRE is the absolute value of the difference between actual net hiring and the 
expected level measured on Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). OVER_LABOR is the positive 
abnormal net hiring as the measure for labor overinvestment. UNDER_LABOR is the 
negative abnormal net hiring as the measure for labor underinvestment. REM_ABCFO is 
calculated as negative one times the level of abnormal cash flows from operations following 
Roychowdhury (2006). REM_PROD is the level of abnormal production costs, where 
production costs are defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in 
inventories following Roychowdhury (2006). REM_DEXP is calculated as negative one 
times the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the 
sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses and SG&A expenses following Roychowdhury 
(2006). REM_COMBINED is the sum of real earnings management proxies, measured as 
RM_ABCFO + RM_PROD + RM_DEXP; Higher values indicate more real earnings 
management. RES_DEXP is a measure of real smoothing based on managerial discretion 
over the level of expense. RES_PROD is a measure of real smoothing based on managerial 
discretion over the level of production costs. RES_COMBINED is the sum of ES_DEXP and 
ES_PROD. SIZE is the log of the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. DIVD 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
LIQ is the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities. 
LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year. SD_CFO is 
the standard deviation of cash flow from operation over year t-5 to t-1. SD_SALES is the 
standard deviation of sales revenue over year t-5 to t-1. TANGIBLES is the ratio of property, 
plant, and equipment to total assets at the beginning of the year. LOSS is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise. SD_NETHIRE 
is the standard deviation of percentage change in employees over year t-5 to t-1. LABINT 
is the ratio of employees to total assets at the beginning of the year. UNION is the industry-
level rate of labor unionization for year t-1. AB_INVEST it the absolute value of the residual 





Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between abnormal net hiring, real 
earnings smoothing, real earnings management and other control variables in Equation 5. In 
line with the hypotheses, I find a negative and significant correlation between abnormal net 
hiring (AB_NETHIRE) and all measures of real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED, 
RES_DEXP, and RES_PROD), indicating that firms with more smooth earnings are generally 
associated with higher level of labor investment efficiency. In contrast, I find that real earnings 
management (REM_COMBINED, REM_ABCFO, REM_PROD, and REM_DEXP) are 
generally associated with higher levels of abnormal net hiring, representing lower labor 
investment efficiency. Even though real earnings smoothing and real earnings management 
have distinctive correlation with labor investment efficiency, I find the correlation between 
these two variables are significantly and positively correlated rather than mechanically 
negatively correlated. The correlations among other control variables in Equation 5 are 
generally consistent with the expectations. For instance, I find real earnings smoothing is 
positively correlated with firm size, market-to-book ratio and profitability whereas negatively 
correlated with leverage and discretionary accruals, which is consistent with the correlation in 
Khurana et al (2018). I find that firms with loss, higher market-to-book ratio, higher levels of 
liquidity and higher concurrent abnormal non-labor investments are more likely to have higher 
abnormal net hiring. The evidence generally suggests that firms with poor financial position, 
or with abundant growth options or liquidity are less likely to suffer inefficient investment in 
labor. The results seem to reflect the findings of prior studies on agency costs and show that 
firms with more growth options and liquidity are more likely to have higher agency costs (e.g., 
Smith and Watts, 1992). Also, firms with inefficient non-labor investment are also expected to 
have inefficient in their labor investment. In addition, larger firms, firms paying dividends in the 
past and firms with higher levels of tangibility and union power are negatively associated with 





Correlations among Labor Investment Efficiency, Real Earnings Smoothing, Real Earnings Management and Other Variables 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. AB_NETHIRE 1 
       
2. RES_COMBINED -0.085*** 1 
      
3. RES_DEXP -0.065*** 0.851*** 1 
     
4. RES_PROD -0.072*** 0.747*** 0.287*** 1 
    
5. REM_COMBINED 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 1 
   
6. REM_ABCFO 0.097*** -0.179*** -0.134*** -0.156*** 0.216*** 1 
  
7. REM_PROD 0.022*** -0.00600 -0.012** 0.00400 0.867*** 0.183*** 1 
 
8. REM_DEXP -0.041*** 0.139*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 0.749*** -0.401*** 0.489*** 1 
9. MTB 0.012** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.00500 -0.155*** -0.054*** -0.115*** -0.117*** 
10. SIZE -0.124*** 0.161*** 0.129*** 0.131*** -0.093*** -0.201*** -0.041*** 0.012*** 
11. LIQ 0.066*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.030*** -0.095*** -0.045*** -0.081*** -0.057*** 
12. LEV 0.074*** -0.098*** -0.076*** -0.083*** 0.028*** 0.164*** 0.028*** -0.075*** 
13. DIVD -0.121*** 0.191*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.029*** -0.119*** 0.010** 0.105*** 
14. TANGIBLES -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.088*** 0.085*** 0.058*** -0.055*** 0.050*** 0.084*** 
15. LOSS 0.119*** -0.249*** -0.203*** -0.198*** 0.054*** 0.316*** 0.059*** -0.148*** 
16. LABINT 0.00700 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.013*** 0.175*** 0.00200 0.150*** 0.154*** 
17. INVEST 0.111*** -0.030*** -0.011** -0.041*** -0.013*** 0.129*** -0.028*** -0.076*** 
18. SD_CFO 0.177*** -0.249*** -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.093*** 0.339*** -0.098*** -0.271*** 
19. SD_SALES 0.145*** -0.071*** -0.042*** -0.077*** 0.105*** 0.165*** 0.080*** 0.00200 
20. SD_NETHIRE 0.174*** -0.079*** -0.060*** -0.069*** 0.024*** 0.101*** 0.067*** -0.069*** 




TABLE 3 (continued) 
        
 9 10 11 12 13 14  
9. MTB 1 
      
10. SIZE 0.202*** 1 
     
11. LIQ 0.016*** -0.082*** 1 
    
12. LEV -0.066*** -0.033*** -0.246*** 1 
   
13. DIVD 0.045*** 0.472*** -0.095*** -0.057*** 1 
  
14. TANGIBLES -0.069*** 0.140*** -0.230*** 0.156*** 0.147*** 1  
15. LOSS -0.064*** -0.391*** -0.016*** 0.120*** -0.324*** -0.027***  
16. LABINT -0.023*** -0.118*** -0.063*** 0.011** -0.034*** 0.011**  
17. INVEST -0.008* -0.033*** -0.00500 0.079*** -0.025*** -0.00600  
18. SD_CFO 0.027*** -0.415*** 0.042*** 0.182*** -0.292*** -0.195***  
19. SD_SALES -0.00200 -0.339*** -0.061*** 0.141*** -0.222*** -0.185***  
20. SD_NETHIRE -0.00500 -0.157*** 0.00100 0.152*** -0.197*** -0.040***  




        
 15 16 17 18 19 20 
15. LOSS 1 
      
16. LABINT 0.00400 1 
     
17. INVEST 0.028*** 0.016*** 1 
    
18. SD_CFO 0.302*** 0.051*** 0.097*** 1 
   























4.2 Real Earnings Management and Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
Table 4 reports the OLS results of the regressions examining the relationship 
between real earnings management and abnormal net hiring. Column 1 presents the 
results for the regression model using the absolute value of the residual (AB 
NETHIRE) as the outcome variable and the combined real earnings management 
proxy (REM_COMBINED) as the variable of interest. The main result shows that the 
estimated coefficient on REM_COMBINED is positively and statistically significant, 
suggesting that firms engaging in more real earnings management are associated 
with higher deviations of labor investment from the level justified by economic 
fundamentals (i.e., lower labor investment efficiency).  
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest that each individual type of real earnings 
management may have different implications for earnings that may be diluted by using 
the combined real earnings management proxy. Thus, I also report results 
corresponding to three individual real earnings management proxies (REM_ABCFO, 
REM_PROD, and REM_DEXP). As mentioned earlier, higher values of these proxies 
indicate more real activities management. In column 2, I report the OLS results 
obtained by regressing the proxy for labor investment efficiency on abnormal cash 
flows (REM_ABCFO). The estimated coefficient on REM_ABCFO suggests that firms 
engaging in more sales manipulation tend to have a higher value of abnormal net 
hiring. In column 3, I find the real earnings management proxy via overproduction 
(REM_PROD) is positively associated with abnormal net hiring, suggesting that firms 
engaging real earnings management via overproduction also tend to suffer inefficient 
labor investment. In fact, I find that both the coefficient and significance level of 
REM_PROD is the largest among three forms of real earnings management for labor 
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investment efficiency. One of the potential explanations might be that real earnings 
management via overproduction is more likely to be related to labor force adjustment 
and overproduction, therefore, might have a more direct influence on a firm’s 
employment decision. 25  Finally, I find the estimated coefficient of abnormal 
discretionary expenses (REM_DEXP) is also positively associated with abnormal net 
hiring. Overall, I find persistent results that real earnings management significantly 
deteriorates labor investment efficiency. Apart from real earnings management 
proxies, I also find several significant relations between the control variables and 
abnormal net hiring. For instance, the coefficients on MTB, LIQ, LEV, LOSS, 
SD_CFO, SD_SALES, and SD_NETHIRE are positive and significant at the 1%, 
suggesting that firms with higher market-to-book, liquidity, leverage, losses and higher 
volatilities of operating cash flows, sales, and past net hiring invest less efficiently in 
labor.  
                                                          
25 I discuss the possibility of alternative channel via which real earnings management can 
affect labor investment efficiency and the potential mechanical relationship between the 
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REM_ABCFOit-1  0.0209***   













MTBit-1 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
 (3.73) (3.20) (3.56) (3.32) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0133*** -0.0157*** -0.0153*** -0.0143*** 
 (-2.67) (-3.17) (-3.10) (-2.88) 
LIQit-1 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 
 (9.18) (9.02) (9.16) (8.99) 
LEVit-1 0.0200*** 0.0192*** 0.0200*** 0.0208*** 
 (4.06) (3.84) (4.08) (4.17) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0134*** -0.0125*** -0.0126*** -0.0128*** 
 (-5.42) (-5.06) (-5.11) (-5.20) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0367*** -0.0325*** -0.0362*** -0.0362*** 
 (-4.38) (-3.87) (-4.33) (-4.29) 
LOSSit-1 0.0207*** 0.0190*** 0.0205*** 0.0226*** 
 (7.78) (6.94) (7.68) (8.37) 
LABINTit-1 -0.1843*** -0.1272** -0.1804*** -0.1543*** 
 (-3.04) (-2.39) (-2.97) (-2.62) 
INVESTit 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003* 
 (1.63) (1.61) (1.65) (1.65) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.2195*** 0.1833*** 0.2181*** 0.2149*** 
 (7.95) (6.90) (7.98) (7.66) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0411*** 0.0494*** 0.0422*** 0.0447*** 
 (4.24) (5.15) (4.37) (4.60) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0787*** 0.0788*** 0.0773*** 0.0794*** 
 (11.90) (11.90) (11.67) (11.97) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0531 -0.0532 -0.0523 -0.0532 
 (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.56) (-1.59) 
     
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 46,761 46,761 46,761 46,761 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 
     
This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on real earnings 
management proxies and other control variables over the sample period between 1995 and 
2016. Column 1 shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on the 
combined measure of real earnings management (REM_COMBINED) and control 
variables. Column 2 shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on 
REM_ABCFO calculated as negative one times the level of abnormal cash flows from 
operations following Roychowdhury (2006) and control variables. Column 3 shows the 
results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on REM_PROD as the level of 
abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined as the sum of the cost of 
goods sold and the change in inventories following Roychowdhury (2006) and control 
variables. Column 4 shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on 
REM_DEXP calculated as negative one times the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, 
where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses, advertising expenses and 
SG&A expenses following Roychowdhury (2006). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted 




4.3 Real Earnings Smoothing and Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
Table 5 tests the relationship between real earnings smoothing and labor 
investment efficiency. I find that the estimated coefficient for the overall real earnings 
smoothing proxy (RES_COMBINED) is negative and significant. 26  The result is 
consistent with the informative smoothing hypothesis that real earnings smoothing 
may convey manager’s private information about a firm’s future earnings and 
therefore can lower the information asymmetry between firms and outside capital 
suppliers, thus reducing inefficient labor investment. In column 2 and 3, I test the real 
earnings smoothing based on managerial discretion over the level of expenses and 
production costs. Consistent with the main result, I find that these two real earnings 
smoothing types are also negatively associated with abnormal net hiring and the 
estimated coefficients of these two variables are statistically significant. In fact, I find 
that the impact of RES_PROD is higher than RES_DEXP, both statistically and 
economically. This is consistent with the above explanation that production-related 
activities adjustments might have a more direct influence on firms’ labor investment 
efficiency. 
                                                          
26 In untabulated results, I control real earnings management in the real earnings smoothing 
tests, and control for real earnings smoothing when test the effect of real earnings 
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RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0111***     
 (-5.33)     
RES_DEXPit-1  -0.0102***    
  (-3.55)    
RES_PRODit-1   -0.0190***   
   (-4.83)   
RES_INFit-1    -0.0127***  
    (-3.60)  
RES_GARit-1     -0.0003 
 
    (-0.10) 
MTBit-1 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
 
(3.07) (3.07) (3.10) (2.66) (2.70) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0158*** -0.0158*** -0.0160*** -0.0123** -0.0125** 
 
(-3.20) (-3.19) (-3.24) (-2.01) (-2.04) 
LIQit-1 0.0073*** 0.0073*** 0.0075*** 0.0064*** 0.0065*** 
 
(8.75) (8.72) (8.96) (6.55) (6.75) 
LEVit-1 0.0192*** 0.0199*** 0.0193*** 0.0176*** 0.0189*** 
 
(3.87) (3.99) (3.89) (2.75) (2.96) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0109*** -0.0114*** -0.0114*** -0.0109*** -0.0124*** 
 
(-4.39) (-4.63) (-4.60) (-3.66) (-4.16) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0359*** -0.0365*** -0.0329*** -0.0367*** -0.0348*** 
 
(-4.29) (-4.33) (-3.91) (-3.51) (-3.32) 
LOSSit-1 0.0194*** 0.0206*** 0.0199*** 0.0136*** 0.0159*** 
 
(7.18) (7.62) (7.41) (4.08) (4.82) 
LABINTit-1 -0.1223** -0.1253** -0.1270** -0.0618 -0.0708 
 
(-2.26) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-1.13) (-1.27) 
INVESTit 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 
 
(1.65) (1.65) (1.64) (4.96) (4.97) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.1840*** 0.1903*** 0.1900*** 0.0502 0.0632** 
 
(6.87) (7.00) (7.13) (1.58) (2.03) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0499*** 0.0494*** 0.0491*** 0.0372*** 0.0360*** 
 
(5.20) (5.13) (5.11) (3.40) (3.28) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0788*** 0.0790*** 0.0787*** 0.0717*** 0.0721*** 
 
(11.91) (11.92) (11.90) (8.77) (8.80) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0509 -0.0511 -0.0530 -0.0200 -0.0217 
 
(-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.58) (-0.48) (-0.53) 
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Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 46,761 46,761 46,761 30,036 30,036 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.120 0.119 
      
This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on real earnings 
smoothing proxies and other control variables over the sample period between 1995 and 
2016. Column 1 shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on the 
combined measure of real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED) and control variables. 
Column 2 shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on the measure 
of real smoothing based on managerial discretion over the level of expense (RES_DEXP) 
and control variables. Column 3 shows the results regressing abnormal net hiring 
(AB_NETHIRE) on the measure of real smoothing based on managerial discretion over the 
level of production costs (RES_PROD) and control variables. Column 4 shows the results 
regressing abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on the informative component of real 
smoothing (RES_INF) and control variables. Column 5 shows the results regressing 
abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on the garbling component of real smoothing 
(RES_GAR) and control variables. 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error adjusted 
by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
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4.4 Decomposition of Real Earnings Smoothing for Labor Investment 
Efficiency 
 
So far, the results suggest real earnings smoothing is negatively associated with 
abnormal net hiring, showing that real earnings smoothing facilitates higher labor 
investment efficiency. In this section, I further test the notion by investigating the 
impact of the decompositions of real earnings smoothing on labor investment 
efficiency. In particular, I predict that the impact of real earnings smoothing on labor 
investment efficiency is primarily driven by the informational component (rather than 
the garbled component) of real earnings smoothing.  
I decompose the smoothing proxy into the informational component and 
garbling component by following Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and Dou et al. (2013). 
Specifically, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) investigate whether smoothing garbles 
earnings information or improve the informativeness of past and current earnings by 
testing the extent to which investors are able to predict future performance. The 
rationale is that smoothing by managers in the current period is public information to 
investors. Investors will observe this public information and it will facilitate investors 
to predict future performance and to price the firm accordingly so that prices lead 
earnings. If managers smooth income because of other incentives, smoothing garbles 
earnings information and the extent to which prices lead earnings is not expected to 
vary based on the level of income smoothing. Dou et al. (2013) modify the basic model 
of Tucker and Zarowin (2006) by considering the differential predictability of earnings 
for profit and loss firms and believing that the earnings of profitable firms are easier 





Rit = β0 + β1EPSit−1 + β2EPSit + β3PROFITPROFIT * EPST3 + β3LOSSLOSS * EPST3 + β4RT3 
+ εit                                                                                                                                           (6)       
          
Where EPSt-1 and EPSt are earnings per share for year t-1 and t, and EPST3 is 
the sum of EPS for years from t+1 to t+3. PROFIT and LOSS are the indicator 
variables for cumulative three-year earnings being positive or negative. All EPS 
variables are basic EPS excluding extraordinary items, adjusted for stock splits and 
stock dividends, and deflated by the stock price at the beginning of year t. RT3 is the 
aggregate stock return in years t+1 to t+3 with annual compounding (Dou et al., 2013; 
Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). The current year’s stock return Rit contains all publicly 
available information and I include EPSt-1 and EPSt to control for unexpected earnings 
in the current period as suggested by Lundholm and Myers (2002). β3PROFIT and β3LOSS 
are future earnings response coefficients (FERC) which capture revisions in investors’ 
expectations about future earnings. If smoothing enables investors in the current 
period to formulate better expectations about future earnings, β3PROFIT and β3LOSS are 
expected to be increasing functions of smoothing (Dou et al., 2013, p. 1639). In order 
to decompose income smoothing into informational and garbling components, I 
estimate Equation 6 for all firms27. I then estimate the following model: 
 
RES_COMBINEDit = α0 + α1PROFIT β3PROFIT + αLOSS β3LOSS + εit                                                        
(7)        
 
                                                          
27 Dou et al (2013) estimate equation (7) for each industry in each country. I estimate equation 
(7) for each firm and request each firm at least has 5 observations. In order to further mitigate 
the concern that there is no substantial variation at the firm level that enables capturing the 
informational component. I further estimate cross-sectional industry regression model as 
estimate of firm i’s. Namely, for each year, I estimate the model for every industry classified 
by its 2-digit SIC. I find the results are similar.  
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After estimating Equation 7, the predicted value of RES_COMBINEDit for firm i 
is the proxy for the informational component (RES_INFit) which facilitate investors to 
predict future earnings. In contrast, the residual, εit, is the proxy for the garbling 
component (RES_GARit) of smoothing which provides noise for investors to predict 
future earnings. I then re-estimate the baseline model (Equation 5) to test the impact 
of informational and garbling components of smoothing on labor investment 
efficiency. 
Table 5 column 4 and 5 report the effects of the informational component and 
garbling component of real earnings smoothing on labor investment efficiency, 
respectively. I find that the estimated coefficient of the informational component is 
negative and significant. This is consistent with the prediction that the informational 
component of smoothing can convey managers’ private information about firms’ future 
and lower information asymmetry, which therefore leads to higher labor investment 
efficiency. In contrast, I find that the estimated coefficient of garbling component is 
insignificant, indicating that if smoothing garbles the informativeness of earnings, the 
garbled smoothing is not able to lower information asymmetry and higher labor 
investment efficiency.  
In sum, the results from Table 4 and 5 suggest that real earnings smoothing 
play a distinctive role from real earnings management activities in affecting labor 
investment efficiency, and that real earnings smoothing is more important and 
beneficial to firms’ labor investment efficiency when firms engage real smoothing 
activities in a way that conveys information to outsiders. 
 
4.5 Labor Overinvestment and Underinvestment 
 
In Table 6, I further investigate the influence of real earnings smoothing and real 
earnings management on labor overinvestment (OVER LABOR) and 
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underinvestment (UNDER LABOR) based on the sign of abnormal net hiring. In 
column 1 of Table 6, I adopt the positive abnormal net hiring (OVER LABOR) as the 
measure of overinvestment in labor and re-estimate Equation 5 based on the 
subsample. I find that firms with higher real earnings smoothing (higher real earnings 
management) tend to have less (more) labor overinvestment and therefore enjoy 
higher (lower) levels of labor investment efficiency. In column 2, I use the negative 
abnormal net hiring (UNDER LABOR) as the dependent variable and re-estimate the 
baseline regression model. I find firms with higher real earnings smoothing (higher 
real earnings management) tend to have less (more) labor underinvestment. This 
suggests that firms engaging in more real earnings smoothing (real earnings 
management) have smaller (larger) deviations between actual and expected net 
hiring in terms of underinvestment in labor. Given adverse selection tends to lead to 
underinvestment when firms are financially constraint and moral hazard tends to lead 
to overinvestment due to managerial private incentives when firms have excess cash 
flows (Biddle et al., 2009; Hope and Thomas, 2008), the results collectively suggest 
that real earnings smoothing improves labor investment efficiency by reducing 
adverse selection as well as moral hazard whereas real earnings management 
impairs labor investment efficiency. 
In column 3 and 4, I further decompose labor overinvestment into over-hiring 
(OVERHIRING) and under-firing (UNDERFIRING) based on the actual net hiring and 
expected amount. I follow Jung et al. (2014) and define over-hiring as actual net hiring 
exceeds the expected amount when expected net hiring is positive and under-firing 
as actual net hiring exceeds the expected amount when expected net hiring is 
negative. In the same vein, I decompose labor underinvestment into under-hiring 
(UNDERHIRING) and over-firing (OVERFIRING) in column 5 and 6. Under-hiring 
happens if actual net hiring is less than the expected amount when the expected 
amount if positive whereas over-firing happens if actual net hiring is less than the 
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expected amount when the expected amount if negative. I re-estimate Equation 5 for 
each subsample and find that the results of subsample regressions are consistent 
with the results in column 1 and 2, suggesting that real earnings smoothing reduce all 
kinds of labor investment inefficiency and facilitate firms to have levels of labor 
investment that are closer to the levels justified by firms’ economic fundamentals. In 
contrast, the results in Table 6 again suggest that real earnings management activities 
generally deteriorate labor investment efficiency in the subsample analysis, reflecting 
the notion that real earnings management and real earnings smoothing are two 
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RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0116** 0.0118*** -0.0095* -0.0120* 0.0121*** 0.0094*** 
 (-2.50) (7.34) (-1.78) (-1.77) (6.91) (2.69) 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0272*** -0.0080*** 0.0388*** 0.0038 -0.0056*** -0.0092** 
 (4.88) (-4.19) (6.21) (0.60) (-2.69) (-2.19) 
MTBit-1 0.0032*** 0.0004 0.0030*** 0.0013 0.0007** -0.0006 
 (4.16) (1.40) (3.17) (1.17) (2.52) (-1.00) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0102 0.0132*** -0.0460*** 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0726*** 
 (-0.95) (3.41) (-3.58) (0.07) (-0.11) (-6.32) 
LIQit-1 0.0159*** -0.0039*** 0.0123*** 0.0147* -0.0051*** -0.0053*** 
 (7.65) (-7.56) (5.72) (1.77) (-9.62) (-2.58) 
LEVit-1 0.0223** -0.0185*** 0.0242** 0.0096 -0.0252*** -0.0116 
 (2.24) (-4.55) (1.98) (0.57) (-5.30) (-1.45) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0146** 0.0017 -0.0141** -0.0037 0.0006 0.0042 
 (-2.56) (0.99) (-2.34) (-0.26) (0.39) (0.71) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0672*** 0.0181*** -0.1016*** 0.0371 0.0099 0.0573*** 
 (-3.81) (2.73) (-4.86) (1.08) (1.38) (3.90) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0059 -0.0374*** 0.0110 0.0119 -0.0331*** -0.0105** 
 (-0.93) (-18.26) (1.38) (1.13) (-14.65) (-2.20) 
LABINTit-1 -0.7867*** -0.0323 -0.8236*** -0.6813*** -0.0363 -0.3157** 
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 (-3.81) (-0.75) (-3.33) (-2.68) (-0.87) (-2.10) 
INVESTit 0.0014* -0.0001*** 0.0041*** 0.0005*** -0.0001*** 0.0002 
 (1.90) (-7.63) (12.31) (2.76) (-6.00) (0.76) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.1848*** -0.1621*** 0.1393** 0.3027*** -0.1975*** -0.1206*** 
 (3.66) (-7.51) (2.37) (4.65) (-7.02) (-3.96) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0519** -0.0268*** 0.0457** 0.0411 -0.0263*** -0.0118 
 
(2.42) (-3.56) (2.00) (1.36) (-3.10) (-0.81) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.1129*** -0.0557*** 0.1067*** 0.0806*** -0.0560*** -0.0487*** 
 (8.62) (-11.53) (6.75) (3.82) (-10.20) (-5.51) 
UNIONit-1 -0.1165 0.0014 -0.0997 -0.0539 0.0124 -0.0389 
 (-1.39) (0.05) (-1.05) (-0.27) (0.47) (-0.55) 
       
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 16,651 30,110 13,440 3,210 24,752 5,359 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.154 0.169 0.099 0.163 0.094 
       
This table presents the results from regressing labor overinvestment (OVER_LABOR) and labor underinvestment (UNDER_LABOR) on 
real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED) and real earnings management (REM_COMBINED) over the period between 1995 and 
2016. Column 1 shows the results of regressing labor overinvestment (OVER_LABOR) on real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED) 
and real earnings management (REM_COMBINED). Column 2 shows the results of regressing labor underinvestment (UNDER_LABOR) 
on real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED) and real earnings management (REM_COMBINED). Column 2 to 6 present the results 
of estimating the model on various subsets of the sample over the period between 1995 and 2016. Overhiring (OVERHIRING) is actual 
net hiring that exceeds the expected amount, when expected net hiring is positive (Column 3). Underfiring (UNDERFIRING) is the actual 
net hiring that exceeds the expected amount when expected net hiring is negative (Column 4). Underhiring (UNDERHIRING) is actual 
net hiring that is less than the expected amount, when the expected amount if positive (Column 5). Overfiring (OVERFIRING) is the actual 




4.6 The Role of Financial Constraints and Financial Loss 
 
As explained earlier, moral hazard and adverse selection are the two primary 
imperfections in the market that make firms depart from the optimal investment level. 
Given the existence of fixed components in labor costs, labor investments also face 
substantial adjustment costs and firms require external capital to finance their labor 
investments. Therefore, the capital market imperfections stemming from information 
asymmetry also influence firms’ efficiency in making employment decisions. In this 
section, I study the role of financial constraints on the relation between real earnings 
smoothing and labor investment efficiency. I expect that more financially constrained 
firms are less able to invest efficiently in labor. However, if the documented 
informational effect of real earnings smoothing on labor investment occurs through 
financing channel, the informational effect of real earnings smoothing should be 
stronger for firms with high levels of financial constraints because the managers of 
financially constrained firms may have stronger incentives to engage in real earnings 
smoothing to provide private information to reduce the information asymmetries 
between their firms and external funding providers.  
To substantiate this conjecture, I use four text-based financial constraints 
proxies from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), including delay investment constraint 
(DELAYCON), equity-focused constraint (EQUITY_DELAYCON), debt-focused 
constraint (DEBT_DELAYCON) and private-placement-focused constraint 
(PRIV_DELAYCON)28. The results reported in column 1, 2 and 4 of Table 7 show that 
                                                          
28 The measures of the firm’s financial constraints from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) are 
based on analysis of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section in 10-Ks for 
the period 1997-2009. The key subsection of MD&A which is also used by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), contains a firm’s remarks concerning its financial liquidity and its intentions regarding 
future capital market interactions.  
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the coefficients on the interaction terms between real earnings smoothing and delay 
investment constraints (DELAYCON), equity-focused constraints 
(EQUITY_DELAYCON) and private-placement-focused constraints 
(PRIV_DELAYCON) are negative and statistically significant. The results show that 
the informational effect of real earnings smoothing on labor investment efficiency is 
amplified for the firms with higher levels of financial constraints and managers of 
financially constrained firms may have stronger incentives to engage in real earnings 
smoothing to provide private information to external funding providers for financing 
benefits. I also noticed that the relations between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) 
and stand-alone delay investment constraints (DELAYCON), equity-focused 
constraints (EQUITY_DELAYCON) and private-placement-focused constraints 
(PRIV_DELAYCON) are positive and statistically significant, which suggests that 
financial constraints per se have a negative effect on labor investment efficiency and 
firms with financial constraints are less likely to invest in labor efficiently. Notably, the 
coefficient on the interaction term between real earnings smoothing and debt-focused 
constraint (DEBT_DELAYCON) is positive and statistically significant. This result 
partially echoes the finding of Amiram and Owens (2018) that the garbling effect of 
earnings smoothing dominate debt contract design and associate with a higher cost 
of debt when managers’ private benefits consumption threat is high. Moreover, this 
result is also in line with the negative correlation between delay investment constraints 
(DELAYCON) and other financial constraint proxies in Hoberg and Maksimovic 
(2015). Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) find that equity market and debt market 
constraints are different in terms of constraints origins and show that asymmetric 
information is likely a strong driver of financial constraints among firms attempting to 
issue equity, but not for debt market constrained firms. The results reflect their findings 
and show that financially constrained firms attempting to issue equity have stronger 
incentives to engage real earnings smoothing to reduce the information asymmetry to 
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obtain financing benefits whereas debt-focused constrained firms may use real 
earnings smoothing as an earnings manipulation tool.  
In addition to financial constraints, I also examine the effect of loss-making on 
the relationship between real earnings smoothing and labor investment efficiency. 
Similar to financial constraints, I expect that firms with loss are less able to invest 
efficiently in labor as lower profitability may face lower financial resources and higher 
financing costs. Hence, the managers of loss-making firm may have stronger 
incentives to engage in real earnings smoothing to signal their firms’ prospect in the 
future. The results are consistent with my expectation and show that loss per se has 
a negative effect on labor investment efficiency whereas the coefficient on the 
interaction term between real earnings smoothing and loss is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting loss-making firms adopt real earnings smoothing as tool to 
lower the information asymmetries between their firms and outsiders, and hence 





The Role of Financial Constraints on the Relationship between Real Earnings Smoothing and Labor Investment Efficiency 

















RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0138*** -0.0139*** -0.0128*** -0.0144*** -0.0078*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.71) (-4.70) (-4.85) (-4.09) 
INTERACTIONit-1 -0.0695** -0.0690** 0.0987** -0.1232*** -0.0074** 
 (-2.41) (-2.38) (2.27) (-3.48) (-2.30) 
DELAYCONit-1 0.1337***     
 (2.96)     
EQUITY_DELAYCONit-1  0.1418***    
  (3.16)    
DEBT_DELAYCONit-1   -0.1147   
   (-1.63)   
PRIV_DELAYCONit-1    0.2274***  
    (4.11)  
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0159*** 0.0166*** 0.0096*** 
 (5.18) (5.21) (5.01) (5.25) (4.89) 
MTBit-1 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 
 (2.84) (2.79) (2.90) (2.69) (4.01) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0131** -0.0135** -0.0115* -0.0140** -0.0117*** 
 (-2.17) (-2.21) (-1.89) (-2.28) (-2.92) 
LIQit-1 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0073*** 0.0070*** 0.0064*** 
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 (6.87) (6.81) (6.88) (6.60) (10.15) 
LEVit-1 0.0151*** 0.0149** 0.0153*** 0.0152*** 0.0175*** 
 (2.60) (2.56) (2.61) (2.61) (4.62) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0119*** -0.0120*** -0.0124*** -0.0121*** -0.0112*** 
 (-3.85) (-3.87) (-3.98) (-3.90) (-5.64) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0419*** -0.0414*** -0.0415*** -0.0405*** -0.0313*** 
 (-3.82) (-3.77) (-3.77) (-3.68) (-4.68) 
LOSSit-1 0.0170*** 0.0167*** 0.0178*** 0.0167*** 0.0292*** 
 (5.16) (5.07) (5.41) (5.07) (5.95) 
LABINTit-1 -0.2145*** -0.2135*** -0.2125*** -0.2114*** -0.1160** 
 (-3.23) (-3.23) (-3.21) (-3.22) (-2.56) 
INVESTit 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002 
 (1.87) (1.87) (1.86) (1.87) (1.59) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.2169*** 0.2119*** 0.2210*** 0.2045*** 0.1645*** 
 (6.81) (6.57) (6.92) (6.32) (8.33) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0446*** 0.0447*** 0.0438*** 0.0450*** 0.0398*** 
 
(3.92) (3.92) (3.85) (3.95) (5.38) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0752*** 0.0751*** 0.0748*** 0.0746*** 0.0683*** 
 (9.68) (9.65) (9.60) (9.60) (13.62) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0914** -0.0912** -0.0934** -0.0917** -0.0420 
 (-2.07) (-2.06) (-2.11) (-2.07) (-1.57) 
      
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30,029 30,029 30,029 30,029 46,761 
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.100 
      
196 
 
This table presents the results regarding the influence of financial constraints on the relation between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) 
and real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED) over the sample period between 1995 and 2016. Column 1 shows the results regarding 
the influence of delay investment constraint (DELAYCON) on the relation between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) and real earnings 
smoothing (RES_COMBINED). Column 2 shows the results regarding the influence of equity-focused constraint (EQUITY_DELAYCON) 
on the relation between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) and real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED). Column 3 shows the results 
regarding the influence of debt-focused constraint (DEBT_DELAYCON) on the relation between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) and 
real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED). Column 4 shows the results regarding the influence of private-placement-focused constraint 
(PRIV_DELAYCON) on the relation between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) and real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED). 
Column 5 shows the results regarding the influence of making loss (LOSS) on the relation between abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) 
and real earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  





5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
5.1 The Role of Non-labor Investment 
 
In this section, I test the robustness of the main results. I first examine the role 
of other non-labor investments. In addition to corporate labor investment, real 
activities adjustments may also influence labor investment through other 
contemporaneous non-labor investments. It is likely that fast-growing firms tend to 
increase both physical and labor investments. In such a case, the relation between 
real earnings smoothing, real earnings management, and labor investment efficiency 
may be driven by the relation between real earnings smoothing, real earnings 
management with other contemporaneous non-labor investment. In order to rule out 
this possibility, I first include the non-labor investment efficiency using the absolute 
value of the abnormal non-labor investment as a control variable across all the labor 
investment efficiency regressions. Following Jung et al. (2014) and Ben-Nasr and 
Alshwer (2016), I further address this concern by examining the impact of four types 
of non-labor investment: capital expenditures, research and development 
expenditures, advertising expenditures and acquisition expenditures. I split the 
sample into three sub-sample: (1) firms with a positive relationship between labor and 
non-labor investment (an increase/decrease in labor investment is accompanied by 
an increase/decrease in non-labor investment); (2) firms with a negative relationship 
between labor and non-labor investment (an increase/decrease in labor investment is 
accompanied by a decrease/increase); (3) firms with zero or missing non-labor 
investment reported. Table 8 presents the results for the subsamples based on the 
relation between net hiring and other specific types of investment. If the main results 
are driven by other contemporaneous non-labor investment, I would observe the 
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results to be concentrated in the subsamples with a positive relationship between net 
hiring and other non-labor investments. However, I find the estimated coefficients for 
real earnings smoothing across all the subsample regressions remain negative and 
statistically significant while the estimated coefficients for real earnings management 
generally remain positive and statistically significant in Table 8. Overall, this confirms 
that the results are not driven by the relation between real earnings smoothing, real 




The Effect of Other Investments on the Association between Real Earnings Smoothing, Real Earnings Management and Abnormal Net 
Hiring 
 
Panel A: Capital Expenditures 
 
Panel B: Research and Development Expenditures 
 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
ZERO OR  
NOT REPORTED 
 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
















RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0132*** -0.0073** -0.0114**  -0.0073** -0.0098*** -0.0131*** 
 (-4.95) (-2.25) (-2.23)  (-2.42) (-4.11) (-3.90) 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0151*** 0.0203*** 0.0160  0.0153*** 0.0098*** 0.0151*** 
 (4.51) (5.31) (1.44)  (3.53) (2.74) (4.06) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes 
N 27,943 16,234 2,584  14,355 10,492 21,914 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.123 0.247  0.125 0.132 0.086 
 
Panel C: Advertising Expenditures 
 
Panel D: Acquisition Expenditures 
 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
ZERO OR  
NOT REPORTED  
POSITIVE NEGATIVE 















RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0119** -0.0105*** -0.0100***  -0.0132** -0.0075* -0.0110*** 
 (-2.17) (-3.66) (-3.88)  (-2.35) (-1.67) (-5.27) 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0189*** 0.0080** 0.0145***  0.0369*** 0.0018 0.0088*** 
 (3.32) (2.24) (4.30)  (4.64) (0.30) (3.67) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 9,762 7,195 29,804  11,466 5,229 30,066 
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.126 0.086  0.227 0.151 0.106 
        
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of other investments on the association between real earnings adjustments (RES_COMBINED, 
REM_COMBINED) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  






5.2 Change Analysis  
 
Despite examining the role of other non-labor investments and incorporating an 
extensive list of control variables, I cannot rule out the possibility that the results suffer 
from endogeneity. A common empirical strategy to address endogeneity is to employ 
an instrumental variable that is correlated with a firm’s real earnings adjustments but 
is exogenous to the firm’s labor investment. It is challenging to find a truly exogenous 
instrumental variable for real earnings adjustments. In order to mitigate the 
unobservable omitted variables that can potentially drive the results, I use change 
analysis to examine the influence of real earnings adjustments on labor investment 
efficiency. In Table 9, I find the coefficient on the change in lagged year real earnings 
smoothing is significant and negative whereas the coefficient on the change in lagged 
year real earnings management is significant and positive. The results of the change 
analysis are consistent with the main results and indicate that the marginal effect of 
an increase in real earnings smoothing can reduce abnormal net hiring whereas the 













































Industry Fixed Effect Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
N 35,657 




This table presents the results of change analysis. Column 1 shows the results 
regressing change of abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE_CHANGE) on the 
change of combined measure of real earnings management 
(RES_COMBINED_CHANGE), change of real earnings smoothing 
(REM_COMBINED_CHANGE) and change in control variables.  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard 




5.3 Alternative Proxies for Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
I then adopt several alternative labor investment efficiency proxies to ensure the 
robustness of the main results. First, I follow Cella (2009) to use the difference 
between a firm’s observed value of labor investment and the industry-median value 
of net hiring. Therefore, if a firm’s net hiring deviates far from its industry peers, the 
firm has a high level of abnormal net hiring. Results are shown in Table 10 column 1. 
Second, I use the absolute value of the difference between the observed value for 
labor investment and the residuals from the regression of the observed value of labor 
investment on sales growth as the alternative labor investment efficiency. This 
approach is in line with Biddle et al. (2009) to estimate the optimal level of capital 
expenditure. Results are shown in Table 10 column 2. Third, to control for the effect 
of other non-labor investment and dynamics in economic environment on change of 
employees, I also augment Equation 1 with several additional variables including 
capital investment (CAPX), R&D expenditures (XRD), acquisitions expenses (AQC), 
industry unionization level (UNION), macroeconomic conditions (GDP) and lagged 
net hiring. I estimate the augmented Equation 1 and find that the main results remain 
robust to this alternative labor investment efficiency. Results are shown in Table 10 
column 3. Fourth, I also use the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) model with both year and 
industry fixed effect to estimate the abnormal net hiring and I find the results still hold. 
Overall, the main results are robust across various alternative labor investment 






The Effect of Real Earnings Management and Real Smoothness on Alternative Abnormal Net Hiring 
 
Cella (2009) Biddle (2009) 
Augmented Pinnuck and 
Lillis (2007) 
Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) with 














RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0084*** -0.0102*** -0.0077*** -0.0115*** 
 (-3.59) (-4.72) (-3.89) (-5.53) 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0120*** 0.0125*** 0.0089*** 0.0136*** 
 (4.06) (5.00) (3.70) (5.40) 
MTBit-1 0.0028*** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 
 (6.40) (4.48) (4.68) (3.76) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0198*** -0.0211*** -0.0256*** -0.0137*** 
 (-3.60) (-4.12) (-5.42) (-2.79) 
LIQit-1 0.0070*** 0.0066*** 0.0065*** 0.0074*** 
 (6.40) (6.89) (8.11) (8.79) 
LEVit-1 0.0045 0.0200*** 0.0086* 0.0177*** 
 (0.82) (3.70) (1.89) (3.63) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0245*** -0.0158*** -0.0155*** -0.0118*** 
 (-8.76) (-6.28) (-6.63) (-4.80) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0433*** -0.0308*** -0.0158** -0.0368*** 
 (-4.65) (-3.48) (-1.99) (-4.48) 
LOSSit-1 0.0184*** 0.0222*** 0.0147*** 0.0188*** 
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 (6.14) (8.08) (5.75) (7.01) 
LABINTit-1 -0.2713*** -0.1710*** -0.0861* -0.1674*** 
 (-4.17) (-3.30) (-1.67) (-2.81) 
INVESTit 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0002* 0.0003 
 (1.13) (1.89) (1.70) (1.64) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.2020*** 0.2515*** 0.2118*** 0.2072*** 
 (7.21) (8.38) (8.25) (7.63) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0534*** 0.0351*** 0.0416*** 0.0417*** 
 
(5.37) (3.51) (4.64) (4.38) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0792*** 0.0810*** 0.0730*** 0.0768*** 
 (10.97) (11.54) (11.85) (11.79) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0602 -0.0486 -0.0505 -0.0598* 
 (-1.60) (-1.41) (-1.54) (-1.80) 
     
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 46,761 46,761 46,761 46,761 
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.097 0.089 0.087 
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This table presents the results from regressing alternative measures of abnormal net hiring on real earnings smoothing 
(RES_COMBINED) and real earnings management (REM_COMBINED) over the period between 1995 and 2016. Columns 1 shows the 
results of regression using the alternative abnormal net hiring is based on Cella (2009). Column 2 shows the results of regression using 
the alternative abnormal net hiring is based on Biddle (2009). Column 3 shows the results of regression using the alternative abnormal 
net hiring is based on augmented Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). Column4 shows the results of regression using the alternative abnormal net 
hiring based on Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) with both year and industry fixed effect. 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.  





5.4 Alternative Channels and Potential Mechanical Relationship 
 
So far, the robustness tests confirm that the main results are not driven by the 
relation between real earnings adjustment and other contemporaneous non-labor 
investment and are robust to various alternative proxies for labor investment 
efficiency. The results show that real earnings management is positively associated 
with abnormal net hiring (i.e., lower labor investment efficiency) whereas real earnings 
smoothing is negatively associated with abnormal net hiring, indicating that real 
earnings smoothing mitigating market frictions that stem from information asymmetry 
between managers and outside capital suppliers whereas real earnings management 
has the opposite effect.  
However, a potential alternative channel may exist if earnings manipulation via 
real activities has an immediate consequence on labor investment and, as a result, a 
mechanical relationship may exist between real earnings management and labor 
investment. By the definition of three measures of real earnings management 29 , 
abnormal cash flow from operations (REM_ABCFO) can be the result of firms 
temporarily boosting sales volumes by offering more lenient credit terms and price 
discounts to boost current period earnings; abnormal production costs (REM_PROD) 
can be the results of firms reducing the cost of goods sold by overproducing to 
increase earnings; and discretionary expenses (REM_DEXP) can be the result of 
firms lowering their discretionary expenses (e.g., R&D expenditure, advertising 
expenditure, and SG&A expenses) to increase earnings. Among three measures of 
real earnings management, boosting current period earnings via abnormal cash flow 
                                                          
29  Abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (REM_ABCFO), production costs 
(REM_PROD) and discretionary expenses (REM_DEXP). 
209 
 
from operations (REM_ABCFO) by offering more lenient credit terms and price 
discounts, or via discretionary expenses (REM_DEXP) by reducing discretionary 
expenses can be less relevant to labor investment and employment decisions. 
However, real earnings management via overproduction can be highly associated 
with labor investment and may have a more direct influence on a firm’s hiring and 
firing. In fact, I find that both the coefficient and significance level of REM_PROD is 
the largest among three forms of real earnings management for labor investment 
efficiency in the column 3 of Table 4. Firms can overproduce to spread their fixed 
overhead costs over more units and therefore reduce fixed costs per unit. As long as 
the reduction in fixed costs per unit is not offset by any increases in marginal cost per 
unit, the total cost per unit decreases, which further leads to lower cost of goods sold 
(COGS) but higher operating margins and earnings.  
One potential alternative channel could be that firms engaging real earnings 
management via overproduction may require more labor force to deliver 
overproduction, therefore resulting in the actual net hiring exceeds the expected 
amount (i.e., labor overinvestment). Alternatively, real earnings management 
overproduction can also incur high production costs and further contribute to higher 
annual production costs relative to sales, and lower cash flows from operation, which 
constrains a firm’s financial ability and operational flexibility to invest in labor efficiently 
and leads to labor underinvestment30. In the cases above, the consequence of real 
earnings management via overproduction directly influence labor investment 
efficiency instead of via the financing frictions, hence information asymmetry between 
managers and outside capital suppliers lose their relevance for labor investment. 
One of the consequences of overproduction can be an abnormal inventory 
increase. To substantiate this potential channel, I follow Hamm et al. (2018) who 
                                                          
30 In untabulated results, I find real earnings management via overproduction is positively 
associated with both labor over- and underinvestment. 
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examine the influence of labor union on inventory stockpiling and adopt two abnormal 
inventory measures in addition to the overproduction proxy (REM_PROD): (1). the 
abnormal portion of inventory relative to its 3-digit industry-year median value 
(AB_INVENTORY1); (2). the abnormal inventory level calculated as residual from the 
cross-sectional inventory holdings expectation model (AB_INVENTORY2). I estimate 
model below for every 3-digit industry and year with a minimum of 10 observation:  
 
INVTit/ATit-1 = β1(1/ATit−1) + β2(ΔSALEit/ATit−1) + β3(ΔSALEit-1/ATit−1) + β4([INVT – 
SALE]it-1/ATit−1) + β5([INVT-SALE]it-1/ATit−1) + εit     (8) 
     
In the tests for both abnormal inventory measures, I find that overproduction 
(abnormal inventory stockpiling) is positively associated with abnormal net hiring. The 
results suggest that real earnings management via overproduction (inventory 
stockpiling) can have direct influence on abnormal net hiring. I provide the results in 
Appendix B-3.  
Even though real earnings management may have direct consequences for 
labor investment, it does not preclude that real earnings adjustments influence labor 
investment efficiency via the market friction stemming from the information asymmetry 
between managers and outside capital suppliers because these two channels do not 
have to be mutually exclusive. First, abnormal cash flow from operations 
(REM_ABCFO) by temporarily boosting sales volumes owing to more lenient credit 
terms and price discounts, and lowering discretionary expenses (REM_DEXP) (e.g., 
R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure, and SG&A expenses) are less associated 
with direct change in labor force, which largely precludes the possibility that real 
earnings management via abnormal cash flow and discretionary expenditure have a 
direct influence on labor investment. In column 2 and 4 of Table 4, the results indicate 
that REM_ABCFO and REM_DEXP are still significant and positively associated with 
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abnormal net hiring, indicating that information asymmetry still can be the channel via 
which real earnings adjustments influence labor investment efficiency. Second, to 
preclude the possibility that real earnings management directly influences labor 
investment, I replace the real earnings smoothing with two accrual-based earnings 
smoothing because accrual-based earnings smoothing does not manipulate real 
transactions to distort earnings and therefore does not have immediate real 
consequences on labor investment. Following Tucker and Zarowin (2006), the first 
earnings smoothing measure, ES_ACCTZ, is the negative of the correlation between 
the change in discretionary accruals (DAP) and the pre-managed earnings (PDI = NI 
– DAP) as calculated in Tucker and Zarowin (2006). The second measure of earnings 
smoothing is ES_ACCFR which is the volatility of income with respect to the volatility 
of cash flows, calculated at the annual level over rolling five-year windows from t-5 to 
t-1 (Francis et al., 2004; Gao and Zhang, 2015; McInnis, 2010). The more smoothing 
indicates more variability of cash flows with respect to the variability of income. Hence 
the higher ratio would signify a smoother income stream. The results in Table 11 show 
that two accrual-based earnings smoothing are negatively associated with abnormal 
net hiring, which supports the notions that it is earnings smoothing that reduces 
information asymmetry and also precludes the possibility that the claimed relationship 
is solely driven by the immediate consequences of real earnings management. Third, 
in order to control for the direct influence of real earnings management and other 
omitted variables on labor investment. I also include prior year’s change of employee 
(EMP_CH) as an additional control. After the inclusion of employee change, I find the 
results are still similar. I report the results in the next section (Section 5.5: Additional 
Control Variables).  
Overall, the association between real earnings management and labor 
investment efficiency can be also partially driven by the real consequences of real 
earnings management via overproduction on corporate labor investment in addition 
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to information asymmetry channels. The results of robustness tests show that these 
two channels are not mutually exclusive and the direct consequence of 
overproduction does not preclude the information asymmetry channels via which real 





The Effect of Accrual-Based Earnings Smoothing on 








ES_ACCTZit-1 -0.0091***  
 (-3.30)  
ES_ACCFRit-1  -0.0039*** 
  (-6.02) 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0142*** 0.0148*** 
 (5.62) (5.80) 
MTBit-1 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (3.68) (3.69) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0130*** -0.0133*** 
 (-2.62) (-2.68) 
LIQit-1 0.0077*** 0.0077*** 
 (9.18) (9.16) 
LEVit-1 0.0201*** 0.0196*** 
 (4.08) (3.97) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0126*** -0.0122*** 
 (-5.09) (-4.94) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0366*** -0.0378*** 
 (-4.36) (-4.52) 
LOSSit-1 0.0197*** 0.0181*** 
 (7.38) (6.73) 
LABINTit-1 -0.1840*** -0.1822*** 
 (-3.05) (-2.98) 
INVESTit 0.0003 0.0003 
 (1.63) (1.63) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.2182*** 0.2303*** 
 (7.91) (8.25) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0399*** 0.0378*** 
 (4.12) (3.90) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0787*** 0.0785*** 
 (11.89) (11.84) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0507 -0.0510 
 (-1.52) (-1.53) 
 
  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
N 46,761 46,761 
Adjusted R2 8.4% 8.4% 
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This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net 
hiring on accrual-based earnings smoothing and other control 
variables. ES_ACCTZ, is the negative of the correlation 
between the change in discretionary accruals and the pre-
managed earnings as calculated in Tucker and Zarowin 
(2006). ES_ACCFR is the volatility of income with respect to 
the volatility of cash flows, calculated at the annual level over 
rolling five-year windows from t-5 to t-1 (Francis et al., 2004; 
Gao and Zhang, 2015; McInnis, 2010). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based 
on the standard error adjusted by a one-dimensional cluster at 




5.5 Additional Control Variables 
 
I further test if the main results are robust by considering several additional 
control variables for the baseline regression model. First, as mentioned in the last 
section, I include prior year’s change of employee (EMP_CH) as an additional control 
for the direct influence of real earnings management and other omitted variables on 
labor investment. I find the results are similar after the inclusion of employee change 
and the results are shown in column 1 of Table 12. Second, Jung et al. (2014) find 
that high earnings quality improves labor investment efficiency. Therefore, I first 
control for earnings quality (FRQ) as calculated in Dechow and Dichev (2002), a 
measure of accruals quality determined by the extent to which working capital 
accruals map into operating cash flow realizations. Specifically, the model of Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) is a regression of working capital accruals on on-year-lagged, 
current and one-year-ahead cash flows from operations, the change in revenue and 
property, plant and equipment. The residuals from the model provide an inverse 
measure of accounting quality based on the portion of current accruals that do not 
map into operating cashflow realizations. The FRQ is defined as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from of the model for firm I over the years t-5 to t-1. I multiply 
FRQ by -1 so that it increases with accounting quality. Results showed in Table 12 
column 2. Consistent with Jung et al. (2014), I find high earnings quality reduces 
abnormal net hiring and therefore facilitates more efficient labor investment. The main 
results still hold after the inclusion of earnings quality as an additional control variable. 
I also use the absolute value of discretionary accrual (AB_DISC) that is estimated by 
using the performance-adjusted modified Jones model suggested in Kothari et al. 
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(2005) as the alternative for earnings quality. In untabulated results, I find similar 
results.  
Third, I add managerial ability (MABILITY) as an additional control to the primary 
model because managerial ability can potentially affect both accounting choices and 
labor investment. The managerial ability proxy is from Demerjian et al. (2012) and I 
obtain the managerial ability data from Demerjian personal website. Results in the 
column 3 of Table 12 show that our results remain qualitatively similar after include 
manager ability. Fourth, I add institutional ownership (INSOWN) as additional control 
and I did not include institutional ownership in the primary model to avoid additional 
sample attrition. Fifth, I further control for the operating cycle (OPERCYC) to take the 
potential influence of the operating cycle on firms’ investment. Relevant results for 
including INSOWN and OPERCYC are shown in Table 12 column 4 and 5. Finally, 
Table 12 column 6 shows the results with all the additional control variables included. 
Table 11 reveals that the main results are persistent across all columns, ensuring that 
the main results are robust for considering a variety of additional controls.  
Taken together, the robustness tests above confirm the main results that 
real earnings smoothing activities effectively reduce abnormal net hiring and increase 
labor investment efficiency whereas real earnings management activities deteriorate 



















RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0113*** -0.0092*** -0.0089*** -0.0090*** -0.0091*** -0.0075*** 
 (-5.44) (-4.46) (-4.19) (-4.24) (-4.25) (-3.53) 
REM_COMBINEDit-1 0.0133*** 0.0150*** 0.0129*** 0.0137*** 0.0142*** 0.0141*** 
 (5.30) (5.93) (4.42) (4.69) (4.85) (4.86) 
MTBit-1 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0015*** 
 (3.57) (3.70) (3.70) (3.59) (3.63) (3.50) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0153*** -0.0117** -0.0087 -0.0043 -0.0093* -0.0042 
 (-3.06) (-2.35) (-1.55) (-0.68) (-1.67) (-0.64) 
LIQit-1 0.0075*** 0.0077*** 0.0063*** 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0065*** 
 (8.96) (9.17) (7.85) (7.91) (7.81) (8.01) 
LEVit-1 0.0190*** 0.0153*** 0.0061 0.0064 0.0058 0.0027 
 (3.85) (3.15) (1.07) (1.13) (1.01) (0.48) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0118*** -0.0121*** -0.0120*** -0.0128*** -0.0119*** -0.0124*** 
 (-4.77) (-4.88) (-4.49) (-4.70) (-4.46) (-4.58) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0390*** -0.0380*** -0.0406*** -0.0402*** -0.0346*** -0.0369*** 
 (-4.65) (-4.55) (-4.51) (-4.44) (-3.74) (-3.98) 
LOSSit-1 0.0193*** 0.0167*** 0.0178*** 0.0179*** 0.0179*** 0.0163*** 
 (7.11) (6.16) (6.23) (6.25) (6.22) (5.66) 
LABINTit-1 -0.1647*** -0.1818*** -0.2248** -0.2290** -0.2216** -0.2192** 
 (-2.79) (-3.01) (-2.28) (-2.31) (-2.25) (-2.20) 
INVESTit 0.0003 0.0003 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 
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 (1.64) (1.63) (5.73) (5.74) (5.77) (5.77) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.2018*** 0.1787*** 0.0755** 0.0719** 0.0714** 0.0478 
 (7.37) (6.48) (2.52) (2.39) (2.40) (1.60) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0429*** 0.0381*** 0.0380*** 0.0369*** 0.0422*** 0.0399*** 
 (4.45) (3.97) (3.59) (3.51) (3.99) (3.80) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0785*** 0.0784*** 0.0712*** 0.0713*** 0.0711*** 0.0703*** 
 (11.90) (11.89) (8.93) (8.95) (9.03) (8.89) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0473 -0.0520 -0.0391 -0.0381 -0.0380 -0.0344 
 (-1.41) (-1.56) (-1.08) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-0.95) 
EMP_CHit-1 0.0018***     0.0015** 
 (2.73)     (2.10) 
FRQit-1  0.0679***    0.0627*** 
 
 (5.30)    (3.87) 
MABILITYit-1   -0.0186   -0.0263** 
 
  (-1.57)   (-2.16) 
INSOWNit-1    -0.0075*  -0.0059 
 
   (-1.79)  (-1.34) 
OPERCYCit-1     0.0058* 0.0059* 
 
    (1.78) (1.79) 
       
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 46,761 46,761 35,508 35,508 35,508 35,508 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.085 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.140 
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This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on real earnings management (REM_COMBINED) and real 
earnings smoothing (RES_COMBINED) including additional control variables over the period between 1995 and 2016.  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  










In this paper, I investigate the influence of real earnings management and real 
earnings smoothing on corporate labor investment efficiency. On the one hand, 
previous accounting studies have largely focused on accrual-based earnings 
adjustments and paid little attention to real earnings adjustments albeit these are more 
pervasive in practice (Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984). On the other hand, 
previous financial literature on market frictions and investment efficiency mainly 
focuses on capital investment efficiency, overlooking the significance and importance 
of labor adjustments costs. We, therefore, contribute to both streams of literature on 
real earnings adjustments and investment efficiency by extending accrual-based to 
real activity-based earnings adjustments, as well as extending capital investment 
efficiency to labor investment efficiency.  
Using a sample of 46,761 U.S. firm-year observations that represent more than 
5,600 individual firms over the period of 1995 to 2016, I provide strong evidence that 
real earnings smoothing is significantly associated with lower abnormal net hiring, 
suggesting that real earnings smoothing improves labor investment efficiency. I 
further find that the positive relation between real earnings smoothing and labor 
investment efficiency is primarily driven by the informational component rather than 
the garbling component of real earnings smoothing. In contrast to real earnings 
smoothing, I find that the real earnings management activities significantly hamper 
corporate labor investment efficiency. The results indicate that these two vital types 
of real earnings adjustments are two distinctive accounting choices.  
In additional analyses, I find that the effect of real earnings smoothing in 
diminishing abnormal net hiring holds for both labor overinvestment and 
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underinvestment regardless of the period of expected expansion and expected 
contraction. I also investigate the effect of financial constraints on the relationship 
between real earnings smoothing and labor investment efficiency and show that the 
informational effect of real earnings smoothing on labor investment efficiency is more 
pronounced for the firms with higher levels of financial constraints. Particularly, I find 
that financially constrained firms with equity-based financing incentives have stronger 
incentives to engage real earnings smoothing to lower the information asymmetry 
between themselves and outside capital suppliers for financing purposes whereas 
debt-focused constrained firms may use real earnings smoothing as an earnings 
manipulation tool and lead to a deterioration in labor investment efficiency. Finally, 
the results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks and continue to hold when I 
consider the possible interrelationship between labor and other investments and 
control for other potential determinants of labor investment.  
Taken together, this paper provides insights into the adverse effect of real 
earnings management but positive effect of real earnings smoothing on labor 
investment efficiency, highlighting that distinctive real activities adjustments can have 
different consequences and implications for corporate employment decisions and 
investment policies. The sign reversal between real earnings smoothing and real 
earnings management may be of interest to both scholars and practitioners and 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
6.1.1 CSR and Earnings Management 
 
This first study of my Ph.D. (i.e., Chapter 3) extends the literature on CSR by 
investigating how firms practicing CSR respond differently from other firms in their 
financial reporting in the context of changing regulatory regimes by considering the 
passage of SOX in 2002. The prior literature provide mixed findings on the relationship 
between CSR and financial reporting quality with some literature supporting the 
transparent hypothesis (Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012) and some 
studies supporting the opportunistic use of CSR from agency cost perspective (Chih 
et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008). The paper does not aim to declare a victor in this long-
standing debate. The study examines the relationship of CSR with accrual-based 
earnings management and real activities manipulation in the context of SOX. The 
study uses 15,844 firm-year observations over the period of 1993 to 2015 and 
generates several findings. First, the study finds that firms with higher CSR 
engagement are more likely to conduct aggressive accrual-based earnings 
management prior to the passage of SOX whereas the passage of SOX significantly 
lowers the aggressiveness of accrual-based earnings management. Moreover, the 
findings of the study also show that the relationship between CSR and accrual-based 
earnings management is moderated by the manager-shareholder incentive alignment. 
Particularly, firms practicing CSR with low alignment are more likely to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management and therefore receive more constraining effect 
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by regulatory scrutiny imposed by the passage of SOX. In terms of real activities 
manipulation, the study finds that firms with better CSR performance are less likely to 
engage in real earnings management strategy in the pre- and post-SOX period. The 
findings indicate that when facing the trade-off between accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management, firms with higher CSR engagement are 
more likely to engage in the earnings management that is less costly. Overall, the 
findings suggest socially responsible firms present more transparent financial 
reporting practices in the post-SOX period.  
 
6.1.2 Employee-Friendly Treatment and Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
In the second study of my Ph.D. (i.e., Chapter 4), I examine the influence of 
employee treatment on labor investment efficiency and its implications for firm 
performance. This study uses a large sample of U.S. firms over the period of 1995 to 
2015 and provides several main findings. The first finding is that employee-friendly 
treatment is significantly associated with lower deviations of labor investment from the 
level justified by economic fundamentals, i.e., higher labor investment efficiency. I find 
employee-friendly treatment reduces both overinvestment and underinvestment, 
primarily via effective hiring rather than retention. The second finding of the study is 
that labor investment efficiency is associated with improved labor productivity, return 
on assets and production efficiency, and employee-friendly policies contribute to both 
return on assets and production efficiency. I further follow Lins et al (2017) and use 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis as an external shock and apply DID method, the finding 
of the study shows that employee-friendly firms have higher labor investment 
efficiency in the post-financial crisis period, but experience more inefficient labor 
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investment during the crisis. The findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests 
and continue to hold when I adopt instrumental variables estimation, PSM, alternative 
measures for both employee treatment and labor investment efficiency, or include 
additional control variables. I have followed previous research in the selection of 
sensitivity tests but I additionally use firm-fixed effects, rather than the more usual 
industry fixed effects. The use of non-labor social dimensions as a placebo test also 
confirms employee-friendly treatment as a plausible indicator of labor investment 
efficiency as I do not find any significant results on other non-labor social dimensions. 
The findings of the study suggest that employee treatment policies have 
influential implications for employment decisions and the allocation of resources, 
which highlights the importance of employee-friendly treatment in contributing to firms’ 
investment behavior, efficiency and value creation. Therefore, in a broad sense, the 
study also speaks to the literature about stakeholder relationship, employee welfare 
and corporate investment policies, and relevant legislation regarding employment 
policies. 
 
6.1.3 Real Earnings Adjustments and Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
In the third study of my Ph.D. (i.e., Chapter 5), I investigate the impact of real 
earnings management and real earnings smoothing on corporate employment 
decisions. The study uses a large sample of U.S. firms from 1995 to 2016 and 
suggests that real earnings management is significantly associated with lower labor 
investment efficiency (i.e., higher deviations of labor investment from the level justified 
by economic fundamentals) whereas real earnings smoothing significantly improves 
labor investment efficiency. The findings are consistent with the notion that real 
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earnings smoothing alleviates market frictions that stem from information asymmetry 
between managers and outside capital suppliers while real earnings management has 
the opposite effect. The findings also indicate that the positive impact of real earnings 
smoothing on labor investment efficiency is mainly driven by the informational 
component rather than the garbling component of real earnings smoothing. In addition, 
the study finds that financially constrained firms with equity-based financing incentives 
are more likely to engage real earnings smoothing to lower the information asymmetry 
to obtain financing benefits whereas debt-focused constrained firms potentially adopt 
real earnings smoothing as an earnings manipulation tool.  
Overall, the sign reversal between real earnings management and real 
earnings smoothing for labor investment efficiency indicates distinctive implications of 
these two real earnings adjustments to capital market participants. By investigating 
the influence of real earnings adjustment on labor investment efficiency, my study 
responds to the important but under-explored areas of real earnings adjustments 
(Khurana et al., 2017; Lambert, 1984) and labor investment (Benmelech et al., 2011; 
Campello et al., 2010; Jung et al., 2014; Matsa, 2018).  
 
6.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Taken together, these studies investigate the interplay between CSR, financial 
reporting and corporate decision-making in labor investment. The findings as to the 
influence of CSR on financial reporting quality, the influence of employee-friendly 
policies and real earnings adjustments on labor investment efficiency contribute to the 
literature over the implications of stakeholder relationship and accounting information 
for firms’ decision-making and capital market participants.  
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The studies included in this thesis have highlighted several important research 
fields that research can potentially pursue in the future. As technology continues 
reshaping modern business environment, human capital can be one of the most 
important sources for a firm’s competitive advantage and success. Previous studies 
in labor economics have already shown that labor has a fixed, or quasi-fixed cost 
component and labor frictions exist and related labor costs can be substantial, 
corporate labor investment and human capital development is important for firm 
survival and development. The fact that firms need external capital to finance their 
labor payments supports the notion that financial market imperfections (i.e., market 
friction, information asymmetry) can have a considerable impact on corporate 
employment decisions. Prior literature largely focuses on capital investment instead 
of labor investment and therefore little is known about the role that financial reporting 
behavior plays in affecting labor investment and its propagation. Hence, future 
research can also continue to seek the influence of accounting information, financial 
reporting environment on corporate employment decision-making and the relevant 
implications for capital market participants. Moreover, apart from the conventional 
hiring strategy, whereby each individual employee and their employers agree to an 
employment contract, firms may also obtain their human capital through alternative 
channels. For instance, acquisitions can be one of the alternatives to normal recruiting 
particularly when job seekers possess proprietary information (Chen et al., 2017; 
Paige Ouimet, 2016). As the global economy is becoming more knowledge-based, it 
is also interesting to explore the interplay between skilled labor, trade secret 
protection, corporate decision-making, and the implications of new technology 
application (e.g., robots at work, artificial intelligence) on firm performance and capital 
market. For instance, one of my future studies investigates the impact of trade secrets 
protection on labor investment decisions. By exploiting the staggered adoption of the 
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by the U.S. state courts as an exogenous shock 
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that significantly reduces employee mobility, we employ a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) approach and find that the adoption of the IDD, on average, leads to higher 
deviation from the optimal employment level explained by the underlying economics 
(i.e., lower labor investment efficiency) for firms headquartered in that state, whilst the 
rejection of the previously adopted IDD results in lower deviation from the optimal 
employment level (i.e., higher labor investment efficiency). Further analyses show that 
the impact of the IDD adoption on labor investment decisions is primarily driven by 
firms’ overinvestment of labor, suggesting that firms strategically engage in building 
precautionary human capital reserves in response to the reduced talent mobility and 
consequently higher labor adjustment costs. The cross-sectional analyses show that 
the impact of the IDD adoptions on labor investment decisions is more pronounced 
for (1) firms in high-skill industries and (2) firms facing high levels of product market 
competition. Overall, my findings indicate that the trade secrets protection 
environment can be an influential determinant for labor investment practices and have 
implications for both policymakers and industry practitioners. 
Furthermore, given a large number of studies have substantially established 
the prominence of CSR and stakeholder relations in today’s business operation, 
investigating the influence of stakeholder relation on capital market and corporate 
decision-making also can be increasingly important (Buchanan et al., 2018; Lins et 
al., 2017). In particular, a large number of CSR programs are employee-related and 
the influence of employee-related dimension of CSR still can be a fruitful area for CSR 
research (Flammer and Luo, 2017; Matsa, 2018; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Given 
human capital can act strategically by choosing where to work and whether to quit 
their employment and join new employers, investigating the factors that facilitate the 
interest alignment between employees and employers can be an interesting research 
area. In addition to the burgeoning literature on pecuniary incentives (e.g., executives 
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compensation, employee stock option), future research can investigate the 
implications of relationship-based incentives (e.g., non-wage compensation) for firm 
performance. 
Finally, institutional investors and various other stakeholders have also pay 
particular attention to climate-change risk and certain capital market participants also 
take firms’ environmental performance, for instance, carbon emissions into their 
investment considerations (Eccles et al., 2014). While a certain number of accounting 
and finance studies suggest that capital markets use environmental disclosure in 
assessing firms’ environmental risk exposure (Barth and McNichols, 1994; Cormier 
and Magnan, 1997; Matsumura et al., 2014), there is still little research regarding the 
association between carbon emissions/environment policies, their disclosures and the 
relevant implications for capital market participants. Given the heightened interest and 
importance, I believe focusing on corporate environmental policies and green 
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Appendix A (Chapter 4: Do Employee-Friendly Firms Invest More Efficiently? 
Evidence from Employment Decisions) 
 
Variable  







Percentage change in the number of employees (EMP) from 
year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
SALESGROWTHit Percentage change in sales (REVT) in year t for firm i.  
ROAit Return on assets (NI / lag(AT)) in year t for firm i. 
ΔROAit Change in return on assets in year t for firm. 
RETURNit Total stock return during fiscal year t for firm i.  
SIZEit-1 
Natural log of market value (CSHO* PRCC_F) at the end of 
fiscal year t-1 for firm i. 
SIZE_Pit-1 Percentile rank of SIZEit-1 
LIQit-1 
Quick ratio ((CHE + RECT) / LCT) at the end of year t -1 for 
firm i.  
ΔLIQit-1 Percentage change in the quick ratio in year t for firm i.  
LEVit-1 
Leverage for firm I, measured as the sum of debt in current 
liabilities and total long-term debt (DLC + DLTT) at the end of 
year t-1, divided by year t-1 total assets.  
LOSSBINit-1 
There are five separate loss bins to indicate each 0.005 
interval of ROA from 0 to -0.025 in period t-1 for firm i. 





EMP_TREATit Employee treatment score from KLD database. 
MTBit-1 
Market-to-book ratio (CSHO * PRCC_F / SEQ) in year t-1 for 
firm i. 
DIVDit-1 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm paid dividends 
(DVPSPS_F) in year t-1. 
TANGIBLESit-1 Property, plant and equipment (PPENT) at the end of year t-1, 
divided by total assets at year t-1, for firm i. 
LOSSit-1 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm I had negative ROA for 
year t-1.  
LABINTit-1 Labor intensity, measured as the number of employees 




Abnormal other (nonlabor) investments, defined as the 
absolute magnitude of the residual from the following model: 
INVESTit = β0 + β1SALESGROWTHit-1 + εit, where INVEST 
is the sum of capital expenditure (CAPX), acquisition 
expenditure (AQC), and research and development 
expenditure (XRD), less cash receipts from the sale of 
property, plant, and equipment (SPPE), all scaled by lagged 
total assets.  
SD_CFOit-1 
Standard deviation of firm i's cash flows from operation 
(OANCF) from year t-5 to t-1.  
SD_SALESit-1 Standard deviation of firm i's sales from year t-5 to t-1.  
SD_NETHIREit-1 
Standard deviation of firm i's change in the number of 
employees from year t-5 to t-1.  






Employee productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of 
sales (REVT) divided by the number of employee (EMP). 
 
PRO_EFFit 
Firm-level production efficiency is firm-level production 
efficiency (Charnes et al. 1978; Demerjian et al. 2012), which 
measures the efficiency of a firm relative to the most efficient 
firm in the same industry estimated by data envelope analysis 
(DEA). DEA calculates a firm’s production efficiency and uses 
an optimization procedure to maximize the ratio of outputs to 
inputs. 
GOVERNANCEit-1 Corporate governance score from KLD database. 
 
Other Variables:  
BEST100it 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm is listed in Fortune 
magazine's list of the "100 best companies to work for" between 
1995 and 2012. 
ENVIRONMENTit-1 Environment score from KLD database.  
COMMUNITYit-1 Community score from KLD database. 
EMP_RELATIONit-1 Employee relation score from KLD database. 
DIVERSITYit-1 Diversity score from KLD database. 
PRODUCTit-1 Product score from KLD database. 
HUMAN_RIGHTSit-1 Human rights score from KLD database.  
AB_DISCit-1 
 
Discretionary accrual is estimated by using the performance-
adjusted modified Jones model suggested in Kothari et al. 
(2005). I estimate the model for every industry classified by two-
digit SIC code for each year and capture the residuals. The 
absolute value of discretionary accrual, AB_DISC, is used as the 
proxy for financial reporting quality. The large value of the 
absolute value of discretionary accrual, the lower level of 
financial reporting quality. I further multiply AB_DISC by -1 so 





Discretionary accrual is estimated by using the Dechow and 
Dichiev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) and 
Francis et al. (2005). I estimate the model for every industry 
classified by two-digit SIC code for each year and capture the 
residuals. I then compute the standard deviation of firm i's 
residuals over the years t-5 to t-1. I further multiply that standard 
deviation by -1 so that large value indicates higher-quality of 
financial reporting. 








Appendix 2: Employee treatment categories (KLD database) 
 
 
Category  Definition 
Strengths    
Union relations strength 
The company has taken exceptional steps to treat its 
unionized workforce fairly. 
Cash profit sharing 
The company has a cash profit-sharing program through 
which it has recently made distributions to a majority of its 
work force. 
Employee involvement 
The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or 
ownership through stock options available to majority of its 
employees; gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing of financial 
information, or participation in management decision making.  
Retirement benefits 
strength 
The company has a notably strong retirement benefits 
program. 
Work/life benefits 
The company has outstanding employee benefits or other 
programs addressing work/family concerns (e.g., childcare, 




Union relations concern The company has a history of notably poor union relations. 
Health and safety 
concern 
The company recently has either paid substantial fines or civil 
penalties for willful violations of employee health and safety 
standards, or has been otherwise involved in major health and 
safety controversies. 
Workforce reductions 
The company has made significant reductions in its workforce 
in recent years. 
Retirement benefits 
concern 
The company has either a substantially underfunded defined 
benefit pension plan, or an inadequate retirement benefits 
program. 
Other concern The company is involved in an employee relations controversy 








Appendix 3, Panel  A: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables in Model 1 









Variable              
NET_HIREit 96,221 0.091 0.028 0.349  -0.050 0.149 
SALESGROWTHit 96,221 0.187 0.078 0.634  -0.032 0.233 
SALESGROWTHit-1 96,221 0.256 0.092 0.812 -0.019 0.266 
ΔROAit 96,221 0.004 0.006 0.190 -0.038 0.044 
ΔROAit-1 96,221 -0.000 0.006 0.212 -0.038 0.045 
ROAit 96,221 -0.032 0.032 0.258 -0.054 0.083 
RETURNit 96,221 0.146 0.002  0.801 -0.294 0.328 
SIZEit-1 96,221 5.615 5.524  2.222 3.971 7.138 
LIQit-1 96,221 2.121 1.265 2.584 0.770 2.343 
ΔLIQit-1 96,221 0.243 -0.000 1.182 -0.208 0.256 
ΔLIQit 96,221 0.106 -0.021 0.823 -0.229 0.202 
LEVit-1 96,221 0.256 0.195 0.282 0.025 0.378 
    
 
  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 96,221 firm-year observations over the 
period between 1991 and 2016. This table presents the number of observations, the mean, 
the median, the standard deviation, and the values for the first and the third quartile for all 





Appendix 3, Panel B: Regression Results  






SALESGROWTHit + 0.2157*** 
  (46.87) 
SALESGROWTHit-1 + 0.0255*** 
  (10.66) 
ROAit + 0.1474*** 
  (17.68) 
ΔROAit - -0.2384*** 
  (-23.52) 
ΔROAit-1 + 0.0407*** 
  (4.95) 
RETURNit + 0.0414*** 
  (22.94) 
SIZE_Pit-1 + 0.0478*** 
  (10.85) 
LIQit-1 + 0.0069*** 
  (10.76) 
ΔLIQit +/- -0.0089*** 
  (-4.33) 
ΔLIQit-1 + 0.0225*** 
  (14.63) 
LEVit-1 +/- -0.0101* 
  (-1.91) 
LOSSBIN1it-1 - -0.0230*** 
  (-2.96) 
LOSSBIN2it-1 - -0.0386*** 
  (-5.37) 
LOSSBIN3it-1 - -0.0312*** 
  (-3.75) 
LOSSBIN4it-1 - -0.0262*** 
  (-3.16) 
LOSSBIN5it-1 - -0.0365*** 
  (-4.34) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes 
N  96,211 
Adjusted R2  21.4% 
   
This table presents the results from regressing the percentage change in 
employees on variables capturing underlying economic fundamentals over the 




Appendix 4: The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring and the Effect of Employee Treatment and Abnormal Net 










































       
EMP_TREAT  -0.0203***  -0.0136  0.0032*  0.0343*** 
 
 (-2.60)  (-0.83)  (1.71)  (5.19) 
AB_NETHIRE    -0.1079***  -0.0367***  -0.0132* 
    (-3.74)  (-3.80)  (-1.68) 
EMP_TREAT_STATE 0.7252***  0.6935***  0.6935***  0.6088***  
 (11.52)  (13.12)  (13.12)  (8.28)  
EMP_TREAT_IND 0.8701***   0.8279***   0.8279***  0.8477***  
 (13.21)  (15.30)  (15.30)  (14.90)  
  
       
  
       
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 18,428 18,428 13,565 13,565 13,565 13,565 12,064 12,064 
Adjusted R2 51.2% 35.6% 54.8% 94.0% 54.8% 65.5% 54.8% 73.9% 
 
 
       
First-stage F-statistic 23.96  36.70  36.70  25.95  
First stage Cragg-Donald 
F-test statistics 
777.64  1045.47  1045.47  776.20  
248 
 
First-stage Cragg and 


















This table presents the results from instrumental variable regressions that control for the the endogeneity of employee treatment. We employ 
two instruments: (1) the mean of the employee treatment score of firms having headquarters located in the same state 
(EMP_TREAT_STATE) and (2) the mean of the employee treatment score in year t of all firms belonging to firm i’s 2-digit SIC code 
(EMP_TREAT_INDUSTRY). Section (1) presents the GMM estimation results for Model 2 of the study to test the relationship between 
employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE). Section (2) to Section (5)  present the GMM estimation results 
for Model 3 of the study to test the impact of employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on employee 
productivity, profitability and production efficiency (SALES, ROA and PRO_EFF). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  




Appendix 5: The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring and the Effect of Employee Treatment and Abnormal Net 










































       
EMP_TREAT  -0.0207***  -0.0177  0.0029*  0.0340*** 
 
 (-2.64)  (-1.05)  (1.72)  (5.12) 
AB_NETHIRE    -0.1161***  -0.0363***  -0.0131* 
    (-3.87)  (-3.75)  (-1.67) 
EMP_TREAT_STATE 0.7252***  0.6935***  0.6935***  0.6088***  
 (11.52)  (13.12)  (13.12)  (8.28)  
EMP_TREAT_IND 0.8701***   0.8279***   0.8279***  0.8477***  
 (13.21)  (15.30)  (15.30)  (14.90)  
  
       
  
       
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 18,428 18,428 13,565 13,565 13,565 13,565 12,064 12,064 
Adjusted R2 51.2% 35.6% 54.8% 94.0% 54.8% 65.5% 54.4% 73.9% 
 
 
       
First-stage F-statistic 23.96  36.70  36.70  25.95  
First stage Cragg-Donald 
F-test statistics 
777.64  1045.47  1045.47  776.20  
250 
 
First-stage Cragg and 


















This table presents the results from instrumental variable regressions that control for the the endogeneity of employee treatment. We 
employ two instruments: (1) the mean of the employee treatment score of firms having headquarters located in the same state 
(EMP_TREAT_STATE) and (2) the mean of the employee treatment score in year t of all firms belonging to firm i’s 2-digit SIC code 
(EMP_TREAT_INDUSTRY). Section (1) presents the LIML estimation results for Model 2 of the study to test the relationship between 
employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE). Section (2) to Section (5)  present the LIML estimation 
results for Model 3 of the study to test the impact of employee treatment (EMP_TREAT) and abnormal net hiring (AB_NETHIRE) on 
employee productivity, profitability and production efficiency (SALES, ROA and PRO_EFF). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  






































Firm Fixed Effect Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
N 4,814 
Adjusted R2 20.3% 
  
This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on alternative 
employee treatment measured as ASSET4 database over the period between 1998 
and 2012. 
  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 






Appendix 7: The Effect of Employee Treatment on Abnormal Net Hiring for 















EMP_TREATit -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0060*** -0.0066*** 
 (-3.22) (-3.16) (-2.75) (-3.17) 
MTBit-1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.51) (0.50) (0.41) (0.49) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0961*** -0.0867*** -0.0724*** -0.0931*** 
 (-3.44) (-3.12) (-2.59) (-3.28) 
LIQit-1 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0082*** 0.0093*** 
 (4.69) (4.67) (4.06) (4.71) 
LEVit-1 0.0340*** 0.0351*** 0.0337*** 0.0341*** 
 (3.14) (3.26) (3.02) (3.14) 
DIVDit-1 0.0066 0.0076 0.0084 0.0068 
 (1.08) (1.24) (1.31) (1.11) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0604** -0.0670** -0.0751** -0.0671** 
 (-2.13) (-2.31) (-2.56) (-2.30) 
LOSSit-1 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0026 -0.0033 
 (-0.74) (-0.90) (-0.58) (-0.76) 
LABINTit-1 -1.9282** -1.8715** -1.7725* -1.9059** 
 (-2.09) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-2.04) 
INVESTit 0.3255*** 0.3174*** 0.3179*** 0.3177*** 
 (5.45) (5.31) (5.13) (5.26) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.0226 0.0078 -0.0052 0.0094 
 (0.35) (0.12) (-0.08) (0.14) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0118 0.0155 0.0083 0.0139 
 (0.61) (0.79) (0.41) (0.71) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 -0.1507*** -0.1547*** -0.1534*** -0.1519*** 
 (-8.28) (-8.20) (-7.97) (-8.06) 
UNIONit-1 0.0373 0.0427 0.0574 0.0447 
 (0.96) (1.09) (1.43) (1.15) 
GOVERNANCEit-1 -0.0011   -0.0004 
 (-0.50)   (-0.18) 
INST_INVESTORit-1 0.0464***   0.0446** 
 (2.68)   (2.52) 
AB_DISCit-1  -0.1069***  -0.1120*** 
  (-3.80)  (-3.98) 
DD_DISCit-1   -0.0020**  
   (-1.98)       
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20,296 20,178 19,065 19,893 
254 
 
Adjusted R2 25.8% 25.6% 24.8% 26.0% 
     
This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on employee 
treatment and additional control variables over the period between 1995 and 2015. 
  








Appendix 1: Description (COMPUSTAT data items in 
parentheses)   
Pinnuck and Lillies (2007)  Variables: 
NET_HIREit 
Percentage change in the number of employees (EMP) from 
year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
SALESGROWTHi
t 
Percentage change in sales (REVT) in year t for firm i.  
ROAit Return on assets (NI / lag(AT)) in year t for firm i. 
ΔROAit Change in return on assets in year t for firm. 
RETURNit Total stock return during fiscal year t for firm i.  
SIZEit-1 
Natural log of market value (CSHO* PRCC_F) at the end of 
fiscal year t-1 for firm i. 
SIZE_Pit-1 Percentile rank of SIZEit-1 
LIQit-1 
Quick ratio ((CHE + RECT) / LCT) at the end of year t -1 for 
firm i.  
ΔLIQit-1 Percentage change in the quick ratio in year t for firm i.  
LEVit-1 
Leverage for firm I, measured as the sum of debt in current 
liabilities and total long-term debt (DLC + DLTT) at the end of 
year t-1, divided by year t-1 total assets.  
LOSSBINit-1 
There are five separate loss bins to indicate each 0.005 interval 
of ROA from 0 to -0.025 in period t-1 for firm i. LOSSBIN1 is 





Negative one times the level of abnormal cash flows from 
operations following Roychowdhury (2006). 
REM_PRODit-1 
Level of abnormal production costs, where production costs 
are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change 
in inventories following Roychowdhury (2006). 
REM_DEXPit-1 
Negative one times the level of abnormal discretionary 
expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D 
expenses, advertising expenses and SG&A expenses 
following Roychowdhury (2006). 
REM_COMBINE
Dit-1 
Sum of real earnings management proxies, measured as 
RM_ABCFO + RM_PROD + RM_DEXP; Higher values 
indicate more real earnings management. 
RES_DEXPit-1 
A measure of real smoothing based on managerial discretion 
over the level of expense. 
RES_PRODit-1 
A measure of real smoothing based on managerial discretion 
over the level of production costs. 
RES_COMBINED
it-1 Sum of ES_DEXP and ES_PROD. 




Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm paid dividends 
(DVPSPS_F) in year t-1. 
TANGIBLESit-1 
Property, plant and equipment (PPENT) at the end of year t-1, 
divided by total assets at year t-1, for firm i. 
LOSSit-1 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if firm I had negative ROA for 
year t-1.  
LABINTit-1 
Labor intensity, measured as the number of employees divided 
by total assets at the end of year t-1 for firm i.  
INVESTit 
Abnormal other (nonlabor) investments, defined as the 
absolute magnitude of the residual from the following model: 
INVESTit = β0 + β1SALESGROWTHit-1 + εit, where INVEST is 
the sum of capital expenditure (CAPX), acquisition expenditure 
(AQC), and research and development expenditure (XRD), 
less cash receipts from the sale of property, plant, and 
equipment (SPPE) multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged total 
assets.  
SD_CFOit-1 
Standard deviation of firm i's cash flows from operation 
(OANCF) from year t-5 to t-1.  
SD_SALESit-1 Standard deviation of firm i's sales from year t-5 to t-1.  
SD_NETHIREit-1 
Standard deviation of firm i's change in the number of 
employees from year t-5 to t-1.  
UNIONit-1 Industry-level rate of labor unionization for year t-1. 
 
Other Variables:  
DELAYCONit-1 












Private-placement-focused constraints from Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015). 
ES_ACCTZit-1 
Discretionary accrual smoothing, following Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006). 
ES_ACCFRit-1 
Total accrual smoothing, following Francis et al (2004) and 
McInnis (2010). 
FRQit-1 
Discretionary accrual is estimated by using the performance-
adjusted modified Jones model suggested in Kothari et al. 
(2005). I estimate the model for every industry classified by 
two-digit SIC code for each year and capture the residuals. 
The absolute value of discretionary accrual, AB_DISC, is 
used as the proxy for financial reporting quality. The large 
value of the absolute value of discretionary accrual, the 
lower level of financial reporting quality. I further multiply 
AB_DISC by -1 so that large value of AB_DISC indicates 




Discretionary accrual is estimated by using the Dechow and 
Dichiev (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) and 
Francis et al (2005). I estimate the model for every industry 
classified by two-digit SIC code for each year and capture 
the residuals. I then compute the standard deviation of firm 
i's residuals over the years t-5 to t-1. I further multiply that 
standard deviation by -1 so that large value indicates higher-
quality of financial reporting. 
INST_INVESTORit
-1 
Institutional shareholders at the end of year t-1 for firm i. 
OPERACYCit-1 
The log of receivable to sales plus inventory to COGS 
multiplied by 360. 
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Appendix 2: The Effect of Real Earnings Smoothing on Stock Price Crash Risk  












   
 
RES_COMBINEDit-1 + 0.0305*** 0.0196*** 
  (3.69) (3.75) 
DTURNit-1 + 0.0698 0.0215 
  (1.26) (0.61) 
NCSKEWit-1 + 0.0267*** 0.0149*** 
  (4.48) (4.03) 
SIGMAit-1 + 0.5428*** 0.2335*** 
  (5.74) (4.73) 
RETit-1 + 0.0630*** 0.0330*** 
  (6.97) (6.86) 
SIZEit-1 + 0.0615*** 0.0353*** 
  (20.17) (18.72) 
MTBit-1 + 0.0135*** 0.0085*** 
  (9.41) (9.52) 
ROAit-1 +/- -0.1278*** -0.0993*** 
  (-3.93) (-5.19) 
LEVit-1 - -0.0767*** -0.0474*** 
  (-3.69) (-3.68) 
ABACCit-1 + -0.1463*** -0.0941*** 
  (-2.69) (-2.88) 
  
  
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
N  32,510 32,510 
Adjusted R2  4.2% 3.9% 
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This table presents the results from the replication of Khurana et al (2018). 
Following Kim et al (2011), two stock price crash risk measures are used. NCSKEW 
is the first measure for crash risk, which is the negative skewness of firm-specific 
weekly returns over the fiscal year. DUVOL is the second measure of crash risk, 
which is the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of firm-specific weekly returns 
on the down weeks (weeks with firm-specific weekly returns below the mean over 
the fiscal year) to the standard deviation on the up weeks (weeks with firm-specific 
weekly returns above the mean over the fiscal year). DTURN is the average 
monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year, minus the average monthly 
share turnover over the previous fiscal year, where monthly share turnover is 
calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by total number of shares 
outstanding during the month. SIGMA is the standard deviation of the firm-specific 
weekly return. RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year 
period, times 100. Size is natural log of total assets. MTB is market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity. LEV is the total long-term debts divided by total 
assets. ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
ABACC is absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals 
are residuals obtained by estimating the modified Jones (1991) model in Kothari et 
al (2005) in the cross section by 2-digit SIC year.  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 














AB_INVENTORY1it-1 0.1053***  
 (6.65)  
AB_INVENTORY2it-1  0.1657*** 
  (5.91) 
RES_COMBINEDit-1 -0.0120*** -0.0110*** 
 (-5.74) (-5.29) 
MTBit-1 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 
 (3.09) (3.21) 
SIZEit-1 -0.0017 -0.0128*** 
 (-0.33) (-2.58) 
LIQit-1 0.0087*** 0.0077*** 
 (9.93) (9.12) 
LEVit-1 0.0204*** 0.0215*** 
 (4.10) (4.30) 
DIVDit-1 -0.0109*** -0.0108*** 
 (-4.37) (-4.35) 
TANGIBLESit-1 -0.0226*** -0.0353*** 
 (-2.63) (-4.22) 
LOSSit-1 0.0228*** 0.0203*** 
 (8.38) (7.51) 
LABINTit-1 -0.1248** -0.1211** 
 (-2.23) (-2.20) 
INVESTit 0.0003* 0.0003* 
 (1.66) (1.65) 
SD_CFOit-1 0.1816*** 0.1822*** 
 (6.79) (6.82) 
SD_SALESit-1 0.0539*** 0.0528*** 
 (5.58) (5.50) 
SD_NETHIREit-1 0.0810*** 0.0788*** 
 (12.26) (11.88) 
UNIONit-1 -0.0499 -0.0465 
 (-1.49) (-1.39) 
 
  
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
N 46,761 46,761 
Adjusted R2 8.6% 8.6% 
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This table presents the results from regressing abnormal net hiring on abnormal 
inventory and other control variables. AB_INVENTORY1 is the abnormal portion of 
inventory relative to its 3-digit industry-year median value. AB_INVENTORY2 the 
abnormal inventory level calculated as residual from the cross-sectional inventory 
holdings expectation model in Hamm et al (2018). 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.001 levels.  
All test statistics and significance level are calculated based on the standard error 
adjusted by a one-dimensional cluster at the firm level. 
 
